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Shevardnadze Praises Treaty With Germany

LD1309141690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1257 GMT 13 Sep 90

[Excerpt] Moscow, 13 Sep (TASS)—USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze and FRG Foreign Minister H-D. Genscher initialed a treaty on good-neighborliness, partnership, and cooperation between the USSR and Germany in Moscow today.

In a speech on the occasion, the Soviet minister stressed that the treaty, initiated by USSR President M.S. Gorbachev and Federal Chancellor Kohl, heralds a new stage in Soviet-German relations. This is a momentous document in spirit and content. It is a charter for our life in the transition to the next millenium.

The initialed treaty, E.A. Shevardnadze pointed out, reflects the will and determination of both sides to look to the powerful and vital sourcs of the traditions of peaceful and fruitful cooperation between the Russian state, the Soviet Union and Germany.

The treaty determines anew relations on matters of security, ruling out the first use of armed forces against each other, and also the provision of military aid or other assistance to the aggressor, should the USSR or Germany become the target of aggression. It establishes the principles of strict respect for rights and interests, of fixing levels of defense sufficiency and of resolving controversial matters through consultation. Its aim is to develop the Helsinki process, to establish areas in Europe with laws, economies, cultures, and information in common. It steers toward a new quality of cooperation in the field of the economy, industry, ecology, science, and technology. Broad prospects are also opening up for the mutual enrichment of our peoples' cultures, for contacts between parliaments, parties, trade unions, young people, and social and humanitarian institutions and organizations. [passage omitted]

German Leaders Send Letter to Four Powers

LD1309133890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1205 GMT 13 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow, 13 Sep (TASS)—FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher and GDR Prime Minister Lothar de Maiziere on behalf of their respective governments, have sent a letter to the foreign ministers of the USSR, United States, Great Britain, and France, who took part in the work of the "two-plus-four" formula meeting on a final settlement regarding Germany.

The document distributed here notes that the joint statement of the governments of the FRG and GDR of 15 June 1990 on the settlement of unsolved property questions notes the "irreversibility of measures to confiscate property, undertaken on the basis of the rights and supremacy of the occupation powers (for 1945-1949). The governments of the Soviet Union and the GDR do not see any possibility of revising the measures taken then." The FRG Government takes note of this. It considers that the adoption of a final decision on any state measures of compensation should be left to the future all-German parliament.

The monuments to the victims of war and tyranny built on German soil, the letter says, "will be respected and be under protection of German laws." The same applies to military burial grounds, which will be preserved and looked after.

The preservation of the foundations of a free and democratic system, the document continues, "is protected by the Constitution in a united Germany." In particular, the Constitution envisages the possibility of banning parties which, judging by their goals or the actions of their supporters, work toward the erosion of liquidation of the foundations of a free and democratic system, and also organizations whose activity is directed against the constitutional order or the idea of mutual understanding of peoples. This also applies to parties and organizations with national-socialist objectives.

Concerning the treaties concluded by the GDR, their revision with the treaty partners is envisaged "from the viewpoint of the protection of the interests of the participant states and the contractual obligations of the FRG in order to settle or determine the continuation, amendment, or annulment of the said treaties." A united Germany will determine its own position concerning responsibility for the international legal treaties of the GDR after consultation with the relevant treaty partners and with the European Communities, in so far as their competences are involved.

Signing of German Unification Treaty Welcomed

PM1409082090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Sep 90 Second Edition p 4

["Viewpoint" by Aleksandr Stepanov: "Results and Expectations"]

[Text] The treaty on the final settlement regarding Germany signed by the six states' foreign ministers was the result of seven months' intensive work by politicians and diplomats. In this case the adjective "intensive" is no mere cliche. On the morning of 12 September, just a few hours before the official ceremony, rumors circulated among the journalists who had filled the Foreign Ministry press center: The signing is being delayed, they are looking for mutually acceptable formulas on certain military-political aspects... The particularly determined pessimists even predicted that the ceremony would be postponed to the next day. But as you already know, the journalists' expectations were not disappointed.

Nor were the hopes of the many millions of Germans seeking the unification of their homeland and its acquisition of full sovereignty. Not only has the date of unification been set but a national holiday has been declared, although Germany will not legally receive sovereignty until the new Bundestag ratifies the Moscow document—and there isn't a shadow of doubt there, of course.

So, the postwar period of 45 years has come to an end. The responsibility and concomitant rights of the four victorious powers are now a thing of the past. And the term "victor" itself will clearly disappear from the journalists' vocabulary, remaining the property of the historians. But some results of World War II, which transformed the political map of the Old World, are enshrined once more and with the utmost clarity by the document. In particular, the borders of the united Germany and its renunciation both now and henceforth of any territorial claims. Yet what passions seethed over this question back in the spring, when Poland demanded unambiguous guarantees of its western border from the FRG! Chancellor Kohl declined, arguing that this is the prerogative of the new united Germany and its state institutions. Then these guarantees were given anyway. A concession? Yes. But is there even one politician or diplomat in the world who achieves his goal without a single concession?..

That is also true of the changes in our position on questions of the German settlement. Four months ago, the USSR was opposed to the united Germany's membership of NATO, which in fact was the main stumbling block to an accord. Both in our country and abroad, of course, people understood that this approach was no whim or struggle for the prestige of our state. It was based on bitter historical experience, gained at an incredibly high price.

But clearly, the future cannot always be judged by the yardstick of the past, otherwise the past will firmly block the path to the future. Then we accepted the fact that it is not the formal sign—whether Germany belongs to NATO or not—that guarantees the future peace-loving nature of this new yet old state. Especially since the North Atlantic alliance has demonstrated a desire for change, too. The Warsaw Pact and NATO no longer regard one another as opponents and are ready not to resort to force or even the threat of force. There is a significant chance that the changes in the North Atlantic alliance's strategy will be positive in character.

But what about our old idea of a neutral Germany with a reduced level of armaments and armed forces? Clearly it turns out that although attractive it, too, is unrealizable, at any event in the real historical conditions. Incidentally, the armed forces of the united Germany—an economically powerful state with almost 80 million people—will be small in number by world standards—370,000 men. There is another very important factor—the renunciation of the production, possession, and disposal of weapons of mass destruction. And of course there is the solemn commitment of the GDR and FRG Governments that only peace will spring from German soil. All the aforementioned features are enshrined in the treaty which crowned work within the "two plus four" mechanism. "I think that we have managed to obtain all the necessary guarantees and commitments corresponding to the actual conditions and situation in Europe," USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze said at a press conference.

But what about our troops on the territory of the present-day GDR? They will remain in place until 1994. The terms of their presence and withdrawal will be settled separately by treaty. But it is envisaged that for our country there will be no additional material costs—and after the introduction of the West German Mark they could be very considerable. The FRG will accept the GDR's foreign economic obligations toward our country. Therefore, we shall have a powerful and reliable economic partner in the state that is being created in central Europe.

But the most important thing, in my view, the main result of German unification is the prospect that it offers for the all-European process. The main relic of the cold war—the bipolar system of forces and the division of Europe according to the bloc principle—is receding into the past, albeit not without a fight. At the beginning of October the CSCE foreign ministers will meet in New York and in November the Paris summit will be held within the CSCE framework. Germany will already be a united country there. United without the least military effort—can we cite many such examples in mankind's recent history? And this is convincing evidence that the common European home is no illusion. Building it will not be easy but as we can see it is possible. Just one thing is missing. All the European states must have enough desire to cooperate and ability to achieve mutually acceptable compromises. And of course, the most important thing—the aspiration to live peacefully and calmly in that home. And I think that we all have that, do we not?

TRUD Calls German Unity Start of 'New Era'

PM1309135590 Moscow TRUD in Russian 13 Sep 90 p 3

[Article by I. Belov and R. Puchkov: "Beginning of New Era: Talks on German Question Have Ended in Moscow"]

[Excerpts] Moscow, 12 Sep—The "two-plus-four" talks (involving the GDR, FRG, USSR, United States, Britain, and France) have covered a great distance in the past seven months: from the initial suggestions and proposals to the signing of an extraordinarily important document. The fact is that the state and legal unification of the FRG and the GDR has happened very quickly and seems to have spurred on the international legal process connected with that unification.

The decision on the holding of talks among the "Six" was made in February. The first stage of the current round of talks was held in Bonn in May. In June the six foreign ministers met in Berlin. In July they were joined in Paris by their Polish counterpart. And now the final stage—in Moscow.

The solution of the German question is of concern to millions of people everywhere. That is understandable. Given, for instance, the fact that German imperialism caused both world wars.

And now, when the divided Germany is being transformed into a single state, the peoples of the world, first and foremost in our country, which was victim of a devastating fascist invasion, are asking the fair question: Are there sufficient guarantees that it won't all happen again and that the united Germany will not again violate their peace and security? The unification of the GDR and the FRG has given rise to a host of problems, of course: social, economic, and political. But this is surely the main one.

In Moscow's Oktyabrskaya Hotel Wednesday the six ministers in the presence of USSR President Gorbachev signed the final document of the marathon "two-plus-four" talks which have lasted many months. Firm guarantees that Germany's neighbors will not suffer as a result of its unification are provided. [passage omitted]

As we learned from official representatives of the USSR Foreign Ministry, the "Treaty on Good-Neighborliness, Partnership, and Cooperation between the USSR and the FRG" (the united Germany will, it seems, preserve the state title of the FRG) is due to be initialed by foreign minister E.A. Shevardnadze and his West German counterpart H.-D. Genscher 13 September. This extensive 22-article document envisages a development and deepening of ties in all spheres of social life without exception which will be unprecedented in the two countries' history. One of the treaty's main provisions is worthy of note. It states that when developing bilateral relations the USSR and the FRG will place man, his dignity and rights, concern for mankind's survival, and the protection of the natural environment at the center of their policy.

Replying to a question from your TRUD correspondents, FRG Foreign Minister Genscher rated the treaty between the two countries as a "solid basis for the development of relations between our two countries which offers new prospects in good-neighborly relations between them."

Political Observer on German Reunification

LD1309162290 Moscow TASS in English 1518 GMT 13 Sep 90

[By TASS political observer Aleksandr Antsiferov]

[Text] Moscow September 13 TASS—Foreign ministers from the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, France, West Germany and the GDR, who took part in the "Two Plus Four" talks, can now sign with relief. In a breathtaking and dramatic race called the settlement of foreign aspects of German unity they managed to reach the finish in time and filfill their mission outlined seven months ago: to work out international legal terms for the restoration of the united and sovereign German state.

The treaty on the final settlement of the German problem, signed in Moscow on Wednesday, reflects the uniqueness of the situation mentioned by West German chancellor Helmut Kohl in his speech about the Moscow meeting of the six: "Obviously, the credit for it goes to all the participants in the talks who assumed constructive stands and displayed readiness for compromises and the will to find mutually acceptable solutions. However, it is also obvious that the main conditions paving the way to a peaceful and free reunification process, which is a rather complex one, are changes in Eastern Europe,a dramatic transformations in the Soviet Union and new political thinking of the leadershp of the USSR—the country that bore the brunt of the Second World War and might well be the least interested in the changing of the post-war status quo.

When speaking in Moscow at a press conference after the signing of the treaty, British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Douglas Hurd stressed that it was only just that the agreement settling once and for all all foreign aspects of German unity had been signed in Moscow. He believes that it is the Soviet policy of new thinking that was the key to the solution of the problem.

The fact that the Soviet Union did not hang this key on a nail, but used it for opening the way not only to the reunification of the two German states, but also to the creation of a new system of relationship of European nations is evidence of its goodwill and significant political courage, of its readiness to give up old schemes and stereotypes for the sake of the final goal—the creation of a single all-European home. The Soviet Union has every reason to expect from the future united Germany, and from the West in general, not only the statement of its services and the recognition of its role, but concrete steps aimed at the elimination of the still existing consequences of the "cold war" which is going down into the past, at consolidating and developing the achieved results.

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze said at the press conference that the treaty "reflects our notion of the constructive role and place to be held by the future Germany—in accordance with the treaty—in Europe late in the 20th century and early in the third millenium." Of course, much remains to be done for this notion to become a reality. The new treaty will replace the rights and responsibility of the four winning powers in German affairs. After coming into force, it will proclaim the responsibility of its of its signatories for the state and the direction of development of the affairs on the whole of the continent.

Future Soviet-German Economic Relations Viewed

AU1309121290 Duesseldorf HANDELSBLATT in German 13 Sep 90 p 3

["HB" report: "Soviet Citizens Hoping for German Help on the Road to Market Economy"]

[Text] Duesseldorf—The two-plus-four treaty might possibly not be ratified by the Soviet Parliament, the Supreme Soviet, before the beginning of next year. In the opinion of Anatoliy Blinov, Germany expert in the CPSU Central Committee International Department, there will not be enough time to have the treaty ratified by the people's deputies before the CSCE summit in early December.

As Blinov, who worked in Bonn for many years, also as deputy chief editor of the magazine SOWJETUNION HEUTE, said in an interview for HANDELSBLATT one can no longer proceed on the assumption that the deputies would "automatically" give their consent. Rather, the deputies's debate can be expected to take "many hours." As can be seen from the present discussion on economic reform in the Soviet Union, it can be expected that "not all deputies will be of the same opinion." However, Blinov does not see any likelihood or danger that the parliament will finally reject the treaty. However, the contents of the treaty also have to be first explained to the people's deputies since the two-plus-four negotiations were largely held in closed session.

Interest will probably focus on the things that can be expected from the united Germany, not only as a trading partner. "In the first place, the people here want to know what sort of state the new Germany will be, where it sees its political role—for example, the way it stops seeking the role of mediator between the United States and the Soviet Union."

Although, in his opinion, many Soviet citizens assess Germany's unification with mixed feelings—especially in view of the experiences of World War II—one can proceed on the assumption that the majority regards the development from an economic point of view; a considerable increase in economic relations is expected. Especially the young generation is now increasingly taking Western Europe as an example and is looking for "long-term" partners.

Blinov sees Moscow's agreement to the unification of Germany as the Soviet contribution to the dissolution of the military structures in Europe: "We are making our contribution to apartment-sharing in the European home, as Gorbachev would like to have his idea of the common European home understood." Blinov thinks that FRG Foreign Minister Genscher's proposal to establish a center for the prevention and avoidance of military conflicts in Berlin is an equally good example.

In Blinov's opinion, the problem of the return of the Volga Germans to their home territories will also be a topic of political consultations between the Soviet Union and the future all-German government. "In view of the large number of immigrants from other South European regions," the future Germany will "certainly be interested in preventing the Volga Germans from leaving the Soviet Union," he said. Rather, the effort "to improve the people's living conditions here" must be in the foreground; this might also include the idea of the creation of free trade zones.

United States & Canada

Baker Holds Talks in Moscow, Concludes Visit

Resumes Talks With Shevardnadze

LD1309112190 Moscow TASS in English 1037 GMT 13 Sep 90

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Konstantin Voytsekhovich and Aleksandr Kanishchev]

[Text] Moscow August [as received] 13 TASS—Talks between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker have just resumed in a Soviet Foreign Ministry mansion in central Moscow.

The ministers started their talks on Tuesday but broke them of on Wednesday to participate in the final "two plus four" meeting. The treaty on the final settlement with respect to Germany was signed during the meeting.

The heads of the foreign policy agencies of the USSR and the U.S. are expected to continue to discuss the working out of an agreement on the reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments in Europe. A Central American settlement may also be discussed. Both these questions have been debated by experts in Moscow in the past two days.

Before the beginning of the talks, Shevardnadze told reporters that the results of the work of the experts on questions of the reduction of conventional armaments in Europe will be summed up today.

Baker added that the discussion of the gulf crisis, of strategic offensive arms and some other problems will be continued.

The talks began a one-to-one conversation between Shevardnadze and Baker.

Views Gulf Crisis, Arms Talks

LD1309153190 Moscow TASS in English 1513 GMT 13 Sep 90

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Konstantin Voitsekhovich and Aleksandr Kanishchev]

[Text] Moscow September 13 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker today resumed discussions of the Gulf crisis in a bid to define more accurately the situation and international acts which can be taken in the situation that arises, a senior Soviet diplomat told TASS.

The diplomat emphasised that the ministers will discuss this problem, guided by the Helsinki agreements between the Soviet and U.S. presidents.

The diplomat said that the talks centre on problems of curbing conventional arms, primarily, "difficulties that arise in their settlement". The Vienna talks is a very urgent issue because the deadline, by which the agreements must be drafted, is very close. The CSCE meeting at summit level will be held on November 19, he said. Therefore both sides are trying to find "refreshing approaches" in dealing with relevant problems. The diplomat singled out aviation and troop levels among them stressing that "the point at issue is not concessions but a reasonable combination of the interests of both sides, considering the current circumstances".

"This is not to say that positions should be abandoned. I think that both sides will take certain steps," he added.

Commenting on Shevardnadze's statement at a news conference in Moscow on Wednesday [12 September] that the USSR was going to make fresh proposals at the Vienna talks in the next few days, the diplomat said they were likely to concern troop levels in Europe.

Asked if the treaty on a 50 percent cut in strategic offensive weapons should be ready for the next Soviet-U.S. summit, the diplomat emphasised: "The question is posed in this way—the treaty should be elaborated. There is no direct linkage to the summit meeting. It is necessary to prepare and revise the document and then the presidents will decide whether or not to link its signing to a full-scale summit. The most important thing is that it was decided to settle the outstanding problems before the end of this year."

Speaking about economic aspects of bilateral contacts, the diplomat pointed out that "the key to the discussion of such issues was given by the two presidents in Helsinki: to discuss problems in a matter-of-fact manner, including the most significant mutually advantageous deals. "I would put it this way: We have passed over to the discussion of major projects which are taking shape, including in the sphere of action of private companies," he said. He believes that the American side is interested in such relations. The arrival in Moscow of a U.S. presidential trade and economic mission only two days after the Helsinki resolutions signed by the Soviet and American leaders is proof to it.

Touching upon possible subjects of a conversation between Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. Secretary of Commerce Robert Mosbacher and a group of American businessmen, planned for today, he said that they would discuss prospects of trade and economic relations, and not from a conceptual point of view, as before, but from a practical one. He pointed out that the American side probably had something to suggest at the meeting.

Discusses Disarmament Issues

LD1309172990 Moscow TASS in English 1645 GMT 13 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow September 13 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister and member of the Presidential Council Eduard Shevardnadze had a final meeting with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker today.

As was arranged before, they discussed major, principled problems. The conversation focused on disarmament issues. Shevardnadze and Baker compared various approaches to the settlement of problems blocking further progress at the Geneva talks on nuclear and space weapons and the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces in Europe. They based their arguments on confidence, expressed by the two presidents at their Helsinki meeting, that the observance of the schedule of the working out and signing of those documents is not only necessary, but also possible. Naturally, it should be understood that it is necessary to speed up work on the whole of the agenda.

Shevardnadze and Baker agreed, that the first thing they would do at their next meeting in New York would be to discuss problems dealing with the working out of a treaty on strategic offensive armaments and an agreement on conventional armed forces. They are determined to insist on the coordination of the remaining issues. Participants in the talks have reached the time limit.

Aside from it, memos on Soviet-American consultative and technological cooperation and plans of economic cooperation were handed to the American side during the talks. A whole range of problems dealing with Soviet-American economic cooperation, including large-scale mutually advantageous projects, were discussed at talks between members of the U.S. official presidential trade and economic mission who came together with the U.S. secretary of state and Secretary of Commerce Robert Mosbacher, on the one hand, and Soviet chief economic executives, on the other. Shevardnadze and Baker believe that new Soviet-American partnership calls for an adequate economic basis.

Reviews Reforms With Gorbachev

PM1409090190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Sep 90 Second Edition p 1

[Text] On the evening of 13 September, the USSR president and the U.S. secretary of state had another meeting. They highly assessed the meeting with U.S. businessmen which took place at the same time. In the words of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, it brings closer a new phase in economic contacts, which have lagged far behind the level of political relations between the USSR and the United States. The presence in the USSR at such a moment of a most prestigious U.S. business delegation headed by two ministers is very significant.

For the USSR, taking account of the scale of its economy, economic cooperation with an economy as powerful as that of the United States is of indispensible importance. We are interested in the Americans' participation in a real and businesslike way in our country's historic turning point. This is included in our philosophy and in our practical calculations.

A sincere, committed conversation in an open and friendly manner took place regarding the problems now being tackled in the USSR, and the programs for the formation of a material basis corresponding with the new image of the state, the path to which lies via the Union treaty.

The U.S. secretary of state once again expressed the conviction that the success of perestroyka is needed not just by the USSR. It is in the interests of the United States and of the whole world.

Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev spoke of the necessity to protect the process of going over to a new economic system and to a new union from serious dangers, and from those who express extreme views, via an agreement of the majority of the country's social forces. The choices in both have already been made. There is no going back, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said. The whole matter is to implement the changeover as painlessly as possible.

The interlocutors exchanged the information about the development of the situation in the Persian Gulf and resolutely confirmed the positions declared in Helsinki. They stated that Soviet-U.S. cooperation had strongly facilitated the United Nations in acquiring the role which was intended for it when it was set up. It holds, too, a great chance for the creation of a new world order. If the main processes to which universal attention is now riveted are kept in a peaceful channel, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said, the foundations of a new world will be laid.

The two sides confirmed their resolve to intensify talks on conventional armaments and on strategic offensive weapons in order that an agreement may be signed this year. Comrade Shevardnadze took part in the conversation.

Departs for Damascus 13 Sep

LD1309161690 Moscow TASS in English 1544 GMT 13 Sep 90

[By TASS correspondents Konstantin Voytsekhovich and Aleskandr Kanishchev]

[Text] Moscow September 13 TASS—U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, who stayed here since September 10, left Moscow for Damascus today.

On the last day of his stay, Baker met President Mikhail Gorbachev and held the second round of talks with his Soviet counterpart Eduard Shevardnadze.

The first round took place on September 11.

Mosbacher's Visit to Moscow Reported by TASS

Issues Statement With Katushev

LD1309144390 Moscow TASS in English 1400 GMT 13 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow September 13 TASS—Soviet Minister of Foreign Economic Relations K. Katushev and U.S. Secretary of Commerce Robert Mosbacher, co-chairmen of the Joint Soviet-American Commission for Trade, have had a working meeting. They discussed the implementation of the policy aimed at the expansion of bilateral mutually advantageous trade and economic relations, that was mapped out by the governments of the two countries.

According to their joint statement, they agreed to take necessary steps to ensure the coming into force as soon a possible of the agreement on trade relations, signed by the Soviet and American presidents in June 1990. Mosbacher stressed the need for speeding up the adoption of the law on entrv and emigration from the USSR.

Both sides deemed it expedient to take some measures ensuring the development of foreign economic relations and found it useful to hold conferences on energy generation and the food industry, to develop cooperation on a regional level, to envigorate the activities of working groups of the commission on oil and gas equipment, medical technology and equipment, food industry, building equipment and tourism, as well as to organise a seminar on investments after the adoption of a corresponding law in the Soviet Union. The sides agreed to discuss the creation of a working group on standardization within the framework of the commission.

The ministers discussed programmes of technical assistance to the Soviet Union in the training of managers, the expansion of ties between Soviet and American small enterprises and the working out of a system of assessment of firms' solvency. They also analysed the state of payments to American firms for goods delivered to the Soviet Union, as well as possible measures to be taken. They agreed that consultations on the level of deputy co-chairmen and leading experts of both parts of the commission would be held on December 17 to 22, 1990. They will discuss the implementation of measures outlined by the co-chairmen, the state of bilateral trade and economic relations and the preparation of the next session of the commission.

Received by Ryzhkov 13 Sep

LD1309211490 Moscow TASS in English 2030 GMT 13 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow September 13 TASS—Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov received on Thursday U.S. Secretary of Commerce Robert Mosbacher and prominent U.S. businessmen, who came to the Soviet Union to hold talks on the two countries' trade and economic cooperation.

Ryzhkov told them about profound changes in the USSR in the process of political and economic reforms, the forthcoming transfer to a market-oriented system and the stage-by-stage incorporation of the Soviet economy into the world economic system. He stressed that the deepening of Soviet-American mutual understanding, which was given a new impetus as a result of the Helsinki working meeting between Presidents Gorbachev and Bush, opens up new opportunities for the development of business relations of the two countries.

It was pointed out during the conversation that the laws adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet are intended to facilitate contacts between businessmen from the two countries and to create favourable conditions for those firms and corporation, which expand mutually advantageous cooperation with the USSR.

Participants in the conversation stated that significant positive changes had taken place recently in Soviet-American economic, scientific and technological cooperation in the interests of the overall improvement of world economic relations. However, many obstacles, left from "cold war" times, still remain on this way. Their overcoming would make it possible to strengthen significantly the foundation of mutually advantageous trade and economic cooperation.

Attends News Conference

LD1309214890 Moscow TASS in English 2007 GMT 13 Sep 90

[By TASS correspondent Mikhail Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow September 13 TASS—Members of U.S. presidential trade and economic mission told a news conference here today that the results of their four-day visit to the Soviet Union were encouraging, productive and fruitful.

The 15-strong U.S. business task force led by the U.S. secretary of commerce, Robert Mosbacher, was sent to the Soviet Union by President George Bush.

The visiting American delegation held a series of meetings with Soviet economic officials, deputies of the USSR Supreme Soviet and members of the Soviet business community.

U.S. delegation members met Soviet and foreign journalists straight after three-hour talks with President Mikhail Gorbachev, Presidential Council members and other top Soviet officials.

The U.S. Commerce secretary said the meeting had been interesting and fruitful.

He said the Americans had told Gorbachev about a new programme of assistance to Soviet managers in learning the basics of a market-based system (Soviet-American business training programme) to be run by the U.S. Department of Commerce.

"The idea was received with enthusiasm," the Commerce secretary said.

Asked if he thought the time was ripe for a massive economic assistance to the Soviet Union, capable of turning it into an efficient partner, the secretary stressed that none of the people the American delegation had talked with asked for help, but they all asked for cooperation and trade, including in the private sector.

According to Dwayne Andreas, chairman of the Archer-Daniels-Midland company, the Soviet Union is interested in honest investment.

His colleague, Donald Marron told journalists that he believed that Americans would begin investing in the Soviet economy in 1991.

Northeast Asia

Significance of Inter-Korean Meeting Assessed

SK1309120690 Moscow International Service in Korean 0900 GMT 10 Sep 90

[Text] An official DPRK delegation led by Premier Yon Hyong-muk recently visited South Korea. Regarding this, our station commentator (Lebedev) says the following:

It is not accidental that the visit to South Korea by the North Korean premier, who went to Seoul to meet with South Korean Premier Kang Yong-hun, is regarded as an unprecedented event by observers. The meeting is the first North-South contact ever held at such a high level in 45 years.

A barrier of animosity and mistrust has existed. However, with all developments, now it can be said that a crack has developed in the barrier.

At the talks held this time, the heads of the governments of the two Koreas clearly disclosed their intentions to seek ways of overcoming confrontation and division and reducing tension on the Korean peninsula. In this regard, the two sides stated specific proposals.

Let us first look at North Korea's position. The DPRK attaches great significance to its proposal for removing the military and political confrontation. In other words, Pyongyang thinks that if confrontation is removed, the North and South, based on mutual trust, can realize broad cooperation and exchanges in the fields of economy and culture and in many other social areas.

However, the Seoul side emphasizes other areas. It says that, first of all, contacts and exchanges should be expanded and that trust should be developed. Then, confrontation in the military field should be removed. The Seoul side also urges that disagreements and contradictions of views should be settled through dialogue and talks, and that interference in each other's internal affairs should be mutually stopped.

As for the two sides' positions, it appears that any disagreement in principle, which may block dialogue between them, is nonexistent. On the contrary, the South Korean president has noted that the meeting between the premiers of North and South Korea is a starting point for the reunification of Korea. He expressed his expectation that the course of reunification would be completed by the end of this century.

No document has been signed as a result of the meeting between the heads of the governments of North and South Korea. However, the meeting itself was of great significance for progress in the North-South dialogue. It has been agreed that the talks will continue in Pyongyang in mid October. This fact raises expectations that the situation on the Korean peninsula will become stable.

Moscow evaluates the meeting between the premiers of North and South Korea as a step forward on the road of achieving mutual trust and of progress in the North-South dialogue.

Beijing's evaluation is the same. Comrade Song Ping, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, stated that China affirmatively assesses the significance of the premier-level North-South dialogue and hopes that the talks will produce good results.

Hope Expressed for Inter-Korean Dialogue

SK1409040090 Moscow International Service in Korean 0900 GMT 11 Sep 90

[From the weekly "Extensive Reform and Innovation" program]

[Text] In this weekly program, we deal with life in the East European countries and other countries in which innovations are taking place. Probably the most amazing phenomenon that has taken place recently is the reunification of the two Germanys. The reunification of the two Germanys will become an historical fact in about three weeks from now.

Meanwhile, on another continent on the Pacific rim, an event took place which can be historic as a first step to make two countries divided for over 40 years because of an ideological barrier, come closer toward each other. The premiers of North and South Korea met last week. A station commentator writes as follows:

Quite naturally, no one expected any sensational result to come about in the first meeting of the premiers of the two countries, nor was there any such result. The two sides stated their positions, and the two premiers admitted that this result was satisfactory enough.

A spokesman for Pyongyang said that the first meeting was a step forward in view of the fact that the meeting admitted the importance of the high-level talks and that the dialogue was held in a more serious manner than ever before. The two premiers agreed that they will meet again in Pyongyang in one month's time.

The initiation of the political dialogue between the North and South of Korea gives us hope. To help the seed of the dialogue, which has just been sown, to shoot out good sprouts, the two sides will have to exert considerable goodwill, thoughtfulness, and realistic approach.

Optimistic View of Inter-Korean Dialogue Noted

SK1409062190 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Commentary by the station commentator Oleg Alekseyev from the "Focus on Asia" program: "One Month of Deliberations"]

[Text] The premiers of the North and South of Korea met in Seoul last week for the first time in history. Our station commentator Oleg Alekseyev commented on this meeting:

It would not be necessary to refer to the significance which the world attaches to the meeting between the premiers of the DPRK and South Korea. I would like to point out only the fact that it took 15 years to arrange this meeting.

A proposal was advanced a full 15 years ago that the premiers of the North and the South meet. The North and the South were able to hold this meeting at this time after overcoming many obstacles. Inter-Korean dialogue has entered a new stage. The premiers of the North and South expressed their views on Korea's reunification and advanced programmatic proposals in Seoul. The premiers will extensively study each other's proposal for one month and will meet again in mid-October. The next meeting will take place in Pyongyang, the capital of the DPRK, and dialogue will continue there.

During the first meeting, many views were expressed. I cannot agree to the view that no success was brought about in the Seoul talks. The meeting, itself, which was held after 15 years of preparations, was a big accomplishment.

I would like to point out another aspect in analyzing the situation. The dialogue has reached a stage in which common solutions can not only be (?discussed) but also be adopted and in which one can expect actual results from each meeting. We expect such results.

The programs presented by the premiers of the North and South are known on the whole. Therefore, some conclusions can be drawn at present.

The two proposals are based on different ideas even though they concern the single goal of reunifying the fatherland. The DPRK proposes that military affairs be coordinated, including the alleviation of confrontation, arms reduction, and the reduction of weapons along the demarcation line. Pyongyang feels that if these measures are taken, the political situation can be alleviated, and reciprocal cooperation involving people and economic affairs can be promoted.

On the other hand, Seoul proposes that the process of reunifying Korea start with expanding economic and cultural ties. It also proposes removing military obstacles to Korea's reunification only after completely promoting mutual trust.

I do not want to examine the two proposals at present in order to decide which of the two sides' proposals is the better. This is because this is an issue that the two sides of Korea must resolve by themselves. What is important today is the fact that a foundation has been built for future dialogue between the premiers. Also, the two sides' proposals were scrutinized and are [words indistinct] in the present international situation. Therefore, I think, optimistic views on inter-Korean dialogue at present are well- founded.

Moscow Considers Improving Relations With ROK

SK1309114790 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 12 Sep 90

[From the "Focus on Asia" program: "Are Seoul and Moscow Ready To Establish Diplomatic Relations?—on the Result of Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's Visit to the DPRK"]

[Text] Reports on the imminent establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and South Korea have recently appeared in foreign publications. Noting that these predictions are not groundless, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokespersons have hinted that there will be some significant event between us, between the countries, in the very near future.

IZVESTIYA today carried an article entitled "Are Seoul and Moscow Ready To Establish Diplomatic Relations?" Here we have the contents of the article:

Answering a question put forth by journalists accompanying him on his Far East tour, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze said that we will develop relations with South Korea, acting primarily on the basis of Soviet interests.

According to what has been pointed out by diplomats, the normalization of relations between Moscow and Seoul would help reduce tension in the Asian-Pacific region and would settle the question of the Korean peninsula. In other words, it would serve the interests not only of the USSR and the ROK, but also of the DPRK.

If the Soviet Union really intends to establish ambassadorial-level diplomatic relations with South Korea in the near future, then it is not without basis to suppose that Shevardnadze visited Pyongyang to inform the North Korean side of precisely this.

The Soviet foreign minister's visit to the DPRK lasted little more than 24 hours.

IZVESTIYA reports that Shevardnadze, as has been reported, had lengthy talks with Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yong-nam. First 90 minutes one on one, and then with the participation of Soviet and Korean diplomats.

The official communique on the results of the talks did not mention any differences in views. But, as the foreign minister noted, the talks were very complicated and demanded colossal effort.

It is hard even to imagine that Pyongyang had reacted calmly to Soviet intentions to establish relations with South Korea. Some recent examples suffice. When East European states decided to establish diplomatic relations with Seoul, North Korea blamed those countries and downgraded its diplomatic relations with them one degree. However, despite this, no country changed its intentions.

Will relations between the Soviet Union and the DPRK follow a similar pattern? It is hard to answer. However, one thing is clear—only North Korea would lose, if events developed according to the old scenario. The Soviet Union is one of the few countries which maintain normal relations with Pyongyang, IZVESTIYA has said.

Soviet Foreign Ministry officials have disclosed Moscow's position as follows: The Soviet Union is a sovereign state, it decides its own foreign policy independently, and the issue of establishing diplomatic relations with someone else is also completely a matter of sovereignty. If Moscow chooses to open an embassy in Seoul, North Korean permission is unnecessary. Problems arise in some other area. Interested parties—Pyongyang, in our case—should be informed of plans. Probably, this is precisely what Shevardnadze did during his visit to Pyongyang.

According to Soviet diplomats, the Soviet Union is interested in normalizing its relations with the DPRK. However, dialogue by way of ultimatum cannot be beneficial, IZVESTIYA has noted.

What were the consequences of the Pyongyang talks? To all appearances, the Soviet side takes the DPRK's position into account, but is not going to adjust its plan toward South Korea at all.

IZVESTIYA continues: The Pyongyang leadership's reaction is clearly shown by the fact that during the Soviet delegation's stay in Pyongyang there was no meeting between the Soviet foreign minister and Kim Il-song or his son, Kim Chong-il. This is very unusual in the history of the Soviet-Korean relations.

Then, when will the establishment of state relations between Moscow and Seoul be officially announced? It is likely that an official announcement would be made at the meeting between Shevardnadze and Choe Ho-chung when they attend the UN General Assembly. It has been made known that the meeting between the foreign ministers of the two countries will be held on 26 September in New York. This is the date informed sources have disclosed, IZVESTIYA reports in "Are Seoul and Moscow Ready To Establish Diplomatic Relations."

Soviet Diplomats on ROK-Soviet Relations

SK1309114990 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 12 Sep 90

[From the "Asian News" program]

[Text] Foreign publications have recently reported that the Soviet Union and South Korea will establish diplomatic relations in the near future.

In connection with this, an IZVESTIYA diplomatic correspondent has conducted a poll at the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Foreign Ministry officials hinted in individual conversations that the predictions are not without basis.

According to Soviet diplomats, the normalization of Moscow-Seoul relations will eventually settle the question of the Korean peninsula as well. It will meet the interests not only of the Soviet Union and South Korea, but also of the DPRK people.

The establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and South Korea is reportedly going to be officially announced at the meeting between the foreign ministers of the two countries in New York in late September.

Soviet Policy Toward DPRK Questioned

SK1409070490 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 13 Sep 90

[From the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] "When Will the Barrier in Korea Be Pulled Down?," MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI carried an article under this title. (Andrey Pichugin), researcher at the Problems of World Economics and International Relations Department under the Academy of Sciences USSR, says in his article:

Last week, the premiers of the North and South in Korea discussed the question of their country's reunification for the first time in 45 years. The Berlin War and the 38th parallel on the Korean peninsula have remained symbols of the confrontation between the two political systems of the East and West. One has now ceased to exist.

Though we think it has been removed for good, in the case of the Korean peninsula, the confrontation between the systems continues, however. The Korean people have not yet taken a step forward toward reunification, and the peninsula remains an area with the most densely concentrated troops and weapons on the globe.

The Soviet leadership is greatly concerned about how the situation in Korea will develop. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait once again draws attention to the well-known fact: the Soviet Union maintains treaty of alliance with some countries in dangerous and explosive regions and it indiscreetly has chosen the consumers of Soviet weapons.

The position of the DPRK, bulwark in Asia of world Stalinism, world, has seriously weakened, says (Andrey Pichugin).

In the economic and foreign policy competition, it is behind the ROK. While trying to maintain stability at home, Pyongyang is isolating itself in the international community. Meanwhile, in the relations with the other side in Korea as well, its behavior is never malleable.

As a result of the talks between the presidents of the two countries held in San Francisco some time ago, the question of establishing diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the ROK has been settled in principle.

Nonetheless, the Soviet Union continues to defend the theory of so-called strategic cooperation with the DPRK. Even during the course of perestroyka, the Soviet Union has continued to supply new-type weapons to North Korea. The Soviet Union appears to lack method also in its position toward the Korean question, that is, the question of the Korea's reunification. Over the past 40 years, the Soviet leadership invariably has supported the line of the Workers Party of Korea allegedly aimed at reunifying the fatherland without foreign interference and in a peaceful and democratic manner. At the same time, it has continued to support even the very illusive proposal for the confederal system of Koryo allegedly aimed at integrating the two current social systems of the North and South. Whenever dialogue is held between the two sides in Korea, the Soviet Union has continued to support only one side without condition.

It is natural to say that the reunification of Korea is the task which should be undertaken by the Korean people themselves and, thus, no one else's advice is necessary. Still, it is desirable for our country, which is responsible for the division of Korea along with the United States since the end of the World War II, to adopt a more constructive attitude.

The reunification of Germany has, in many aspects, elucidated how national reconciliation can be achieved at the earliest possible date. The issue has been settled not in the form of merger or reunification but by Democratic Germany being absorbed by the Federal Republic of Germany.

However, the condition seen in Germany is still nonexistent in Korea. At the same time, there are many elements unfavorable for change. So, the reunification of Korea can be achieved by overcoming numerous diametric elements that have grown over the past decades.

But, I think it is not correct to think that the settlement of the German question has been smooth from the beginning. The beginning was very similar to the case of Korea, (Andrey Pichugin) says in his article carried in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI.

Science Delegation Visits North Korea

SK1309121390 Moscow International Service in Korean 1330 GMT 10 Sept 90

[From the "Annals of Friendship program]

[Text] A delegation of scholars of (Lubna) combined nuclear research center left the Soviet Union for the DPRK by plane on 9 September. The delegation had visited Pyongyang at the invitation of the DPRK Ministry of Nuclear Energy.

The delegation includes Hungarian scholar (Vege Gis), director of the nuclear research center; (Aleksey Romanov), aide to the chief of an international relation committee; and (Pak Mun-son), guide of the Korean department of the combined nuclear research center.

Shortly before leaving for Pyongyang, (Vege Gis), director of the combined nuclear research center, stressed in an interview with a station reporter:

Korean physicists and technicians have positively participated in a basic study conducted by our international scientific center. This center includes representatives coming from eleven countries. The DPRK was one of those countries founding a research institute as an international scientific organ, which was found in 1956. At present, the Korean scholar group consists of 30 members. In addition, (Vege Gis) said that the work of the DPRK scholars received official commendations on several occasions from the research center. The Korean scholars have been making efforts to be industrious and outstanding experts.

Approximately 30 Korean physicists, working at (Lubna) center for the past few years, have issued theses for junior doctoral or doctoral degrees. Some of them have leading positions as directors of research sections, laboratory chiefs, and chief lecturers.

Scientific relations have been strengthened between the combined nuclear research center and the DPRK scientific study organs. In addition, a kind of joint work has been promoted. Korean experts have come to (Lubna) center on scientific business to press ahead with a joint research.

The schedule of the delegation of scientists of the combined nuclear research center is quite complex. They will visit a study institute of nuclear physics and nuclear energy of the DPRK Academy of Sciences, Kim Chaek Technology University, and Kim Il-song University.

(Vege Gis) will give a lecture on a result effected by the international group of the (Lubna) international scientific center, at which approximately 2,000 scholars and experts are working. (Vege Gis) expressed the conviction that a visit to the DPRK by the delegation led by him will contribute to further consolidating relations between (Lubna) institute physicists and the DPRK scholars.

Visits of Warships Exchanged With Pyongyang

SK1409072590 Moscow International Service in Korean 0900 GMT 6 Sep 90

[From the "Soviet Maritime Kray" radio magazine]

[Text] Some time ago, the DPRK Navy warships' friendship visit to Vladivostok was concluded. During the 4-day visit, sight-seeing to the city, visits to the enterprises and schools, and a concert was held. Finally, the day to bid farewell came. At the dock in the heart of Vladivostok, the Korean band began playing music in the morning and the actors of the fleet sang songs and danced. (Vladimir Kropotov), commander of the united fleet [yonhap hamdae], says:

[Begin (Kropotov) recording in Russian fading into Korean translation read by announcer] Good relations are maintained between the seamen of the Pacific Fleet and the Korean seamen. Our warships returned (?three weeks) ago from the DPRK receiving a wholehearted welcome. The Pacific Fleet and the DPRK Navy regularly conduct joint exercises. Of course, the scale of these joint exercises are much smaller than those of the "Team Spirit" exercises. The "Team Spirit" exercises have offensive nature, but our exercises drill defensive operations and the operations for defending our joint national bord [end recording]

Captain Second Rank (Chang Yon-kil), commander of the [name of ship indistinct], says, holding a souvenir flag given by the Soviet marines as a present:

[Begin (Chang Yon-kil) recording] I am pleased during our visit here that the friendly relations between Korea and the Soviet Union are as warm as this. We hope the Korean-Soviet friendship and the friendship between the seamen of the Korean People's Army and the Pacific Fleet will be eternal in the future as well. [end recording]

The Soviet seamen who visited the DPRK last August had the same good impression. They visited Wonsan and Pyongyang. Captain Third Rank (Boris Okurukov), commander of patrol boat [name of boat indistinct], says:

[Begin (Okurukov) recording in Russian fading into Korean translation read by announcer] We were in Wonsan from 14 to 18 August. Our visit was made on the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the Korean liberation. Our itinerary included such interesting occasions as seeing the sights of the city, attending sports games, and meetings with Korean seamen.[end recording]

The members of the Soviet flotilla included (Nikolay Litkovich), director in charge of publications section of the Political Directorate of the Pacific Fleet, and reporter. He is now writing a travelogue on his visit to Korea for the (VOHEWAYA WAHTA), a paper published by the fleet. We asked (Litkovich) to join us in our broadcast.

[Begin (Litkovich) recording in Russian fading into Korean translation read by announcer] I have been to the DPRK for the first time. I was very pleased that they kindly and wholeheartedly welcomed our seamen. The Korean people remember that many soldiers of the Soviet Army died in action in the battle with the Japanese militarists. We saw a grand monument for the soldiers of the Soviet Army in Pyongyang. On the outskirts of the city there is a lonely graveyard where our compatriots who worked in North Korea after the liberation are buried. I was surprised that it was a tomb of people buried together and had no names. They must have relatives in the Soviet Union, these relatives will want to find their precious ones' names on a tombstone. I think that our first task is to clarify the names of these people.

To speak of another impression I had, the Korean people took good care of the soil. We went from Wonsan to Pyongyang, and saw an empty lot of land. In Wonsan, we liked the Songdowon swimming beach which was as wide as 200 hectares. In the park we went there were an artificial (?pond), fountain, and waterfall. Not far from there were the colorful buildings of the International Boy Scouts camp. The friendship visit to the DPRK by the Pacific Fleet seamen is unforgettable. The majority of us visited this country for the first time, and came to know a wonderful industrious and kind people and a beautiful country. The friendship between the navies of our two countries has continued since it began in August 1945. [end recording]

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Foreign Ministry Welcomes Cambodian Agreements

LD1309123390 Moscow TASS in English 1221 GMT 13 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow September 13 TASS—A Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman made the following statement on Cambodia here today:

"The Soviet Union welcomes the decision by the Cambodian sides at the Jakarta meeting to set up the Supreme National Council of Cambodia. We also hail their decision to endorse an overall agreement on the comprehensive political settlement of the Cambodian conflict, elaborated by the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, as the basis for settling the Cambodian problem. We regard it as an important step towards national reconciliation in that country.

"Under the agreements reached, Cambodia's seat at the U.N. should go to the Supreme National Council, which along with other positive factors makes it possible to discuss the Cambodian issue in a new constructive spirit and without confrontation, at the forthcoming session of the U.N. General Assembly.

"At present the Cambodian side has every possibility of convening the first meeting of the Supreme National Council, of defining its functions and of beginning practical work to settle other aspects of a settlement. We call on the Cambodian sides to continue to act in the spirit of goodwill which they displayed at the Jakarta meeting.

"In our view, the point at issue now is an immediate halt to hostilities in Cambodia, an end to foreign military aid to all Cambodian sides and the establishment of a U.N. mechanism in that country.

"We believe that the necesary prerequisites for preparing and convening, in the short run, the final round of the international Paris conference on Cambodia are now emerging. The Soviet Union is prepared to work in that direction together with all interested countries."

New Guinea Parliamentarians Travel to Moscow

PM1309132790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading "Official Reports"]

[Text] A delegation of the Papua New Guinea parliament headed by Denise Young, its speaker, has been on an official visit to the USSR at the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The Papua New Guinea parliamentarians were received by A.I. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

During the meetings and conversations, which proceeded in an atmosphere of mutual understanding, the development of ties between the USSR and Papua New Guinea parliament on the basis of principles of equality, mutual respect, noninterference in internal affairs, and freedom to choose the path of sociopolitical development was noted with satisfaction.

Near East & South Asia

Israeli Ministerial Delegation Visits Moscow

Meeting With Gorbachev Sought

TA1409103190 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1000 GMT 14 Sep 90

[Text] Eliyahu Zemtsov, the adviser to the minister of science and technology and of energy and infrastructure, is trying to arrange a meeting between Ministers Moda'i and Ne'eman and Mikhail Gorbachev in Moscow today. In a telephone conversation from Moscow, he told our correspondent that if the meeting cannot take place today, he will try to reschedule it for Sunday, 16 September. Professor Zemtsov said that the meeting between the two ministers and Gorbachev was handled by the Soviet president's office, not the Soviet Foreign Ministry. He expressed the fear that it might not take place because of the advance publicity given it. The minister's aide added that Ministers Ne'eman and Moda'i will confer with the Soviet finance minister and senior officials, focusing particularly on joint projects to promote bilateral trade in agriculture, for example. They will also discuss the establishment of a joint nuclear physics institute, as well as research in mathematics, electronics, and chemistry.

Meeting Called 'Unreasonable'

TA1409114290 Jerusalem Domestic Service in English 1100 GMT 14 Sep 90

[Text] In Moscow, there has been no confirmation from the Soviet Foreign Ministry. Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov told reporter Gid'on Remez that he doubted Ministers Moda'i and Ne'eman would be able to meet Soviet President Gorbachev on such short notice.

[Begin recording] [Gerasimov] That's news to me. There is nothing like this in our papers. What ministers?

[Remez] They are the finance minister, Mr. Moda'i, and the science and energy minister, Professor Ne'eman.

[Gerasimov] Interesting, but I do not have any information. I can check.

[Remez] Does it seem to you reasonable that Mr. Gorbachev would receive Israeli ministers at this level?

[Gerasimov] No, this is unreasonable. [end recording]

To Meet at Foreign Ministry

TA1409100990 Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English 14 Sep 90 p 14

[Report by Walter Ruby]

[Excerpt] Moscow—The high-ranking Israeli delegation that arrived here yesterday is not expected to be pressed by Soviet officials for agreement to take part in an international peace conference, a key foreign policy adviser to President Mikhail Gorbachev said yesterday.

The Israelis, led by David Afeq, head of the Foreign Ministry's Center for Political Research, are here to prepare the ground for the meeting in New York later this month between foreign ministers Eduard Shevardnadze and David Levi.

Nikolay Shishlin, an adviser to the Central Committee of the Communist Party, said the negotiations will be a "chance to review how the relations between our countries are going in a variety of areas."

Implying that the negotiations are a step toward the eventual reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and the USSR, Shishlin said, "I hope this meeting is a preliminary step toward broader relations."

The Israeli delegation, including the consular delegation in Moscow, will meet with Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Belonogov, the Soviet ministry's chief point man on Middle East policy, Shishlin said.

The apparent decision to have the Israelis meet Belonogov, who has taken the leading role within his ministry in dealings with Iraq since its invasion of Kuwait, is an indication that the Soviets take this mission very seriously.

Despite a call on Wednesday by Shevardnadze for a "global approach" to the Middle East, including an international conference to address the problems of the region in its entirely, Shishlin stressed, "It is necessary to separate the Gulf crisis from larger Middle East issues. Right now, the most important thing is to solve the Gulf crisis. Only after that is it possible to think about political steps between Israel and its neighbors."

Sources here said that the difference in approach between Shishlin and Shevardnadze is indicative of a continuing split here between Arabists in the Foreign Ministry, who are signalling the Arab countries that the Soviet Union has not abandoned its cause despite its condemnation of Iraq, and 'Westernizers' intent on bringing the Soviet line on the Middle East closer to that of its new ally, the United States.

It is not yet clear which trend will predominate during the negotiations about to begin, but the fact that they will take place in the Foreign Ministry may indicate that the Soviets are still hesitant about altering their longstanidng anti-Israel policy. [passage omitted]

Sharon Criticized as 'Tool' in Internal Struggle

TA1109123990 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 11 Sep 90 p 17

[Report by Moscow-based correspondent Amnon Kapeliuk]

[Excerpts] Housing and Construction Minister Ari'el Sharon presumably did not know that his visit to Moscow would become a tool in a domestic struggle between Boris Yeltsin and his colleagues and the Soviet Administration's upper echelons.

Yesterday it was learned that Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federative Republic and Mikhail Gorbachev's opponent, was behind the invitation to the Soviet Union extended to Minister Ari'el Sharon. The invitation Sharon received bore the signature of V. Yerushenko, the Russian Republic's deputy prime minister [name and title as published], who is also one of Yeltsin's confidants. In a brief letter dated last Tuesday, the deputy prime minister invited Sharon for a seven-day visit to the Soviet Union.

Boris Yeltsin, however, had not sought the Soviet Foreign Ministry's approval for the invitation, and the Kremlin appears to feel uncomfortable with Sharon's arrival. [passage omitted]

None of this has, of course, interfered with Minister Sharon's visit. Yesterday he met with Soviet businessmen, with whom he discussed the establishment of a plant in Israel which would use quick methods of construction. Sharon toured two factories, inspected their equipment, and promised a speedy reply. The minister is scheduled to meet with several notables, including the mayors of Moscow and Leningrad. [passage omitted]

[Writing on page 2 of Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM POST in English on 11 September, Walter Ruby reports that Sharon "is in the process of negotiating a deal whereby Muscovites would get Israeli vegetables in exchange for Russian prefabricated housing, an informed source told THE JERUSALEM POST."]

Sharon has been accorded a warm reception in Moscow. People who recognize him in the street shake his hand. This happened in the Kremlin museum and in Red Square, where he was yesterday photographed near Lenin's mausoleum and other sites.

Ari'el Sharon is the first Israeli minister visiting Moscow to have long talks with Jews who crowd the gates of the Netherland Embassy from which the Israeli consular delegation operates. He answered everyone's questions, taking occasional notes. He spoke Russian, changed into English when vocabulary failed him, occasionally resorting to Hebrew. There was always someone to translate. [passage omitted]

Ryzhkov Calls for Political Solution in Gulf

LD1309162490 Moscow International Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 13 Sep 90

[Excerpts] Dear listeners, at the request of the Soviet deputies, the issue of the Soviet position on events in the Gulf was included in the agenda of the current fourth session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. [passage omitted]

Now, dear listeners, here is the opinion of Nikolay Ryzhkov, USSR Council of Ministers chairman, about ways to solve the conflict. He is expressing his opinion especially for our Arab listeners.

[Ryzhkov in Russian fading into Arabic report] Nikolay Ryzhkov says: I think that the principal issue about which Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President George Bush talked in Helsinki was settling this crisis using political means, and that this crisis should not be allowed to become a broad military confrontation.

Nikolay Ryzhkov said: The situation in the Gulf region is very complicated. Therefore, all political means should be used to settle the conflict. We prefer international collective methods, within the context of the UN, and also bilateral and multilateral relations among all the sides concerned with the conflict.

I think that the Arabs themselves should play the essential role in settling the conflict, and that they should find a common language among themselves, with the help of the international community, to restore peace and stability in that region. [passage omitted]

Belonogov, Egyptian Envoy Discuss Gulf Crisis

LD1309162690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1454 GMT 13 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow, 13 Sep [TASS]—Today Aleksandr Belonogov, USSR deputy minister of foreign affairs, received A. Mahir al-Sayyid, ambassador of the Arab Republic of Egypt in the Soviet Union, at the latter's request. Topical problems of the situation in the Persian Gulf area and the Near East were discussed.

U.S. Military Strike 'Not Ruled Out' in Gulf

PM1409104190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Sep 90 Morning Edition pp 1, 4

[Survey by B. Ivanov: "Persian Gulf: Military Strike Not Ruled Out"]

[Excerpts] The United States intends to continue to build up its armed forces in the Persian Gulf region. U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney has stated this.

Speaking in Congress, he stressed that in the administration's opinion it is essential to continue to step up the military grouping concentrated in the region of the conflict in order to have "a sufficient number of troops for action under any circumstance." He made it clear that the U.S. Armed Forces will be in the Gulf region "for as long as is required until the situation is defused." These statements by the Pentagon chief, THE WASHINGTON POST believes, are the administration's frankest statement yet regarding the plans the United States is viewing for the possible use of its troops against Iraq. The White House has also expressed itself on this score, confirming through its press secretary M. Fitzwater that "the number of American servicemen is growing every day." The total numerical strength of the troops deployed, AP believes, could reach 250,000. [passage omitted]

At the same time there is an increase in the role of the multinational aspect of forces in the Gulf, in which military contingents from 25 countries are now taking part. After Washington's appeal to its NATO allies to send additional army subunits to the region of the conflict, the British Government decided to send tanks and accompanying ground forces there. In the opinion of specialists, "at least two armored brigades" will be sent there, as a result of which the total numerical strength of British troops may reach 7,000. In this connection attention is drawn by the statement by M. Mates, chairman of the House of Commons defense committee, who said that the dispatch of new British subunits to the Persian Gulf should be viewed as "a part of long-term military building." [passage omitted]

In the past few days there has been increasing talk in Washington of the possibility of direct military operations against Iraq. The U.S. defense secretary has admitted that the Pentagon has elaborated a plan for a strike against strategic targets in Iraq and is prepared to implement it if the appropriate decision is made by the U.S. President.

Citing THE WASHINGTON TIMES, A. Blinov, IZVESTIYA correspondent in the United States, reports that the decision on the White House's future course in the Persian Gulf is to be made in mid-October, when the shipment of U.S. troops to the region ends.

In the newspaper's opinion, several possible options for operations have been elaborated, of which military operations are the riskiest. Thus, attempts to "dislodge" Iraqi troops from Kuwait by force could lead to great losses and destruction and the death of the hostages. Nor will there be a way of avoiding considerable losses with an airborne missile attack against Iraqi military establishments (the U.S. press organs hint most frequently at this "surgical operation" scenario).

That is why the path of continuing Baghdad's blockade and isolation remains the most preferable, and, according to THE WASHINGTON TIMES, G. Bush and J. Baker are inclined toward this. Ultimately this could provoke a military coup in Iraq and the advent to power of officers who could review that country's policy. [passage omitted]

'Severest Sanctions' Against Iraq Endorsed

90UF0535A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 33, 26 Aug-02 Sep 90 p 13

[Article by Aleksey Aleksandrov: "Soviet Arms to Iraq, Part of the Problem"]

[Text] It looks as if one more prophecy from the Middle Ages is coming true. The great prophet Nostradamus said that in the early 1990s the devil would materialize in the Middle East as a despot and plunge the world into an endless war. Saddam Husayn and his regime, which occupied Kuwait last week, could well be this force.

The situation in the Middle East today, when the regime of a military monster with an economy limping on all fours crushes its defenceless neighbour under the pretext of "aiding revolutionaries," poses questions about the regional policy of the great powers, including the USSR. It is good that for the first time in postwar history the USA and the USSR have jointly called for action against Saddam Husayn—an unprecedented event, when the two superpowers acted as allies in a region where they had always been rivals. But the basis, upon which the USSR's relations with Iraq were built, remains inviolable. We (for the first time in the history of relations with non-socialist countries) signed the 1972 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Iraq, one of whose points was a passage on mutual defence?

Our party and state leadership was perfectly aware of the rivers of blood which flooded the country during the brutal campaigns to wipe out the Kurdish minority and the Iraqi Communist Party, but it preferred to keep silent, supplying Iraq with armaments for money. We knew who started the Iran-Iraq conflict—its initiator was Saddam Husayn—but the river of Soviet arms to Iraq did not stop. And we continue to harp on the "effectiveness", "mutual benefit", etc., of contacts and relations with an "old partner". We need to reappraise our relations with patently totalitarian, aggressive regimes bent on armed gambles as well as the destruction of their own citizens.

Furthermore, any aggressor must think of the price to be paid for his aggression. There is no need to be content with Husayn's vague promises to withdraw his tanks. Iraq must pay the highest price for its unprecedented and brazen aggression. The Arab countries will be inclined to regard the goings-on as a "dispute among Arabs". But the Arab world is not an island. It will be fine if the PLO or the Arab League are able to contribute to the settlement of what they see as a conflict between Iraq and Kuwait. But the rest of the world must impose the severest sanctions on Iraq for whatever this world sees as the insolent and gratuitous aggression of the strong against the weak, and not be in a hurry to cancel these sanctions after the last Iraqi tank has pulled out of Kuwait.

As far as the USSR is concerned, it would be advisable not to "suspend" arms deliveries to Iraq, but to stop them altogether—at any rate so long as Iraq presents a threat to its neighbours and to international peace. MOSCOW NEWS recently wrote about the dubious nature of the USSR's motives for supplying hardware to the Middle East. The invasion of Kuwait bears out the correctness of this point of view.

This time it won't be enough to issue statements about "the need to settle the dispute by peaceful means". We must check the degree of cooperation between the USA and the USSR in organizing rebuff to the presumptuous aggressor. The Soviet Union is duty bound to assume part of this burden.

East Europe

Polish Minister Outlines 'Eastern Policy' Plans

90P50091 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 9 Sep 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by TASS correspondent Mikhail Malchun: "The Opinion of a Polish Politician"]

[Text] Warsaw, 8. (TASS correspondent Mikhail Malchun). The formation of a new type of relations with the USSR, as well as the resolution of the German question became a vital task for Polish foreign policy in the first 12 months of T. Mazowiecki's government. K. Skubiszewski, foreign affairs minister of the Republic of Poland, stated this in his progam speech at a session of the senate, which was reviewing the concept of the Polish state's eastern policy.

In the period just passed, the minister said, we have been successful in normalizing Polish-Soviet relations, freeing them from the baggage of the past, as well as from the burden of ideology. In this context, the Polish side has expressed its willingness to broaden and intesify multifaceted contacts, which proceeds both from the traditional ties between the peoples of our two countries, as well as from the mutual understanding now developing between us.

Regarding claims against the USSR regarding post-war borders, advanced recently by the Polish emigre government in London and by various parties and groups inside the country, the head of the Republic of Poland's foreign policy department declared that the current borders are inviolable. He called for realism in mutual relations both with the union leadership and with the individual republics. The attempts by Lithuania to establish a rail link across the Soviet-Polish border without Moscow's participation was pointed out as a negative example.

K. Skubiszewski directed the attention of the senators to the fact that Lithuania, having expressed its wish to cooperate with the Republic of Poland, had done nothing in the past six months to improve the lot of the Polish national minority living in the republic. These people, in the opinion of the Polish politician, should have the right to study in their own language, and to use it as an official language both in the local organs of self-management and in the state offices of this Baltic republic.

The Senate adopted a decree on a timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Polish territory. It condemned the manifestations of stubborn Russophobia, contradictory to Polish traditions and capable of harming national interests and spoke in favor of strengthening good-neighborly relations with the peoples of the USSR.

Rogachev Receives Hungarian Ambassador 13 Sep

LD1309162390 Moscow TASS in English 1611 GMT 13 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow September 13 TASS—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Rogachev today met Ambassador of the Hungarian Republic Sandor Gyorke at his request. They exchanged views on some pressing international issues, focusing on the situation in the Asian-Pacific region.

Bulgarians Aid in Uzbek Computer Production

PM1209141390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 9 Sep 90

[Report by M. Ganiyev and S. Ziyamukhamedov from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] An exhibition of computer equipment for schools produced by "Variant," a Soviet-Bulgarian joint venture, has opened in Tashkent.

[Reporter] You will recall that at the beginning of this Five-Year Plan, all-Union and republic programs for the computerization of our schools were adopted. Frankly speaking, but for this joint venture, the republic program would have been a fiasco.

In just over two years, in premises ill suited for this purpose, I must admit, "Variant"—this is the name of the Tashkent enterprise—has produced computers for 3,000 Uzbek schools. And it did not only produce the computers, it also provided them with educational software, taught the computers to conduct a dialogue with children in the Uzbek language, and offers reliable service facilities.

The computers on show at the exhibition are able to converse in Tajik, Kazakh, Turkmen, and Kirghiz. And there is a microcomputer with Arabic script. There are many interesting educational programs for teachers.

It is true that the computers are very simple. But take a look: The Bulgarian specialists and their Tashkent colleagues have also embarked on the production of more powerful, 16-bit [as heard] machines.

Tell me, what benefit does Bulgaria draw from cooperation of this kind?

[Khristo Khristov, director general of the Bulgarian "Pravets" company] We have our market here. The most important thing in a market economy is to have a market. Therefore our efforts are geared to this market.

[Reporter] In turn, the "Variant" collective, having "taught" the computers to operate in the languages of the peoples of Central Asia, is developing its own market in the region. As you can see, it is not the government program, but real competition and market conditions which are resolving the problem of the computerization of schools here.

However, the exhibition has highlighted another important problem.

Frankly speaking, would you not say that the production of computers has outstripped the training of cadres who are to work with these computers?

[K.Yu. Yusupov, Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic minister of public education] The Ministry of Public Education has drawn up a range of measures to train computer specialists. Another aspect of this question is that computer equipment is so far used as part of information science. The main task is to introduce this equipment in the teaching all subjects, that is to say, this equipment must serve the intensification of the teaching and educational process within the public education system.

East European News Agencies Hold Conference

LD1209172190 Moscow TASS in English 1537 GMT 12 Sep 90

[Text] Prague September 12 TASS—Senior executives of the ADN, BTA, MTI, PAP, ROMPRES, TASS and CTK news agencies attended a conference in Rabstejn, Czechoslovakia, on September 11, 1990 to discuss regional cooperation.

The president and general secretary of the European Alliance of Press Agencies, of which all the aforementioned news agencies are members, took part in the conference as observers.

Participants exchanged information about changes that have occurred in their countries and the news agencies' work in new democratic conditions. They agreed that they needed a new plan of cooperation, a plan free of former political and ideological elements. They called for professional cooperation in new democratic conditions.

News agency senior executives decided to meet regularly, at least once a year. This cooperation will be of a regional nature. Meetings to be held within the framework of this cooperaiton are open to other news agencies of Central and Eastern Europe.

CTK will coordinate with all participating news agencies the venue, time and other details of the next meeting.

The conference endorsed recommendations to a forum of news agency technical directors, which was held in Rabsteijn on September 4-5. BTA agreed to hold the next forum of news agency technical directors in Bulgaria in 1991.

West Europe

Shevardnadze Greets FRG on Anniversary

LD1309080990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 13 Sep 90

[Text] Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze has congratulated FRG Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher on the occasion of the 35th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the USSR and FRG. The congratulations message expressed the hope that relations between the two states will continue to develop fruitfully in the interests of strengthening peace in Europe and throughout the world.

FRG's Genscher Praises Soviet-German Treaty

LD1309201190 Moscow TASS in English 1908 GMT 13 Sep 90

[By TASS Correspondent Vladimir Serov]

[Text] Bonn September 13 TASS—The treaty of good-neighbourliness, partnership and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Federal Republic of Germany, initialled in Moscow, opens up new opportunities for the development of broad and comprehensive cooperation between the two countries, according to West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher.

At a news conference in Bonn today he said that the future united Germany would carry great weight in Europe, but there was no intention on its part to take advantage of this to beef up its might. Genscher said there was the awareness of a great responsibility to be shouldered and this would entail benefits for the Soviet Union from a united Germany.

The agreement with the Soviet Union reached recently, the West German foreign minister continued, creates a new basis not only for the development of bilateral cooperation but also for the involvement of the Soviet Union in the construction of a new Europe.

There can be no single Europe without the Soviet Union and against it, Genscher said.

The German unification treaty, signed by the foreign ministers of six countries in Moscow, was described by Genscher as an important historic event. The treaty, he said, settles the foreign policy aspects of the future German unity and sets the beginning to a new era in Europe's further development.

The shaping of new relations among European countries, based not on confrontation and enmity but on trust, responsibility and cooperation, Genscher said, created the needed prerequisites for overcoming the German split. The success of the two-plus-four negotiations, according to the West German foreign minister, can serve as an example for the solution of other international issues on the basis of mutual confidence and the rejection of the desire to reach unilateral benfits and advantages.

Genscher said that he intended soon to consider, jointly with the Soviet foreign minister, problems relating to the Soviet military presence in Germany and the stage-by-stage withdrawal of soviet troops from German territory.

Accord Reached on Troop Withdrawal Payments

LD1309195390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 13 Sep 90

[Text] The FRG and the Soviet Union have reached agreement on the FRG's contribution toward financing the Soviet troop withdrawal from the territory of what is now the GDR. This was announced at a press conference here [place not further identified] today by [FRG] Finance Minister Waigel. It is thought that a treaty on this may even be initialled next week. According to the minister, the Federal Republic has pledged to pay the Soviet Union DM 12 billion by the end of 1994. Most of this money will go toward financing the construction of housing for servicemen returning home.

Gorbachev To Visit Paris in October

LD1309201790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1430 GMT 13 Sep 90

[Text] The Soviet Union and France are preparing an agreement that will provide for the development of bilateral relations in various spheres. The agreement will be signed during the visit of USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev to Paris in October.

Gorbachev Cables Andreotti on Fiuggi Award

AU1409085390 Rome ANSA in English 0809 GMT 14 Sep 90

[Text] Rome, 14 Sep (ANSA)—Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev on Thursday sent a telegram to Italian Premier Giulio Andreotti, who had notified him on September 7 that the Soviet leader had been awarded the 1990 Fiuggi International Award, to express his appreciation for what he called "an extremely (?kind) gesture.... Both from a human point of view, as valorous moral support at such a difficult time in my country, and from the point of view of kindred Soviet-Italian views and mutual understanding, while taking into account the interests of international policy."

A communique by the Fiuggi Cultural Foundation said Andreotti had written to Gorbachev as president of the organization, which assigns the award.

Saying he was "deeply moved" by the award, Gorbachev said: "I have great [word indistinct] in my next meeting with you, as I expect from you, as always, new ideas and new wisdom."

Britain's Douglas Hurd Views Moscow Life

LD1309162190 Moscow TASS in English 1603 GMT 13 Sep 90

[By TASS correspondents Igor Peskov and Sergey Skripnikov]

[Text] Moscow 13 September TASS—British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd began his working visit to the Soviet Union today by having a talk with Moscow's Mayor Gavriil Popov.

Popov told Hurd about the causes of the Soviet economic crisis as he saw them. He said that the crisis was at its gravest in the multi-million Soviet capital.

Popov pointed to such ills behind the crisis as outdated machinery and equipment, the lack of resources to modernise them, the low pay and the inadequate infrastructure.

He noted that in order to overcome the crisis, the city authorities intended to focus on privatising Moscow's municipal services and setting the market mechanism in motion as soon as possible.

According to Popov, the transfer to citizens' ownership of housing and small enterprises will mark the first steps in the transition to a market system.

In reply to Hurd's question, Popov said the Moscow City Council would do everything in its power to increase Soviet-British cultural and economic exchanges.

The British foreign secretary was then driven around the city. To get a first-hand experience of life in the Soviet capital, he went down in the metro, visited an apartment in the Ramenki residential area and paid a call to a nursery school.

Hurd also visited a vegetable market—a sore testimony to the current hardships: Even at the height of the season the range on offer left much to be desired.

The British foreign secretary, who was interior minister before filling his current post and published a number of detective stories, was most impressed by his visit to a district militia centre. He inspected the switch-board in the operations control room, a detainee cell, and took a ride in a militia patrol car on its routine round.

Hurd then went to see the Moscow Institute of International Relations, where he addressed students and staff members.

Addresses Moscow Students

LD1309180190 Moscow TASS in English 1647 GMT 13 Sep 90

[By TASS correspondents Igor Peskov and Sergey Skripnikov]

[Text] Moscow September 13 TASS—The joint statement by the Soviet and U.S. presidents in Helsinki on the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait reflects the new character of international relations, characterized by cooperation between countries, said British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd.

Hurd, on a working visit to the Soviet Union, on Thursday spoke to the teaching staff and students of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Moscow State Institute of International Relations. He shared with them his opinion of changes in the world and Europe.

Speaking of the future of Europe, Hurd said he believed Europe will consist of independent states united in voluntary unions. In his opinion, three main structures—NATO, the European Community and the CSCE—will remain on the continent, but they will gradually develop and transform.

NATO will remain, but its role will correspond to the new situation in Europe, the secretary said, noting that the North Atlantic Treaty will be a defensive union, ready for cooperation with the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty countries, Hurd said.

Hurd noted the important role of the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), noting that at the forthcoming Paris meeting the leaders of CSCE member-countries are expected to discuss its future forms.

The CSCE should consider its main task the formation of the common system of values and the common understanding of the main principles of European nations' domestic and international policy, Hurd said. The secretary supported the proposal to set up a centre within the CSCE framework to prevent conflicts.

Hurd said he was satisfied with the United Nations' active role in the settlement of international and regional conflicts, including the U.N. Security Council's resolution concerning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the U.N. assistance in the settlement of the Namibian and Cambodian problems.

Britain realises that new opportunities for the U.N. can be explained, to a great extent, by the Soviet Union's current position, reflecting fundamental changes in the Soviet foreign policy. The changes are an inalienable part of revolutionary restructuring of Soviet society, begun by President Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985, Hurd said.

Discusses Cooperation With Yeltsin

LD1309183690 Moscow TASS in English 1801 GMT 13 Sep 90

[By TASS correspondents Igor Peskov and Sergey Skripnikov]

[Text] Moscow September 13 TASS—President of the Russian Federation Boris Yeltsin met British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Douglas Hurd at the House of Soviets of the Russian Federation here today.

After the end of the one-hour conversation Yeltsin told journalists that it was held "in an atmosphere of mutual understanding on all issues, including those dealing with Russia's sovereignty, its independent home and foreign policy and the desire to conclude direct treaties with other countries".

"Russia is ready to sign treaties with Britain in the political, economic, cultural and other spheres without violating any union treaties," Yeltsin pointed out.

Touching upon the relationship between Russia's leadership and President Gorbachev, which was one of the topics of the conversation, Yeltsin said: "We began our cooperation and we shall continue to cooperate for the sake of the peoples of Russia."

Speaking about the concept of the transfer of Russia's economy to a market-oriented system, known as the "programme of 500 Days", Yeltsin pointed out that it can be implemented only in conditions of an all-union market. "This is why we are working for the programme to be adopted by other republics," he said, recalling that it had already been approved by specialists from all republics, with the exception of Estonia.

At the end of the conversation Yeltsin stressed that Russia "intends to move more rapidly and more quickly towards reforms, but if the centre lags behind, it is their fault".

Atlantic Treaty Association Delegation Visits

LD1409063790 Moscow TASS in English 0627 GMT 14 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow September 14 TASS—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy has received a delegation from the Atlantic Treaty Association, led by its head B. Gomes.

The Soviet side said it was necesary to institutionalise the European process and create all-European security structures. It was noted that an important role might be played by the forthcoming Paris summit of country-participants in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Yakovlev Receives Netherlands Delegation

LD1309181690 Moscow TASS in English 1745 GMT 13 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow September 13 TASS—Member of the Presidential Council Aleksandr Yakovlev received today a delegation of the general states (parliament) of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, led by Wim Deetman, (Christian Democratic Party), chairman of the second chamber.

They discussed perestroyka in the Soviet Union, possible consequences of the transfer of the Soviet economy to a market-oriented system and the development of the all-European process in the setting of changes taking place on the continent.

TASS Journalist Denied German Visa

LD1409064990 Moscow TASS in English 0617 GMT 14 Sep 90

[By TASS commentator Alexey Sergeyev]

[Text] Moscow September 13 TASS—There is no need, perhaps, for a long discourse on the role of journalists in the development of mutual understanding between nations and on the construction of a common European home, the residents of which want the right to freely exchange ideas and information.

This is an axiom, as is the thesis that journalists should not be interefered with in their work, but, on the contrary, should be assisted as much as possible, this is also required by the Helsinki final act. The Soviet Union abides by such an approach with regard to foreign journalists. And it has the right to expect reciprocity from foreign partners.

West Germany has denied an entry visa to a veteran TASS journalists, recently appointed to head the TASS office in that country. The journalist, Sergey Sosnovskiy, spent many years in both Germanys working for TASS. He is well know there both as a journalist and a member of the central board of the USSR-West Germany Friendship Society. He has visited West Germany several times, including at the invitation of governmental bodies. This time, Bonn officials did not hurry to grant a visa, and after two months of delay returned the visa application to the Soviet Foreign Ministry's consular department.

This coincided with the "two-plus-four" talks in Moscow, at which the foreign ministers of six nations signed a historic treaty on the final settlement with respect to Germany. Against the background of the warming up of relations between the two countries, the establishment of new ties and the renunciation of the old stereotypes, the denial of a visa to a Soviet journalist representing a world news agency can only leave observers perplexed.

The journalist has been denied a possibility of providing objective information about the developments in the country, which is expected by TASS subscribers in the Soviet Union and abroad. One would like to hope that the action stemmed from a misunderstanding.

Moscow on Prospects for Cyprus Solution

NC1309183790 Moscow in Greek to Cyprus 1630 GMT 13 Sep 90

[Text] According to reports from New York UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar has expressed concern over the continuing deterioration of the situation in Cyprus and the lack of progress in the intercommunal talks on the island. Our commentator Aleksandr Mikhaylov writes:

For many newspapers the UN secretary general's statement was not the main news item of the day, because their attention is focused on the Gulf crisis. However, the Cyprus problem had not received much publicity during the past months either. After the dynamic changes two years ago the intercommunal dialogue first began to warm up but later was suspended. Despite expectations the parties were not able to find the key to a settlement. The Cyprus problem has entered a period of instability and vagueness. There was a repetition of the situation as it existed four weeks ago with one important difference: The international situation changed. With surprising speed decade-long disputes have been eliminated. One could say that soon it will be Cyprus' turn. Currently, however, unfortunately we are not more optimistic than a year ago, although the new trends in international relations offer huge possibilities for the settlement of the Cyprus problem.

In my opinion Cyprus now has another chance for a solution because international law has ceased to be subject to various interpretations. In Cyprus the activity of the United Nations and its secretary general is producing results. Simultaneously, joint Soviet-U.S. efforts for the solution to regional problems can be included among the positive developments of the last few years. I have enumerated the factors that can change the well-known lineup in Cyprus: The one wants but cannot while the other can but does not want and the third parties neither want nor can.

At the same time foreign pressures, regardless of how strong they may be, will not produce results unless the deadlock in the intercommunal talks is overcome. If the parties do not orient themselves toward a reasonable compromise and a quick solution to the problem which will consider the interests of both communities, they will not be able to take advantage of the current period. Continued deadlock in the internal Cypriot dialogue and a devotion to a tough line will inevitably exacerbate the situation on the island and around it. It is not necessary to say that this would be the worst script for developments on the island.

Bakatin Praises Work of Cypriot Police

LD1309213990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1845 GMT 13 Sep 90

[Interview with USSR Internal Affairs Minister Vadim Bakatin by unidentified reporter following signing of a cooperation agreement between Cyprus and the USSR on 12 September; date and place not given; from the "Television News Service" program—recorded]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Bakatin] Cyprus, you understand, is a country which is situated on the crossroads of very many routes, from Asia, especially from the Near East to Europe. It is a kind of focal point, a concentration. Suffice it to say that the transit of people through the country is three times greater than the population of the country itself, if you like. You see?

There exists there a whole interwoven tissue of interests of both international terrorists and those who are involved in the matters of the transit of narcotics, and many other problems, see? Therefore, there exists there a pool of very rich experience. And, if we have a relatively calm atmosphere in Cyprus, then this points to the very high class, the very high level, of the work of the Cypriot police. We all observe this, and therefore we have something to learn from the experience of the Cypriot police in matters of economic crimes, bearing in mind our transition to a market economy. For us, any experience is very valuable, because so far we have, let's be frank, little experience. No, we have no experience whatsoever.

[Reporter] We are starting from zero.

[Bakatin] Yes, we are starting from zero. Therefore, it is very important.

Soviet Fighter Crash at Italian Air Show

PM1409090490 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Report by correspondent V. Belikov: "Soviet Fighter Crashes in Italy"]

[Text] A Soviet Su-27 fighter-interceptor, on show for the first time in Italy, crashed on Sunday at the international air show in Salgareda, near Venice.

Your IZVESTIYA correspondent was told at the Aviation Industry Ministry that the aircraft, belonging to the M. Gromov Flight Research Institute, was carrying out an ordinary demonstration flight in front of 40,000 spectators. It was piloted by the institute's test pilot Rimas Stankiavichius, who had also undergone training on the "Buran" spacecraft program. A technical backup group and representatives of the institute leadership were with him at the show in Italy.

Immediately on completing a loop the fighter was suddenly engulfed in flames. Brushing an observation post, where there was also a small group of spectators, the Su-27 crashed to the ground.

It is not yet known what caused the crash and the pilot's death, but it has been reliably established that the pilot was grappling with the aircraft's controls until the last moment, trying to prevent it from hitting anyone. Perhaps that is why he failed to use the ejector seat. However, casualties were not completely avoided: A volunteer helper at the airfield was killed and several other people, including children, were injured when the aircraft crashed and exploded.

There was another air crash a month before the show. An "Alpha-T6" aircraft, with Italian pilot M. Ferrari and Soviet pilot L. Lobas on board, crashed during a rehearsal. The Italian was killed, our pilot was injured.

Belonogov, Swedish Envoy Discuss Gulf Situation

LD1309173190 Moscow TASS in English 1613 GMT 13 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow September 13 TASS—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Belonogov today exchanged views on the situation in the Persian Gulf zone with Swedish Ambassador to the Soviet Union Carl Otto Orjan Berner.

Latin America & Caribbean

'Embassy Crisis' Ends in Cuba

PM1309150390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by IZVESTIYA correspondent A. Kamorin: "Finale of 'Embassy Crisis'"]

[Text] Havana—According to a GRANMA report, the last of the 53 Cuban citizens who entered the territory of a number of diplomatic missions in Havana has left the Spanish Embassy.

As is well known, during the summer several groups of Cubans who wanted to emigrate took refuge in the embassies of Czechoslovakia, Spain, Canada, and other states. In a number of cases these actions led to a cooling of relations between Cuba and the countries which allowed the fugitives into their missions and, in the case of Spain, led to such contentious steps as the reduction of bilateral economic cooperation.

The only compromise formula arrived at was a promise from the Cuban side not to prosecute those who voluntarily left the embassies' territory. All those taking part in this unusual demonstration eventually took advantage of that agreement.

Summing up the results of the "embassy crisis," GRANMA places the main responsibility for the summer's events, predictably, on the United States, accusing Washington of deliberately exaggerating the emigre problem. To back up this thesis it gives the following information: 20,000 citizens have now been given official permission to leave Cuba, over 700 of whom have served time for various "counterrevolutionary crimes." These people cannot leave the island for the simple reason that the U.S. authorities are refusing them a visa. No statistics are given on how many Cubans in all have declared their desire to emigrate.

To avert incidents like the "embassy crisis" in the future, the Cuban authorities have issued two stern warnings. First, "absolutely no one who enters or is accepted on the territory of diplomatic missions for the purpose of obtaining emigration privileges will be given permission to leave the country either at that time or in the future." Whether that means that future participants in "embassy" actions will automatically be "black listed" is not clear at the moment. Second, it turns out that freedom from criminal responsibility for the fugitives was granted "this time" only. This is a clear hint of tougher actions by the authorities in the future.

Correction to Latin America Expert on Cuba Ties

PY1209200090

The following correction pertains to the item headlined "Latin American 'Expert' Assesses Ties With Cuba," published in the 11 September Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, page 26:

Column two, make sourceline read: Moscow in Spanish to Latin America 2300 GMT 6 Sep 90 (correcting date)

Supreme Soviet

Supreme Soviet's Legislative Program Noted

90UN2779A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 9 Sep 90 p 1

[Interview with K. Lubenchenko, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Legislation Committee, by A. Kozhakhmetova; place and date not given: "'I Do Not Want To Work in the Dark'"]

[Text] *While the summer time-out continues for members of the Union parliament, the country is changing in appearance not by the day but by the hour. New independent legislative authorities have been formed in all the republics. How will the USSR Supreme Soviet organize its business under these conditions, what laws will it enact at the fourth session which opens tomorrow—these and other questions were put by our correspondent to K. Lubenchenko, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Legislation Committee.*

[Lubenchenko] Smiling as we go down. Thereby, in a couple of words might we describe the situation we are in. But seriously, I am well aware how difficult it will be now for the country's Supreme Soviet. Its authority is catastrophically low among the electorate and we have become a permanent butt of criticism. Practically no law is working, and not because they are bad in themselves; no, they were in many instances prepared very skillfully and contain new ideas. But serious flaws impeding the development of the progressive ideas themselves were embedded in them from the outset. This applies to the law on property, the cooperative system, land, leasing, and so forth. The point being that they are oriented toward man's interests, but the departments are preventing progress. Aside from this, there are also of course factors like the unregulated nature of relations between the Union and the republics, interethnic contacts, and separatist movements.

And one further very important point. A corps of deputies which has the necessary majority to adopt the most radical decisions and laws is represented in the Russian Supreme Soviet. We have lacked such a majority, and we have not influenced the development of events but merely endeavored to keep pace with them.

[Kozhakhmetova] Nonetheless, Konstantin Dmitriyevich, the country's Supreme Soviet is a complete organism in which work has already been organized....

[Lubenchenko] Yes, thank heavens we have learned to listen to one another and are no longer in our sessions demonstrating a state of nervous excitement as is happening in other forums. But this is not enough. There are no political decisions changing our life for the better. It is not we who are pulling society after us—it is we who are being pulled. And we will now be in serious political confrontation with the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] parliament, of which the most assertive and strongest politician deputies are members. They constituted the nucleus of B. Yeltsin's team and have occupied the key positions in the Russian Council of Ministers.

You say that work has been organized, but technical support is still at the lowest level. There is no information, either domestic or foreign. We do not know fully what the budget expenditure of the government, the Defense Ministry, or the KGB is. We do not know what kind of economic agreements and transactions which could affect the country's interests are being concluded. And this is the state in which deputies of the Supreme Soviet are on Monday to learn what kind of program of transition to the market the Union Government is proposing. For me and the members of our committee, and for other deputies also, this is still some kind of official secret. But we were, after all, to have received it and to have worked on it back on 1 September. I fear that we will have to take the draft on hearsay and then put questions impulsively.

[Kozhakhmetova] So what kind of program will you be discussing?

[Lubenchenko] I use the words "it seems," which are absurd for a member of parliament, but I can use no others: It seems that we will be offered some symbiosis of two drafts, although this is being strongly opposed by the Russian deputies who will consider only the latter. [sentence as published] Not all members of the Supreme Soviet, incidentally, will come totally unprepared. Some groups of deputies, the Interregional Group included, have for two days been discussing questions of the transition to the market economy. So there will be someone tomorrow, I hope, to speak and put the questions which are making the rounds.

[Kozhakhmetova] Aside from the concept of transition to the market, which laws will be examined at the session?

[Lubenchenko] The agenda will depend entirely on the main aspect—the question of the market. But in any event we will discuss laws on demonopolization, the banks and the banking system, pricing, the procedure of entry into the USSR and exit from the country, public associations of citizens, and freedom of worship. Not a final list; everything will, I repeat, be decided literally in a few days.

[Kozhakhmetova] Konstantin Dmitriyevich, one has heard often recently that under the new political and economic conditions the USSR Supreme Soviet should disband lest it become an assemblage of wedding-speech generals. How do you view this?

[Lubenchenko] A new economic agreement will shortly be concluded among the republics, and bodies to which these republics delegate certain political functions will consequently arise. What they will be like specifically it is now hard to say. I am for the creation of our own version of the Europarliament. And it is all the more essential for us now to enhance the authority of legislators of this level and become a parliament, not a talking-shop.

Lukyanov Meets With Group of Stalin's Victims

LD1209183790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1500 GMT 12 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow, 12 Sep (TASS)—Issues of guaranteeing the rights and interests of citizens and peoples who suffered from the mass repressions in the years of Stalin's rule were discussed at a meeting held today between Anatoliy Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and N. Numerov, president of the All-Union Asociation for the Victims of Illegal Repressions.

They examined ways of expanding public participation in putting into practice the measures being taken by the supreme soviet and the government of the country to overcome the consequences of illegal actions, to provide for the social provision of the victims of repression, and to consolidate society further in dealing with the tasks of perestroyka.

Gorbachev Announces Compromise Plan on Economy

AU1209185890 Paris AFP in English 1843 GMT 12 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow, Sept 12 (AFP) — President Mikhail Gorbachev announced Wednesday [12 September] that the Supreme Soviet, which has been examining two widely diverging blueprints for the Soviet economy's future, will be given a unified version on Thursday.

The new text combines elements of the proposal by Mr. Gorbachev's top economic advisor, Stanislav Shatalin, and that of Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzkhov.

The first seeks to create a market economy in 500 days, the second to largely continue the traditional methods of central planning.

The new text, Mr. Gorbachev said in an interview with Soviet television, was the fruit of "cooperation—not the work of a single man, but of a group." "The most important thing," he said, "is that there are proposals from the federated republics."

The republics too will have to approve whatever plan is chosen, but the largest one, Russia, has already adopted the radical Shatalin plan.

Copies of the new text will be distributed to the members of the Supreme Soviet, or parliament, and to the Soviets of the republics.

The draft economic reform programs are being examined by some 15 committees and are expected to need several days before they can meet in full session to take a decision.

The debate on the pace of economic reform erupted with a stormy session of parliament Tuesday. Mr. Ryzkhov threatened to resign if his government's proposals were not implemented and Mr. Gorbachev had to bang his fist on the table to restore order.

The Soviet leader expressed a preference for the shock program of Mr. Shatalin, who co-chairs a special economic reform commission with the president of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin. Their 1,500-page plan calls for wide-ranging privatisation and a lifting of price controls.

Mr. Ryzkhov's plan, already rejected by the Supreme Soviet in June, calls for some price rises but under state control and accompanied by measures to soften their social impact. The prime minister argued for it in the light of failure to agree on other plans.

Mr. Gorbachev does not want the Ryzhkov government to resign for the time being, however, and persuaded the deputies to give him a vote of confidence. The president wants to maintain the present government until a new treaty between the various Soviet republics is signed, probably in December.

Ryzhkov Calls for Political Solution in Gulf

LD1309162490 Moscow International Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 13 Sep 90

[Excerpts] Dear listeners, at the request of the Soviet deputies the issue of the Soviet position on events in the Gulf was included in the agenda of the current fourth session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. [passage omitted]

Now, dear listeners, here is the opinion of Nikolay Ryzhkov, USSR Council of Ministers chairman, about ways to solve the conflict. He is expressing his opinion especially for our Arab listeners.

[Ryzhkov in Russian fading into Arabic translation] I think that the principal issue about which Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President George Bush talked in Helsinki was settling this crisis using political means, and that this crisis should not be allowed to become a broad military confrontation.

The situation in the Gulf region is very complicated; therefore all political means should be used to settle the conflict. We prefer international collective methods within the context of the UN, and also bilateral and multilateral relations among all the sides concerned with the conflict.

I think that the Arabs themselves should play the essential role in settling the conflict, and that they should find a common language among themselves, with the help of the international community, to restore peace and stability in that region. [passage omitted]

Alternatives for Market Relations Discussed

LD1409062390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 14 Sep 90

[Text] At the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet and at meetings of committees and commissions, people's deputies will continue discussing alternative concepts of transition to a market economy today. To answer numerous questions, the authors of these projects have been invited to attend the meeting.

Scientists from the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee have conducted an opinion poll on attitude to the market. It was carried out in various regions of the country. Forty-five percent of those polled are in favor of market relations while 33 percent are against. Almost two thirds of those polled reject the possibility of unemployment.

A joint sitting of the chambers is under way at the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet this morning. A draft law on freedom of conscience has been submitted for discussion. As usual, our correspondents will tell you about the Supreme Soviets' work during the day.

14 Sep Supreme Soviet Meeting Reported

LD1409104290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0800 GMT 14 Sep 90

[Report by M. Novitskya from the 14 September meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet in Moscow—live]

[Text] Good afternoon. I must say that there are almost as many people in the hall of the Supreme Soviet chambers today as at a plenary meeting. Only the main commissions on economic reform were to get together, but a very large number of deputies have turned up. After all Academician Shatalin, leader of the working group; Academician Abalkin, who defends the governmental program; and Academician Aganbegyan, who was instructed by the president to prepare an agreed version, have been invited here. Aganbegyan spoke first today and stressed immediately that the agreed project is based on the Shatalin group's program. Why? The main point, in Aganbegyan's view, is that Shatalin's concept has been prepared with the participation of all the republics. He even said that the program's authors had performed quite a feat by managing to attain a consensus among all the republics within an extremely short time, around 20 days. Nothing may be changed in these sections, Academician Aganbegyan believes. After all, the sovereignty declarations adopted by many of the republics have radically altered the situation, whereas the government in his view is proposing an extremely centralized version.

The second point is, according to the Shatalin group's concept, the transition to the market will begin by stabilizing the economy and monetary and finance balance. Prices should not be tampered with prior to that. I will clarify here that the Gorbachev-Yeltsin program proposes to release prices in the market gradually and smoothly. According to this program, prices for staple goods, including food, will remain stable for a year [v techeniye goda]. The government program proposes to increase prices simultaneously from as early as 1 January next year; food prices are to be increased 2.1-fold. [as heard] True, full compensation to the population for this is envisioned, but in that case Academician Aganbegyan believes inflation cannot be stopped or shortages eliminated. The Shatalin group's program has many other advantages; however, some sections of the government program have been included into the agreed version, such as a system for controlling employment and cadre training.

The Academician Shatalin and Academician Abalkin set forth their views. I do not know what conclusions the deputies will draw. I for one was more impressed by Academician Shatalin. All answers to questions and debates are yet to come. There is an interval now. We will try to convey all the shades of views to our listeners. I am concluding this report from the Kremlin for the time being.

Lukyanov's 10 Sep Supreme Soviet Address

PM1409082190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Sep 90 Morning Edition pp 1, 3

[Unattributed report: "The Lofty Responsibility of Legislative Power. Report by A.I. Lukyanov at the USSR Supreme Soviet's Fourth Session" in Moscow 10 September]

[Text] Comrade deputies!

The USSR Supreme Soviet's fourth session is opening at a time which is difficult, tense, and really crucial for our society.

Having embarked on the practical implementation of fundamental transformations in the economy, the country now has to undergo serious trials. Economic ties and the consumer market are falling apart. The sociopolitical situation is getting exacerbated. Public opinion is seething. There are sharp polemics about the ways of our state's further development and its ability to act assertively and resolutely.

In these conditions it is extremely important to define with utmost clarity the place of the country's supreme organs of power in the solution of the most complex tasks facing us as regards advancing the economic and political reforms; overcoming conservatism and extremism; strengthening legality and law and order; and—let us be blunt about it—ensuring normal life in every city and village, in every region, and in the state as a whole.

Now that we are moving toward market relations, now that we are almost at the point of radically renewing the union of the republics, and now that state and party functions are being really separated, the activity of the

Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet acquires special importance and at the same time encounters previously unknown difficulties.

There is no special need to prove that these difficulties are directly associated with the very nature of the transition period, with the fact that the old management system has still not departed from the stage while the new one is still shaky, and the fact that the effect of manifestations of nationalism and separatism and the sharp decline of state discipline is acutely felt. If this continues into the future, we will come up against a situation whereby the growth of negative processes could lead society into a dangerous state of destabilization.

A desire to prevent such a turn of events was the guideline of work by the Congress of People's Deputies and the USSR Supreme Soviet.

As you may recall it was the Congress that approved the idea of radical economic reform and adopted a decision on its acceleration. It was the Congress that paved the way toward solving key questions of political reform like ensuring full power by soviets, changing the CPSU's position in the political system, instituting the presidency, and making all state and social structures gear their work to man and the protection of his rights and freedoms. Finally, it was the Congress that laid down the basic parameters for our Union's renewal.

The USSR Supreme Soviet acted along the selfsame avenue. Gradually acquiring the characteristics of a permanently functioning legislative organ, it adopted within a brief period more than 50 laws each one of which—despite the headlong progress of the changes now under way—makes a considerable contribution to the implementation of planned reforms and the radical change of social relations. The Supreme Soviet's formal showpiece status has receded into the past. It convincingly asserts its autonomy and its exclusive accountability to the Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

In the light of all this, recent proposals to curtail the functions of the Congress and the USSR Supreme Soviet, and even to disband them, appear absolutely groundless. To render the country's parliament inactive at such a complex and acute period of our history when the peoples' destiny is being decided and the new course of society's development is making headway with pains and contradictions, would mean letting the cause of renewal just drift along and depriving those whom the people have entrusted with the exercise of supreme state power of any participation in the perestroyka processes. Such a step would inevitably loosen the management system further still, would intensify illegality and anarchy, and would thrust further back all our ideas and practical deeds aimed at the creation of a rule-of-law state, let alone the fact that this would run contrary to the will of voters who gave the country's deputies a mandate of trust and would be perceived as a deviation from the performance of pledges given by deputies to the people.

As you know, the Supreme Soviet gave paramount attention to the national economy's problems and its transfer to market relations. The creation of a fully fledged market is the core of the economic reform. We are consistently moving along this avenue and today we already have at our disposal laws on ownership, on land, on enterprises, on the cooperative movement, on leasing, on taxation, and a series of other fundamental union laws.

You may recall how strictly the Supreme Soviet analyzed the USSR Council of Ministers' proposals on specific steps associated with the transition to regulated market economy. Following comprehensive consideration and criticism, these proposals were sent back for further elaboration. But the Supreme Soviet also expressed its awareness of the fact that the government has no alternative and that transition to the market, to reform of ownership relations, and to elimination of monopolism represents the only correct way for extricating the country from the crisis. This is why the entire package of problems associated with the resolute introduction of market relations are today the central task facing the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Bearing this in mind, the Supreme Soviet Presidium considers it necessary to actually single out the measures for transition to the market economy and the relevant draft laws as the first group of questions being submitted for consideration by the present session.

As you know, the process of preparing the concept for transition to the market was complex and, it can be said, pluralistic in full measure. Let me remind you that the USSR Supreme Soviet back in June this year instructed the government to make amendments to the documents debated at the third session and to submit by September a package of interconnected measures for shaping the structure and mechanism of the market economy. Alongside the measures elaborated by the government, substantive proposals were prepared by scientists and experts belonging to the collective created by the USSR president and the chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet. A group of independent experts analyzed about 120 alternative drafts. After discussion of all these materials at the 30-31 August sittings of the Council of the Federation and the Presidential Council, work was done to reach agreement on existing disputed questions under the USSR President's leadership and with the participation of representatives of the governments of all Union republics.

In this way, the Union parliament will be dealing with a synthesis of the most diverse opinions with the collective work of many people who have striven to untangle the most complex knots of our national economy's development. Moreover, the consideration of proposals for practical steps for stabilization of the economy and transition to the market will take place not only in the USSR Supreme Soviet but also in the Supreme Soviets of the Union republics. This is exceptionally important since such an unconventional method of working out the concept of entry into market relations will provide an opportunity to concretize this concept as applied to the special features of each region and each sovereign state belonging to the USSR.

It is equally important that work will continue simultaneously to create a legal basis for the establishment of market relations. In this context, the government was instructed to submit to the Supreme Soviet in August-October drafts of a series of fundamental laws. To date 13 drafts have been handed over including: Fundamentals of Legislation on Investment Activity; On the Population's Employment; On Social Protection of the Disabled; On Price Formation; and laws on banks, on foreign currency regulation, on customs dues, and others.

During September-October, the Council of Ministers proposes submitting several more draft laws, and this will bring the total number of acts connected with the transition to market relations to about 20.

At the same time the government, as instructed by the USSR Supreme Soviet's 13 June 1990 resolution, is working on the adoption of its own acts and the drafting of presidential acts directed at the introduction of the market. Specifically, resolutions have already been promulgated on joint stock companies, on development of small enterprises, and on antimonopoly policy which will undoubtedly have to be formulated and adopted in the form of appropriate laws.

Here, however, I would like to offer one clarification. During the preparation and adoption of these acts, just as during the elaboration of the concept of the introduction of market relations, voices were and are being heard saying that some laws recently adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet should be amended right away without any delay, and even repealed.

What are we to do? To what extent are such demands justified? Indeed, the changes in the country's economic situation are rapid. They do of course expose and will continue to expose the imperfections of various legislative provisions we have adopted. But this hardly justifies repudiating a Union law and demanding its repeal out of hand and "at first sight," as the saying goes, at times even before it has come into force.

Let the need for this be demonstrated by practice, let it be confirmed by the actual experience of transition to the market. Especially as work should be done and is already being done on preparing the plan and budget of the USSR and the republics for next year on the basis of the recently adopted legislative acts. This work must not be stopped, must not be slowed down, if we want to seriously manage the national economy and, even more so, to stabilize it.

It is proposed that the draft state plan for economic and social development and the draft state budget for 1991 be included in the agenda of the session as a separate question which will also have to be most thoroughly examined by deputies. The relevant materials should be submitted by the Gosplan [State Planning Committee] and the Ministry of Finance to the permanent commissions and committees not later than 25 September. After a detailed study of these materials they will make their representations to the government which will then submit the finalized plan and budget for consideration by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

What should be borne in mind here? First of all, the fact that the contents of the plan and budget and their preparation by government organs and consideration by the Supreme Soviet will differ substantially from prevailing practice. Next year—the year of the stabilization of the economy and entry into market relations—will bring to the forefront tasks which are completely new for us. These are the counteracting of inflation and the indexation of the population's money incomes, support for enterprise and the sale of some enterprises to personal and family ownership, the introduction of measures on the social protection of the population, and—and this is the main point—the utmost and strictest saving of state funds. At the same time it will be necessary to ensure the uninterrupted financing of the social programs we have adopted and to achieve the fulfillment of the second session's decisions concerning the considerable reduction in the budget deficit.

Briefly speaking, the new tasks demand new approaches by the permanent commissions of the chambers and the Supreme Soviet committees. Moreover, it must also be borne in mind that as of this year the USSR Supreme Soviet is empowered to ratify only the Union budget.

These are a few of the basic and most fundamental aspects of the consideration of the entire block of economic problems.

The entire work of the current Supreme Soviet session will bear the exceptionally important imprint of the fact that it will be held in conditions when the destiny of our multinational Union is being decided. We are growing more and more convinced of the need for its fundamental renewal and its transformation into a Union of sovereign states, for the creation of conditions for the national rebirth and self-determination of each Soviet people. It is precisely this which constitutes the path toward mutual understanding and cooperation among the Soviet nations and the elimination of interethnic conflicts whose acute nature is unfortunately not abating.

That is why the preparation of a new Union treaty has now become one of the most urgent problems. This work has already become a practicality. It is based upon a sufficiently extensive mass of documents, both in the form of Union laws connected with the delimitation of the powers of the USSR and the subjects of the federation, and of all the most important provisions contained in the declarations on sovereignty adopted by the majority of Union republics, and now by autonomous republics as well.

Today we are faced with the task of collating, of condensing as it were, all that is most valuable and constructive in these documents and that unites the sovereign republics and requires their joint efforts. It is in those areas where such common efforts and common concern for the good of the country are required that the need arises to delegate certain powers at inter-republic level and to transfer them to USSR organs whose functions should be outlined precisely and unambiguously. The sovereign republics themselves must bear the responsibility for everything else. That was not a slip of the tongue seeing that sovereignty is not just a sum total of the rights exercised by an independent state, but full responsibility for everything that happens on its territory. That is why concluding a new Union treaty means dividing responsibility for the implementation of perestroyka at the center and at local level, ensuring the decentralization of management which is so absolutely necessary in a vast state like ours, and having the republics voluntarily transfer to the competence of the Union only those powers which make it possible to guarantee the rights of Soviet people and to ensure the full-blooded and normal functioning of our society as a single whole.

Naturally this is not easy to do. Efforts, patience, and mutual understanding will all be needed. Consequently the renewal—which essentially means the creation of a fundamentally new Union treaty—can be approached only via a broad and democratic dialogue; the establishment of permanent business contacts; and meetings between leaders of Union and autonomous republics' Supreme Soviets and deputies, and the involvement of skilled experts, experienced practitioners, and authoritative scientists in this joint work.

As a matter of fact, the majority of republics have already actively joined this work. As is known, consultative meetings between the working group of the USSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers and representatives of 12 republics have been held in Moscow. At these there was a detailed exchange of opinions on the widest range of questions concerning the preparation of a new Union treaty. The positions on the main conceptual problems were revealed more clearly.

It is understandable that these positions do not always coincide. At times the republics' perception of a Union treaty is quite different. The actual coordination of these viewpoints will not be easy. This was noted at a recent sitting of the Council of the Federation and the Presidential Council whose participants, having positively assessed the significance of the work already done, agreed to form a committee to prepare a new Union treaty. This committee comprising high-ranking state leaders of the Union and the republics—including the USSR president, the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers—will start its work already in September, step by step bringing the positions closer together and working out common approaches in order to ultimately arrive at the best possible version of this fundamental document.

In order to ensure that the USSR Supreme Soviet is kept fully informed and provide a kind of additional "synchronization of watches" in the elaboration of the Union treaty, the Supreme Soviet Presidium deems it expedient to hear at the current session a report on the progress of this very important work, bearing in mind that subsequently the main avenues in the preparation of the new Union treaty and the procedure for its conclusion will obviously become the topic of debate at the next Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

Here it makes sense to touch upon, if only briefly, a further aspect which has appeared in connection with the preparation of a new Union treaty. The point is that some deputies are speaking in favor of us altogether refraining from adopting any kind of new Union laws before the treaty's ratification, inasmuch as the sword of Damocles is supposedly hanging over them in any case—nonrecognition by republics which have proclaimed the primacy of republican over Union laws. I think that such a position does not stand up to criticism either from the political and juridical or from the economic points of view.

From the political and juridical aspect it should be perfectly clear: Inasmuch as the powers of the Union may be changed only with the consent of all, and not by each individual republic, then until a new Union treaty is signed it is necessary to unconditionally observe the Constitution now in force and the USSR laws promulgated within the limits of its competence. Otherwise the whole legal system existing in our country and the broadest sphere of social relations will be placed in doubt. A significant portion of them are now directly regulated by Union legislation. In the current circumstances, to try and replace overnight the thousands of Union norms with republican ones is simply beyond the capabilities of any one republic. And the haste to do this, which can be noticed in some places, can produce nothing good. Everything must follow its course in normal political conditions.

Disregard for Union legislation is also fraught with other negative consequences. Attempts to unilaterally establish an order whereby Union laws have effect on a republic's territory only subject to its consent are quite lightly copied by lower-ranking soviets which also start picking and choosing only those of the republic's laws which "suit" them, as it were, refusing to recognize the "unsuitable" ones. This is unfortunately not a hypothetical situation. The effects of such absurd sovereignty have already been felt down to rayon and rural soviet level.

Of course, such practice has nothing in common with the shaping of a rule-of-law state and the strengthening of legality.

As regards this problem's economic aspect, the republics themselves as well as economic managers and specialized scientists have been more and more confidently arriving at the same substantial conclusion over the last few months. Its essence is that a transition to market relations in the USSR can be effected only subject to the creation of a single economic space, ruling out any barriers which hamper the autonomy of labor collectives and the freedom of entrepreneurial activity, therefore only within the framework of an all-Union market. The preservation of the integrity of the monetary, credit, and taxation systems—and of common rules for price formation, accounting, and statistics throughout the country's territory—constitute an absolute condition for the existence of such a single market. Moreover, the declarations of sovereignty by most republics add to this provisions about the need to transfer to the USSR powers in the spheres of defense and security; energy; transport and communications; elaboration of international, foreign economic, and customs policy; guaranteed ecological well-being; assisted development of backward regions; elimination of the consequences of natural disasters; struggle against crime; and solution of a series of other questions posed by today's economic conditions and the real situation in society.

Of course all these spheres demand clear-cut legal regulation primarily by means of Union laws and all-Union legislation whose elaboration is borne by the present members of the USSR Supreme Soviet. If the future Union treaty introduces amendments to the powers of Union and republican organs as regards various spheres of life, the Union legislation will have to be correspondingly amended. Until such time, however, it must remain in force throughout the country's territory if we want to have at least elementary law and order and legality.

This fully applies also to the drafts of those laws which were considered by the Supreme Soviet at first reading and which it is now proposed to include in the agenda of our session. There are eight such draft laws.

Of these, it is planned to consider at second reading and to adopt laws on public associations of citizens; on the freedom of conscience and religious organizations; on leave entitlement; on the Soviet militia; and on the procedure for leaving and entering the USSR.

We also have to define our attitude toward the draft law on the procedure for recalling USSR people's deputies, which was also published in the press and which should in due course be submitted for consideration by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies. In the very near future we will evidently also have to address a draft law on trade unions—it has been submitted by the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions]—especially since it is closely linked with the law on public associations.

A large group of draft laws is being presented for consideration at first reading. The list of these laws has been thoroughly worked out and distributed to all people's deputies.

Quite an extensive legislative program is thus being submitted to the fourth session. It will not be easy to cope with it, but we simply have no other way out. In the course of discussing the proposed agenda, amendments and additions to it are of course possible. But on the whole I think that the agenda meets both the demands of life and the demands of the situation. That was actually the conclusion reached by the Supreme Soviet Presidium having considered this question and relying upon the conclusions of the Supreme Soviet committees and the chambers' commissions which did a vast amount of work on preparations for the session. Incidentally, the total of all the draft laws which are either already in our portfolio or on their way there stands at over 100. But a single session, looking at our past experience, can consider at best only one-third of this number. This is probably what we should proceed from, especially since here we face a further two, possibly most acute problems. They are the problem of improving the quality of laws and the problem of actual and consistent implementation of laws.

Speaking about the quality of normative acts, it has already been noted on numerous occasions that a great lot depends on the organization of preparatory work in scientific organizations, in ministries and departments, in the government, and of course directly in our working organs—the committees and commissions. People say nowadays that the Supreme Soviet has entered a crazy lawmaking race. Yes, life is really hurrying us on. Some draft laws are elaborated in haste and not comprehensively enough, they lack a reliable mechanism for the application of norms. The so-called "enabling" normative acts, without which it is impossible to apply the laws, are being prepared very slowly. The republics are also lagging in this regards, and this is having an adverse effect on, for example, the fundamentals of legislation on land, on leasing, on local self-management, and several other union acts.

Of course, we must learn to anticipate this kind of breakdown. But any imperfection of the normative base itself or the quality of various laws do not in any way relieve people of their duty to obey them. And yet now we are in a situation whereby legislative acts are no longer observed by the organs of power themselves while many officials at both local and central level do not even have the time to read and ponder the law.

The new norms and principles quite often come up against rigid rejection by old structures which in essence block the laws, even under the seemingly plausible excuse that they are imperfect or insufficiently radical. Briefly speaking, there are attempts by the right and the left alike to disregard new acts and to nurture disrespect for the law. Let us be frank: At times we ourselves help to diminish the law's strength when, in the course of debates, we raise doubts about the norms to be adopted and thus encourage the legal nihilism which flourished for decades in our country and today is frequently transformed not only into an ideological but also I would say a considerable material force.

The main factors in solving the problem of implementing the laws—and this must be emphasized with utmost certainty—have been and still remain the clear-cut organization of permanent and effective monitoring and the taking of each official strictly to task. Their weakness, and at times even their complete absence, can be felt everywhere today. Executive discipline has become the most vulnerable link in the work of management organs at all levels, starting with enterprises, construction sites, and kolkhozes [collective farms]; and ending with Union ministries in whose activity today we can notice the full spectrum of hues—from confusion to overt or covert resistance. The work of law enforcement organs, whose duty it is not only to apply the laws but also to monitor their performance by all institutions, officials, and citizens, is clearly lagging behind the situation's demands. The press continues to report more and more new cases of laws being grossly trampled by criminal elements. And yet it has been known for a long time that the commission of fresh crimes is encouraged more than by anything else by impunity with regard to past crimes. And so it is with the laws—to put it mildly, nonperformance of some engenders and a cool attitude toward others.

Proof of this was provided by our meetings with the population and our conversations with deputies returning from their electoral districts. One thing is clear: The demand to resolutely impose the strictest of order and discipline and to wage a merciless struggle against raging crime is today perhaps more important than all other demands and complaints by people at local level.

In these conditions, the USSR Supreme Soviet must sharply turn in the direction of the performance of its monitoring functions. The "driving force" of this monitoring should be primarily the committees and commissions as well as the Supreme Soviet Presidium as coordinator of all this work. While remaining a component of the mechanism of legislative power and without supplanting organs of management and the government, it is incumbent upon them to take on a much greater share of monitoring the implementation of laws in the country.

Comrade deputies, we are not talking simply about the strength or impotence of the laws we adopt. We are talking about the authority of power. This is why the most important problems of monitoring must be permanently in the field of vision not only of committees and commissions but also of the entire Supreme Soviet. In this context we are fully justified in including in the current session's agenda the question of the implementation of the laws on ownership, on land, on leasing, and on local self-management, of our decisions on the future of the Aral Sea and the elimination of the Chernobyl AES [nuclear power station] accident's consequences and of other Supreme Soviet decisions. It would be correct to retain the practice of monthly replies to deputies' questions by members of the government, to be more demanding as regards the way management organs respond to deputies' questions.

As you know a series of republics recently adopted decisions abolishing people's control. Of course there can be different interpretations of this step. I think, however, that in the conditions of the transition to market relations, when we are witnessing the emergence of sundry wheeler-dealers—including those from the shadow economy—and their fusion with corrupt elements, when the questions of strictest observance of state discipline are especially acute, we should obviously talk not about the abolition of monitoring but about the organization of a better and more effective structure of control organs.

By the way, it would not be amiss to look at world experience in this context. It indicates that market relations force the organs of power, even in very dissimilar states, to constantly strengthen their monitoring system. Furthermore, monitoring services in many countries have been set up directly under the parliaments and constitute a sufficiently ramified network with clear-cut powers. For example the U.S. Congress has, in addition to the Congressional Budget Office, the General Accounting Office with a staff of some 5,000 which performs the broadest monitoring functions.

In this context it is worth giving attention to the proposal by the Soviet of the Union Planning, Budget, and Financial Commission to create, instead of the present Union People's Control Committee, a strong monitoring and auditing organ directly subordinate to the USSR Supreme Soviet. It could evidently be tasked with monitoring the expenditure of Union budget funds, all-state capital investments and their assimilation, the maintenance of state management organs, and much else. Supporting this proposal, the Supreme Soviet Presidium believes that it ought to be most thoroughly studied by the relevant committees and commissions, and then be submitted for consideration at one of our plenary sittings.

On the whole, comrades, the actual logic of the processes of renewal, including those associated with radical steps like the adoption of market relations, demands consistent strengthening of state order and monitoring and harmonization of central and local interests. This is in no way something we have invented. It is a reflection of the general integration laws which can be observed in the contemporary life of the majority of developed states. As for our own—even though scant—experience, it also proves beyond all doubt that unless the inordinate growth of centrifugal tendencies, departmentalism, and parochialism is blocked; unless uniform legality is fully effective; unless decisions which have been voluntarily delegated to the center are fulfilled—to put it briefly, unless firm state power starts functioning to full effect—

there will be no perestroyka. The sign of support for reforms must be precision and order including production, legal, and taxation order; a responsible attitude toward the work in hand; and, briefly speaking, discipline everywhere and in everything.

A few words on organizational matters. There are not all that many for the current session, but they have to be tackled. We are talking about forming a Procedural Commission; appointing a USSR chief arbiter; ratifying changes in the composition of the government, the prosecutor's office collegium, and some of our commissions; and forming ad hoc commissions and groups.

Going beyond the session's framework and looking a little further ahead, we can see on the horizon the preparation for and convening of the next Congress of USSR People's Deputies which could, more than likely, be held in December. Proposals on this subject will be specially considered at the session as will be the proposed Congress agenda which, in all likelihood, could cover the pressing matters of elaborating a new Union treaty, introducing amendments to the Constitution, determining the procedure for recalling USSR people's deputies, and rotating the Supreme Soviet's composition. It is self-evident that time, the development of the situation in the country, public opinion, and the stance of our corps of deputies will help to finally determine the future Congress' work.

Now about the session's working procedures. In view of the fact that it seems impossible to determine in advance the schedule for considering all questions by the day and by the hour, it would be expedient as it was done previously to discuss guideline work schedules for the coming two weeks, depending on the specific timing for submission of drafts and the extent to which they are ready.

Following the agenda's approval, the Supreme Soviet Presidium will introduce a proposal that our session begins by considering the question of immediate measures for the stabilization of the country's national economy and the transition to regulated market economy, adopting a decision on it, and instructing the committees and permanent commissions to work out draft laws directly associated with the implementation of planned measures. Then we could begin their discussion at first reading, followed by consideration at second reading of draft laws on a series of other questions of which I have already spoken.

It is envisaged that debates on the 1991 plan and budget should begin at the end of October and that these documents should be ratified in November after which we will continue considering other items on the agenda, including those associated with the market economy.

The fourth session's work could end by about 25-27 December. And in order to avoid an extension of time schedules, as has happened in the past, we ought to agree right now at the very start of the session on the date when it should finish.

These, comrade deputies, are the proposals on the agenda and work procedure of the USSR Supreme Soviet's fourth session. The Supreme Soviet Presidium asks you to consider them.

As you can see, there is a great volume of work to be done. And in order to achieve what has been planned we will need considerable exertion of energy and utmost precision of work.

There is something I would like to say at this point. In essence, we have to achieve a new pace and new quality of actions by the Supreme Soviet. Bluntly speaking, the past year was largely the year when we mastered the elements of parliamentarianism. In many regards we had to start from scratch, from zero. We learned from one another, we made mistakes, we argued, we gathered experience.

Generally speaking, this stage is now behind us. We can no longer make the excuse that a new Supreme Soviet is taking shape. Time and the situation in the country permit no delays. They demand of the supreme legislative organ much more businesslike efficiency and responsibility, concentration of attention on the fundamental problems of our life.

The voters also demand this of us in their letters and applications to the Supreme Soviet and the mass media. Generally speaking, comrades, it is impossible to overlook that all strata of the population are now suffering from some sort of allergy to the fact that, in terms of words spoken per capita, we have probably surpassed the most developed democracies in the world. People are fed up with barren debates and emotional outbursts, with speeches calculated to appeal to television viewers, with attempts to use all means to promote shop floor or parochial interests. We cannot disregard this.

Largely new demands as regards the organization of the USSR Supreme Soviet's work are also made by the multiparty system which is gaining an increasingly clear shape, by the galvanization of various social movements, associations, and groups. All this will no doubt leave its mark on our parliament's activity and the formation of deputies' groups and factions. It is well known that constitutional prerequisites for this were laid in the decisions of the Third Extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies and the Procedural Rules of the Congress and the Supreme Soviet.

The task now is to create a flexible mechanism for collaboration, to develop dialogue between the factions and groups representing different social streams. Here it would obviously be correct if the positions of deputies' associations were clarified and agreed primarily during preliminary work in committees and commissions. It is there that opinions ought to be compared and common decisions acceptable to all ought to be elaborated. Otherwise there is a danger that our plenary sittings might turn into barren verbal battles, into clashes of heads rather than of minds. In other words, we all must seek ways to thoroughly improve the organization of work bearing in mind the new phenomena in our parliamentary life.

Some people say today that the USSR Supreme Soviet has an intellectual potential which is perfectly adequate for the elaboration of radical decisions and the maintenance of the reputation of the supreme institution of legislative power at the necessary level. At the same time, however, there are people—including some deputies—who assume that nowadays it is altogether difficult to name a problem in the Supreme Soviet which would not produce mutually exclusive opinions. Hence the conclusion that any consolidation and sensible compromise would be altogether impossible here.

Indeed, here we do experience both. There is indeed, and quite often at that a deliberate desire not for a quest of mutually acceptable solutions but for exacerbation and confrontation. But I have no intention of extrapolating any pernicious rules from this. Truth is born out of argument, not out of quarrel.

Generally speaking, it is high time to cease "measuring" the depth of differences in positions and to try, despite all their divergence, to perceive primarily that which unites us. And we must be united by the main and fundamental factor—the shared desire to lead the country out of the crisis, out of the social tension, out of the interethnic feuds. So let us concentrate all our efforts on this. The reliance on our work and the people's expectations today are too high for us to allow ourselves the luxury of turning this most important state work into a debating marathon.

The word "perestroyka" has a constructive rather than a destructive root: "stroit" [to build]. To build, not to demolish. Today there is nothing more important than civic accord, than our people's tranquil and fruitful work. And they are entitled to demand of those whom they have entrusted with the exercise of power to consistently and fully obey these instructions. Voters wish to see the USSR Supreme Soviet as an efficient legislative and monitoring organ possessing the requisite political will and capable of becoming a stabilizer of the complex socioeconomic situation and an organizer of radical reforms, of the strengthening of Soviet statehood and legality.

And if each and every deputy brings his own share of knowledge and labor to the common cause, if the differences of opinions produce not confrontation but a solution of our reality's complex problems, if the concern for the people's destiny prevails over all other considerations—this will be a most befitting application of the USSR Supreme Soviet's intellectual and political potential.

Ryzhkov, Abalkin Hold News Conference on Economy

Transition to Market Discussed

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[Report by correspondent V. Stepanyuk on news conference held by USSR Prime Minister Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov and Leonid Abalkin, chairman of the USSR State Commission for Economic Reform, with Soviet and foreign correspondents in Moscow on 11 September—remarks by Ryzhkov and Abalkin are recorded]

[Text] [Stepanyuk] On 11 September, after the report by the head of the Soviet Government on the fulfillment of the parliamentary instruction on working out a program for the transition to a market economy had been heard at the USSR Supreme Soviet session, Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov and Leonid Ivanovich Abalkin met with Soviet and foreign correspondents. In this program you will see an excerpt of the news conference from which you will be able to judge how the work has gone on the government's program for the transition to market conditions.

[Ryzhkov] In recent months we have been working intensively. We have recruited a colossal number of experts; met with a whole host of people in production, directors of works, and enterprises; and had numerous discussions with specialists. Nearly every day, or every other day, there has been a session of the government where these questions have been discussed very passionately. The discussions have, I would say, been very stormy because on many questions points of view have not coincided. We have tried to persuade one another and sought compromises, and we have progressed gradually, step by step, to the program which was completed on 1 September this year—in other words the day which was proposed by the USSR Supreme Soviet. We have not delayed by a single day.

At the same time, as was proposed by the Supreme Soviet decision in June, we have prepared draft bills which develop this or that point on the transition to market conditions, and we have prepared a number of presidential decrees, some of which have already been issued, giving certain license of this or that measure in the economic sphere to go through. Several decisions of the Council of Ministers have been adopted which also address fundamental economic questions and which have enabled this whole pile of documents to be drawn up and which also enabled preparatory work to be carried out directly by branches of the national economy, at enterprises, and in the Union republics. So the work has been very complex and intensive. The government's leadership—that is the chairman, members of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers, the main ministers and chairmen of committees and our economic departments, and the main ministers—have not taken leave; it was simply proposed, as they say, that no one should go anywhere but sit down all the time and get on with these questions.

We have been very much prompted by the fact that the year 1991 is coming closer and closer. We realized that if we were not ready for 1991 now we could find ourselves with programs—perhaps even ideal programs—but with a national economy which is not ready to function under the new conditions. I tell you this still worries me. When there is passionate discussion of this or that question of the economic program, I always think of what will happen in three months time and how will the country work because this uncertainty on many points is leading to a situation where the national economy is preparing very poorly for 1991. If earlier we had approximately up to 60 percent of treaties already concluded with enterprises by this date, the figure now is only 25 to 30 percent of concluded treaties. In other words, there is a great deal of obscurity on many questions, and the national economy is not ready to function in these new conditions.

We believed that we had all the preconditions for moving over in 1991 to the new principles of a regulated market economy. We think that we have sufficient detailed studies and laws which have been adopted by the Supreme Soviet to enable us to organize the work of the national economy under the new economic conditions. I will not dwell in detail on what this entails—they are matters of taxation and interest rates as well as a number of other documents which differ quite sharply, of course, from those statutes in force under which we have been working in the 12th Five Year Plan, and indeed under which we still have three and a half months to work.

At the same time we considered that for 1991 it is also necessary to employ state regulation because the national economy is not in a state to transfer overnight to total market conditions without, well, a certain amount of state regulation. In our view, that is fraught with grave consequences. This is what we have accomplished.

[Stepanyuk] Answering a question about what real levers of power the central bodies of government will have at their disposal in market economy conditions, Ryzhkov said:

[Ryzhkov] This is the main fundamental issue of disagreement. We consider that in the future our country will be a state with juridical and international rights, and a federative state which will have its own Union property such as military plants, rail transport, and so forth. This issue therefore is the main one—namely, whether or not there is to be a unified state. This state at the present time is called the USSR. Regarding the future name of the state, I do not know what it will be called when the Union treaty is concluded.

For this reason we consider that we should have a federative set-up and that we should have a common economic arena in our country that will make it possible for all republics and all areas, irrespective of territorial and geographical boundaries, to participate as they say in the division of labor. That is the main thing. But at the same time our position is this: Once we have a federative state which has its own Union property—I have already pointed out that the plants in question might be the heavy and basic sectors of the national economy—the appropriate financial aspect should of course also be finalized.

We are proposing to do as all other countries do—and this incidentally is the second fundamental issue of disagreement—we are proposing that taxation definitely be channeled in two ways. That is, taxes should be paid directly to the republic and to the Union budget. A few months ago the Supreme Soviet adopted a decision on the taxation of enterprise profits which spoke of 45 percent as the level of the tax. Of this, 23 percent was allocated to the republican budget and 22 percent to the Union budget. Both budgets—the republic and the Union budgets—will now be drawn up separately. On the basis of what they get from this tax each of them must, as they say, draw up their economic policy.

It has been proposed to us that all the taxation should be only within republics and that for the upkeep of the Union a certain proportion should be allocated for the maintenance of various institutions of authority. It is as yet difficult to say what these institutions of authority would be. Perhaps it would be the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or some other institutions. If there is no Union property, the institutions of authority will indeed be very limited. The structure of government will be limited accordingly, too. This then is the fundamental disagreement. We consider that a two-channel taxation system is definitely needed.

[Stepanyuk] One of the foreign correspondents asked Nikolay Ivanovich to express his attitude towards the alternative draft for transition to the market.

[Ryzhkov] There is very much of interest in it. Much of it coincides with the government program, but there are several fundamental tenets with which the government cannot agree. I have already spoken of one of them. This relates to a unified state, a single all-Union market, the accompanying taxation system and finance and credit systems, and so forth.

Take for instance the issue of banking. Can one seriously talk of a unified state when there will be, say, no single issuing bank, whether it be subordinated to the Supreme Soviet or to the Council of Ministers, and there will be say 15 banks? Can each republic issue money? In this connection question after question arises. That is the trouble. Therefore we do not have agreement on these positions. We have had a small difference over prices.

They criticize me all the time, saying that Ryzhkov is in favor of raising prices. At the same time everyone has been saying over recent months—our opponents whom I shall not name have been saying—we are not in favor of raising prices. You know for the individual, the ordinary individual, the white-collar worker, this is the ideal option; it is ideal. Ryzhkov is enforcing price rises, although he says that they have to be raised, fixed, and that there has to be compensation for this rise. But nevertheless it is a price rise. Other people say: You do not have to do anything with prices, you do not have to raise them. But something else is left unsaid—a transfer to free prices. And we ask our opponents: Tell us, please... I say for example that foodstuffs are to be doubled, and we would have to compensate for this while other people are saying that we should let prices go free... I ask how much, what growth in free prices will there be from 1 January? Excuse me comrades for speaking so directly, God alone knows the answer to this. And in this case, can we really go to the people when God alone knows and we do not know at all? So why should we deceive the people? If these methods do not suit the principle that we are proposing—and we have changed it very considerably, in general, in comparison to the concept of May and June—if it does not suit us, then let us start forecasting for a transition to free prices. What price increases will there be? If we have guarantees that we shall have no avalanche-like price increases, increases by dozens of times, that is one thing. But we do not see such calculations as yet. Therefore this is a dangerous thing. It is a dangerous thing to let prices out of your grasp. They can create such inflation that it will even be difficult to stop it. That is the point.

[Abalkin] Let me add that there are two possible options for a transition to the market. There is the option of a shock transition, an immediate entry into the market, and the option which the government describes. Nikolay Ivanovich said in his report today that we are stubbornly and persistently proposing a radically measured option. We must choose. But it is not a matter of what we would like. We must be realists and assess the readiness of society and the economy to follow a particular option. A monopolist structure of production has come about in our country, and this is not just the ministries—it is technological monopolies. Is the preservation of monopolism compatible with free price formation? Can monopolistic production structures be eliminated by the start of next year? Is the population prepared, unlike other countries that have implemented reforms after decades or years of previous experience, to enter into market structures immediately? Can one enter into them not in the conditions of a stable economy but in conditions of a deepening crisis? Would a transition to immediate market methods stop this descent and start an upward trend, or would it push the economy further down? All these factors must be weighed—the economic structures, the preparedness of the population, existing traditions, public opinion, the existence of surpluses and reserves which are indispensable. It is proposed in particular that trade stocks be created and accumulated by that point so that they will be stabilized. Well, imagine republics, oblasts, or towns in the Soviet Union now starting to pile up stocks at trade depots. What would the population do to those who attempt to do this?

We have to look at things realistically. There are various options, therefore, and the matters cannot be combined. We must choose to proceed along one path or the other. The whole question is which path is the more realistic, corresponds to the conditions that have come about, leads to fewer social distortions, and is capable after several months of not causing such a shock that will remove for decades the desire of the population and the government to engage in a transition to the market and will achieve this transition as smoothly as possible, although it will take longer. Yes, this is the longer path.

Yes this will be more moderate, moderately radical as we call it. But in our opinion it matches up to realities, and the readiness of those who will have to deal with this program to be responsible for making it possible with difficulty and pain, but yet possible. That program of course also requires that someone prepared to (?implement) this variant should declare his readiness to conduct such a policy and take on responsibility both for the program and for its consequences.

[Stepanyuk] Later a question was asked about the possibility of a compromise between the various programs for the approach to a market economy.

[Ryzhkov] I have always advocated sensible compromise. I have never been one who for the sake of some ambition would not agree to this or that sensible proposition. In this case as well, as long as we see that there exist certain compromises which will not harm our people, we shall of course opt for them. But if there are fundamental disagreements, which in our opinion would create an even worse situation in the country, then we shall as they say defend our position.

[Stepanyuk] One of the questions was this: How does the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers view the idea of creating a government of national accord?

[Ryzhkov] I said today in my report, and I can repeat now, that in this regard we need to go step by step. I am against breaking up today's administrative structure because we have been top of the class in this area—we frequently break up administrative structures without creating new ones. After all, many of our troubles stem from the fact that we have been very quick to break up the administrative-command system which has indeed outlived its usefulness, but we have not really created any other economic system for management of the national economy. The structure of the government must change. There must be fewer ministries, and in all probability the government should include representatives of different public movements. I see nothing bad in this, and I think that is how things will be given time.

[Stepanyuk] One of the most acute questions being actively discussed in our society at the moment is that of the privatization of property. In this connection, one of the journalists asked Abalkin: Will it not turn out that some will remain empty-handed while others will possess factories and plants?

[Abalkin] In our program we make use of the less euphonious word which is difficult to pronounce—Destatization [razgosudarstvleniye]. I consider that destatization and privatization are different things. A specific example: by decree of the president state ownership—or property rather of the USSR Academy of Sciences, its institutes, laboratories and centers—was transferred totally to the USSR Academy of Sciences. An act of destatization took place, the transfer of this property to non-state structures. But is that really privatization? Has the property of the Academy of Sciences, with its mighty centers and laboratories, become private? This is not a process which coincides. In the same way many forms of share formation are not unambiguously tied up with privatization and the development of private ownership. We have a quite detailed program worked out point by point. In the document which we have already shown you today we have made our assessment. There are several tables with specific calculations of the value of the basic assets for each structure and national economic complex with an approximate evaluation of the opportunities for marketing, for example, of shares in the various items and the proceeds which we expect to receive from this—here you are, I can find these pages quickly. These are very varied.

So the first step: Shops, public catering, communal services, bathhouses, hairdressers, and so on—the most radical measures for the sale of this property and transferring it into private or family ownership, including the involvement of credit resources and sale with deferred payment. [as published] The aim of this is to create the structure of a market with medium-sized industrial enterprises. This means the transfer of ownership to collectives, it means the creation of shares, it means the transformation of the enterprises into cooperatives, it means the creation of collective property. [video shows official handing Abalkin a document] No, I have (?seen) this [word indistinct], I wanted to find something else where we provide an assessment.

We have calculated how much the population can realistically buy overall. By the war we have our differences here as well in our programs. Thus the population has deferred demand—let us say 165 or 200 billion [currency not specified] is the assessment of the deferred demand. The program of the working group takes as its premise the fact that the population is ready to use this money for puchases. So we can sell, we have to sell such and such an amount of property—houses, leases for land, enterprises—and the money will disappear from the market straight away so prices will not rise. But we had a more detailed and more professional analysis of the structure of deferred demand. If a person wants to buy a refrigerator, washing machine, color television, furniture, or pots and pans he will not be satisfied with buying shares. He will bide his time. So on the one hand, the opportunities of buying property through shares or direct purchase are limited to a considerably greater degree than deferred demand, while on the other hand these measures do not reduce the tensions in the consumer market unless it is really saturated with goods.

We have different options and we display moderation here as well. For example, we have adopted a decision on share companies. Normal share companies have the right to the free, unrestricted issue of shares which anyone can buy. We understand that there is a danger of the laundering of income from the black market, the acquisition of property by certain mafia groups. This exists, it is real, and so we take one step and then stop saying that shares may be sold to state enterprises, cooperatives, banks, and also citizens—either workers at the given enterprise or other citizens, but in their own name and without the right of unrestricted sale to other persons. We introduce an element of control over this movement. This acts as a regulator. Once the market is formed this will all have to be abolished. Shares like money should circulate freely, be exchanged at stock markets—there should be exchange rates—and so on. But that is when the market is on its feet, when we have eliminated all these kinds of things. Again this is balance and realism, it is a complete program and I think that we will now embark on a detailed exposition of our program, including some special presentations. Perhaps we still need interviews with the people doing the drafting, and press conferences on the destatization program and the program for setting up the financial market and the restructuring of the credit system.

[Stepanyuk] Leonid Ivanovich Abalkin was asked another question: What is the difference between the government's outline which was examined by the Supreme Soviet in the spring and the program proposed by the Council of Ministers now?

[Abalkin] First and foremost, in May it was an outline and now we have the program, a very pragmatic one which is very down-to-earth. We also have the specific situation relating to the fourth quarter of this year and 1991. Further, we are now supplied with the necessary set of legal instruments—that is, a number of draft laws—and the government resolutions and presidential decrees already adopted.

What has changed regarding specific issues? That is, what has been said? Nikolay Ivanovich was saying that an entire section on the population's social welfare is prescribed in more detail, and more precisely including employment issues—this is also a social welfare issue—protection from price increases, and the way to implement this protection. The differentiation according to groups and population strata shown there has significantly changed. The government's approach to the conducting of reform in price formation has changed. I shall also mention some very important elements.

We viewed price reform in the May program as one method of financial recovery, proposing to raise prices by approximately R200 billion and to return to the population only R135 billion, using the difference—well, it went toward certain groups of goods—as a means of financial recovery. We have rejected this idea. We shall attempt to implement financial recovery through other rather harsh methods. We cannot get by without it anyway. But we have rejected the use of prices, retain price reform as such a lever. We are compensating goods from this whole set with R135 billion one for one. In addition we have rejected attempting to direct this out of Moscow, to direct how children, large families, invalids, pensioners, workers, and white collar workers with different salary levels, etc. will be compensated for this. We have agreed that the entire compensation sum should simply be given out according to the actual level of consumption according to the fact—what people have eaten, what they have worn, what the republics have bought. They [the republics] can each independently determine how this compensation is to be shared among the groups and strata of their population.

We have also removed the issue of introducing a preliminary warning price increase for bread and bread products which had been separated from the reform package, although this was a sensible step and society was ready for it. We have been able to work out, to feel our way to compensatory mechanisms for a relatively small group of goods. How will this be done in a city, in the countryside? How will this be brought to each resident and by what method? Through the bodies of authority, the rural soviets, or some other structures? How will it to be given out? You see, we have to give out compensation to 290 million people. Well, we have rejected that, we shall not allocate it. Further, we have rejected increasing prices on liquor and vodka products and on municipal services.

I could go on describing it. Also, when this program appears everyone will see that we have worked out the issue of the structures for managing the economy more profoundly and in a fundamentally new way. This is no longer simply a stating of principles but a rather precisely prescribed system of how we see the structures of the country's central economic bodies which differ radically from the current ones, and in what way. You see, this is not just mechanically removing a ministry here or eliminating a ministry there. This is the formation of a fundamentally new structure for the central bodies, including the appearance in them of those structures engendered by the transition to the market such as the USSR state property fund, the anti-monopoly committee, the committee to support small business, etc. This is the model. This is a matter which has been studied in detail. There are also other particulars but I am simply afraid of going on too long.

[Stepanyuk] At the end of the news conference the journalists asked Ryzhkov for his assessment of the role of the mass information media in covering problems of the transition to market relationships.

[Ryzhkov] If I were now to say that the press has only hindered us I would be wrong. We are grateful to the press for publishing a very large amount of material and all kinds of alternative opinions, and I should say that when we were discussing particular issues, both in the Presidium and in the working groups which were working on the program, we of course studied very carefully those proposals that were expressed in the newspapers. Therefore I do not recall ever seeing such acute discussion about any particular issues as there has been during these three months. That is the positive side. On the negative side I would like to say bluntly that we have at times sensed partiality in the press. We have sometimes sensed that criticism is going over the top. I think that the press and the mass media should not, without having even seen a single document, have made various kinds of assessments—positive or negative—connected with personalities, concerning one group or another, or concerning one issue or another. I could give you many examples. Even before we submitted the outline which we presented to the Supreme Soviet in May, journalists and commentators met three days beforehand and were saying: Ryzhkov's program or outline is no good. At the time, however, I was sitting down and writing it. How can you say it is no good if no one has seen it yet and you are still chopping and changing things, as they say? And the same thing has happened recently. It seems to me that there was something of a slander here. The attacks on the government were very harsh. In my view, they have been of no benefit to the formation of some kind of public opinion in our country so that people can sort things out in the final analysis. So that is the only comment, that first of all you have to see the material, see the essence, sort out the essence of the issues, and then make your criticisms and express your attitude. We have not always seen such objectivity.

[Abalkin] Nikolay Ivanovich, perhaps I could add a request for a bit of kindness, not just regarding the government but in general a bit of kindness of warmth, a request not to step up tension that could lead toward an impasse, toward any apocalypse. They must not lead people astray like this. Whether this is the right government or not is not the point. They must not lead the people on to such a situation.

[Ryzhkov] Leonid Ivanovich is doing his Tolstoy bit now, asking for more kindness. I too consider that we must have a respectful attitude to one another, one of respect.

Protection for Service Families

PM1309134390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Sep 90 First Edition p 1

[Report by parliamentary correspondent Lieutenant Colonel V. Kosarev under the "USSR Supreme Soviet Session" rubric: "How To Move Toward the Market?"]

[Excerpts] On Tuesday, as agreed the previous day, deputies began discussing the most important problem facing our society—the transition to a regulated market economy and urgent measures to stabilize the country's national economy. [passage omitted]

N.I. Ryzhkov and L.I. Abalkin gave a news conference during the interval between session sittings. They had to explain over and over again the essence of the government program for a transition to the market as well as the discrepancies between it and the alternative draft. It was stated at the news conference that these discrepancies consist of different assessments of the social sacrifices which society has to make in the name of creating a fundamentally new economic structure.

The KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent's question to the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers:

"Nikolay Ivanovich, the most vulnerable part of the government program which you submitted to the Supreme Soviet in May was its poor social protection of the people—their least well-off sections. As is known, these now include servicemen and members of their families. Meanwhile a comprehensive program of social provision for servicemen has been drawn up, as the USSR president mentioned. But it has been at the Council of Ministers for approval since April. How long does it take to approve this program?"

N.I. Ryzhkov:

"If we are speaking of the concept which was submitted in May, social protection really was a weak point in it. I agree with you on this. But it was a concept. At that time we could not write down everything in detail. During that period, when we were working specifically both on the program and on laws and resolutions, we primarily paid attention to just this aspect. I do not want to repeat it now, but very fundamental documents were adopted on social protection for large families and invalids, on assistance for children, etc.; that is, a whole range of draft laws which we specially drew up and submitted to the Supreme Soviet. In our view our program now is far better than the former concept from the viewpoint of social protection. As for your question about the program of social provision for servicemen, if I am not mistaken it was signed two days ago." [passage omitted]

System of Management Needed

PM1309092190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by A. Demchenko: "N.I. Ryzhkov and L.I. Abalkin Press Conference"]

[Text] On 11 September, after the discussion of the head of the Union government's report at the USSR Supreme Soviet session, N.I. Ryzhkov and L.I. Abalkin answered questions from Soviet and foreign journalists.

The government is often accused of not changing. That was also implied in the questions asked at the press conference. In my view, that criticism is unfair. Together with the transformation from being the darling of the command economy into an executive organ, the approaches and views of the cabinet of ministers are bound to undergo a certain evolution. It is a different matter that the pace of this evolution is lagging catastrophically behind first the pace of society's political and social development, and second the speed at which the economic crisis is deepening. That was demonstrated even during the press conference when Leonid Ivanovich Abalkin defined the program for switching to the market prepared by the union government as "moderately radical" and gradual—even though it follows from N.I. Ryzhkov's report at the Supreme Soviet session that there is absolutely no time left for things to be done "gradually."

"Many problems," N.I. Ryzhkov said at the press conference, "stem from the fact that we were very quick to break up the command-administration system which was indeed obsolete, but did not create a truly new system of economic management." But perhaps conversely, the crisis had gone so deep precisely because of the indecision and sluggishness shown by the supreme organs of power when breaking up the old system and because of their traditional and perhaps even instinctive desire for the kind of change which changes nothing and offends no one.

Naturally the journalists returned in their questions a number of times to the USSR President's unexpected statement at the session that he supports the program of the working group led by S.S. Shatalin. What will the USSR Council of Ministers do if the country's parliament adopts "someone else's" program? N.I. Ryzhkov answered that the government will not be able to fulfill decisions which do not coincide with its viewpoint. As it emerged, M.S. Gorbachev had not given the prime minister prior warning that he tended to support the alternative to the government program.

To your IZVESTIYA correspondent's question of whether in his opinion the government has the situation in the country under control, N.I. Ryzhkov replied with a question of his own: "But who is controlling it now?" Then he added after a pause: "The government is doing everything to support the country's national economy at this difficult time. Within the limits of its functions the government is in control of the situation."

Let us add that we did not manage to obtain exhaustive answers to many questions. They included a question on what the USSR Council of Ministers will do if the largest republic in the Union adopts the program elaborated under Academician S.S. Shatalin's leadership. Nikolay Ivanovich said: "It may be a very complex situation when some republics favor one program, Russia another, and the Supreme Soviet perhaps a third. I think that on the whole Russia should bide its time a little here. But unfortunately the discussion is proceeding. So long as it is just a discussion I see nothing terrible in it."

Life, however, has shown that it was not "just a discussion." By an irony of fate at the very time that N. Ryzhkov was answering that question, the Russian parliament was adopting a resolution on transition to the market economy based on the Shatalin group's program. Now clearly the USSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers will have to decide together how to answer this question. In life this answer cannot be avoided.

Political & Social

Correspondent Analyzes Gorbachev's Future

PM1409084090 London BBC Television Network in English 2130 GMT 12 Sep 90

[Interview with Dimitriy Biryukov, OGONEK political correspondent, by Jon Snow in London on 12 September during the BBC "Newsnight" program—recorded]

[Text] [Snow] Earlier this evening I spoke to the leading Soviet political commentator, Dimitriy Biryukov. I asked him whether there was any substance behind the rumors that the Army was contemplating stepping in.

[Biryukov] No, I don't think so because according to the public opinion polls Gorbachev is supported by, not by the majority of population, but by the good part of the population of the Soviet Union. Besides that, after Gorbachev made good talk and made a friendly gestures with Yeltsin, the anger towards him calmed down.

[Snow] Mr. Biryukov, how do people in the Soviet Union, particularly the military in the Soviet Union, reflect on seeing Mr. Gorbachev today signing this treaty on the future of Germany—effectively signing away the Soviet Union's position in Eastern Europe. What do they make of that?

[Biryukov] Well, if you ask from the Army position, I can tell you this—that Army is not a unity, for as you.... For example, you take in the West, Army reflects the society. There is the generals with high salaries which think that they are losing their positions, even by... even just giving away where is job. But there is a good part of the majors, lieutenants, who are just living in unbearable conditions with no salary, with no... with a fear for the future. So I think this new generation of our officers—not many of them, but I think a good part, the thinking part—applaud that, that act.

[Snow] But are you, are you confident that there really is no threat to the system in the Soviet Union from those in the Army who, as you said, feel they're in danger of losing their position, particularly seeing Mr. Gorbachev signing that treaty on Germany? Some of those generals might just want to try and arrest the situation, change the government.

[Biryukov] Yes of course there is a threat, because now when we're leaving in the... balancing between a catastrophe and a normal life. Even... you know, even small fire, even just one brigade will be enough, one rebel brigade will be enought to throw us into catastrophe. That's why I think, and this is, all Army should have the perestroyka inside itself, and that's why so much public opinion attention attached to the Army, to the KGB and to the militia.

[Snow] Now what do you think are the prospects for the Shatalin economic reforms succeeding?

[Biryukov] Everything concerned of who will be in front of that reform. If it will be Gorb... if it will be Ryzhkov catastrophe is inevitable. But if it will be done by Yeltsin, by Popov, by Sobchak, people will suffer, living in the aspiration that they are going in the right direction because the population... the popularity of those figures, public figures is very high.

[Snow] Meanwhile, what do you think is going to be the outcome of the constitutional negotiations going on now: Do you think we're looking at the prospect of a Soviet Union that disintegrates into completely separate independent republics, or are we looking for a confederation with some remaining central power?

[Biryukov] That will be a new kind of confederation. I think there will be no Council of Ministers like it was before, above all of them. It will be really some kind of a new construction. I don't think it will be party construction; it will be just the European Economic Community, and it will be trying to work this way, so it will be... we will have something reminding Europeans of a European economic committee parliament.

[Snow] And Mr. Biryukov, for his part went on to say he thought Mr. Gorbachev would survive for the next year or so.

KGB Colonel Condemns Andropov, Corruption

90UF0523A Moscow SOBESEDNIK in Russian No 36 Sep 90 pp 6-7

[Report on interview with unidentified KGB colonel by SOBESEDNIK special correspondent Mikhail Sokolov; place and date not given: "Lubyanka: Characters and Patrons"]

[Text] Could it really be us?! The same people who as recently as several years ago tried not to even mention the KGB in letters and phone conversations, to say nothing of thinking about criticizing the mighty "office"? However the dam has burst: A storm of phone calls and an avalanche of letters came down on editorial boards that published materials critical of the KGB. "By his admission—or rather repentance—former Chekist Oleg Kalugin has not only taught us a lesson of high morality and rectitude, but has also set an example of how a man may renounce totalitarian thinking." These lines from a letter to SOBESEDNIK by L. Voloshin from Yalta are the most characteristic ones. Today we continue the discussion of this topic which is of concern to us all.

...I am not going to tell you how I came to meet this individual. I will only communicate that several days after an interview with ex-KGB General Oleg Kalugin that very red booklet was produced to me. My new acquaintance, a KGB colonel, an active intelligence officer with a tenure of 30 years, decided to meet with a journalist and complement O. Kalugin's story:

[KGB colonel] The fact that the people are beginning to adopt a negative view of the KGB despite the fact that most employees here are honest people bothers me. I want to help the public figure it all out, to discern what is going on inside the committee at present and what style of work is characteristic of the current leadership....

[Sokolov] Do you think that we know nothing about it?

[KGB colonel] I believe that many things are going to be news to you. These facts shed light on personnel work in the KGB and the reasons for former apparatchiks rather than professionals running everything in our office.

Let us look at the best-known figure, current KGB Chairman V.A. Kryuchkov. When his candidacy was confirmed at a meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Chairman of the Committee for Defense and State Security Lapygin stated that the candidate chairman is a professional intelligence officer. However it was not communicated to the deputies that he began his career in the position of personal secretary of USSR Ambassador to Hungary Yu.V. Andropov. Later came the positions of aide and chief of the secretariat of, once again, Andropov when the latter was chief of department at the CPSU Central Committee. After Andropov was appointed KGB chairman, his protege was his chief of secretariat. As late as the early 1970's he was appointed first deputy chief of intelligence—for financial and management affairs. Therefore he owes a lot of his career to the patronage of Andropov.

[Sokolov] Are you sure that this is really a horrible shortcoming?

[KGB colonel] In my opinion, Andropov is mainly responsible for the three catastrophes that befell our foreign policy in 1956, 1968, and 1979; and naturally so is his "team." I am certain that when historians gain access to the now secret archives and read his memoranda as I have they will realize how much evil Andropov and his entourage have wrought.

[Sokolov] However, in Hungary Andropov was merely an ambassador....

[KGB colonel] Nonetheless his information turned out to be decisive. Two weeks before the events in Budapest he made an incorrect assessment of the situation. Initially he believed that everything would work itself out, but later he made a 180-degree turn and demanded that the troops be sent.... It is interesting that, having become committee chairman, Andropov appointed his former KGB adviser in Hungary as chief of counterintelligence. In 1968 they once again dramatized together the situation in Czechoslovakia, seeking military intervention and the sending of Soviet troops. Apparently Andropov got this complex for the rest of his life: What if another Budapest happens....

However, Afghanistan is the greatest political miscalculation of Andropov and his immediate entourage. This would not have happened in the absence of Andropov's purposeful disinformation of the Politburo. We reported from Afghanistan that troops cannot be sent in; our informers—we had them everywhere—communicated that this would bring about bloodshed and antagonize loyal Afghans. Meanwhile the Central Committee was receiving memoranda through Andropov to the effect that they were awaiting us there almost with open arms.

[Sokolov] Your opponents will say: However, Andropov fought corruption....

[KGB colonel] As KGB chairman he had all the data on Shchelokov, Rashidov, and many others. It was exactly on account of this silence that Brezhnev opened the road to general secretary for him.

Perhaps you are aware of how the career of General Tsvigun ended? Andropov's first deputy obtained information on the adventures of Galina Brezhneva and her contacts with foreign-currency dealers and reported this to Andropov. The latter referred him to Suslov. As they maintain, Tsvigun shot himself after this meeting.... It would be good to take an interest in the circumstances of this mysterious death.

They might ask me: Why dwell on these legends of ancient times? Only because those who head the KGB even now were selected by Andropov in his time by virtue of their personal dedication and evolved in an atmosphere of lies and disinformation.

[Sokolov] Oleg Kalugin maintains that there have been cases of corruption in the KGB. Is this so?

[KGB colonel] Oleg Danilovich says that employees from posts abroad bring gifts for their superiors. Nevertheless, he left intelligence quite long ago and this is why he is not aware of how this business has now prospered: On occasion, gifts worth up to $25,000 are put to use.

Besides, common crime is not rare. Does the country know that Generals Grigorenko and Kostrov robbed foreigners? Their employees collected information on diplomats—up to ambassadors—involved in smuggling antiques and icons. When such a character headed home with his baggage he was stopped on the way to the airport, his gear was searched and compromising evidence was produced to him. Later they supposedly secured a written pledge of cooperation by blackmail while actually keeping the objects and letting their victim go. Subsequently the valuables confiscated ended up in the homes of the organizers of the apprehension. A special investigation of the adventures of the generals was held. Finally, the case was closed and the generals were shunted into retirement.

[Sokolov] I was told that the criminal war in Afghanistan became a source of personal wealth for many KGB officers....

[KGB colonel] Smuggling to the USSR of entire shipments of gems, silver jewelry, imported audio equipment, and furs flourished because the baggage of KGB employees was delivered without inspection. I may name people who had direct contacts with fencers from the second-hand goods stores of Moscow. Employees of the Ministry of State Security of Afghanistan also took part in these operations, they were drawn into drinking bouts.... It is a shame, but it was a real "gravy train."

[Sokolov] Tell me whether highly placed KGB employees have had to stand trial for all the adventures you have enumerated.

[KGB colonel] Several major scandals involving our employees became known—Mogilnyy in Austria and Noskov on Madagascar. They stole brazenly and entered into transactions with Western businessmen. So what? They were just shipped home before the appointed time.... For example one of the top KGB brass, General Spolnikov, was apprehended for profiteering in decorations. They just had him retire.

The most frightening penalty is to be retired with half the retirement benefit. Yet the people do not do badly: I know dozens of former KGB employees who have been placed in Intourist, various foreign-trade agencies, and the administrations of ministries for foreign contacts. But they belong in the slammer!

However it seems to me that we should refer not only to petty and major crooks who discredit the organs but also to the fact that a system of squandering currency, so-called servicing which was created in the time of Andropov, still exists under the cover of the KGB.

[Sokolov] Who is serviced?

[KGB colonel] When a highly placed Soviet official in whom the leadership is interested comes to some country, the KGB resident receives a telegram signed by, for example the KGB chairman, which sets the task to render assistance and so on. Gifts and luxury dining are paid for with the currency funds allocated for maintaining agents. Of course the resident does not have enough funds "of his own," and for this reason he has to enlist his subordinates and have them set up "a collection" for the benefit of the VIP. Later everything is written off as outlays for missions allegedly carried out; there are plenty of ways to do this. Naturally, many of those drawn into the system of "servicing" have sticky fingers too. They begin to write funds off and their "besmirched" superiors turn a blind eye to it.

Of course there are honest people, but their life under powerful pressure from above is not easy.

[Sokolov] Is a lot of money spent that way? Who gets this money?

[KGB colonel] A lot of money. However it is not yet time to give specific amounts.

There are many people who shape our policy among those who have used the financial services of KGB posts abroad during their trips to the West: functionaries of the CPSU Central Committee, secretaries of the Communist Parties of Union republics and oblast committees, ministers and their deputies, academicians, heads of some colleges.... Persons as odious as former Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Sushkov, Moscow State Institute of International Relations Rector Lebedev, and CPSU Central Committee Secretary Ponomarev have been among the beneficiaries....

[Sokolov] Why did they have to fatten up the management of colleges?

[KGB colonel] After all, they need to make arrangements on behalf of their children. An entire system of "cadre training" for the children of KGB chiefs has been created. Lists of those who should be accepted "on a noncompetitive basis" were submitted to the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, the Institute of the Countries of Asia and Africa, and the imeni Maurice Thorez Institute of Foreign Languages. Later positions were prepared in, say, the Ministry of Foreign Relations. Despite Gromyko being skeptical of KGB information, he did not interfere with the placement of children in his ministry.

[Sokolov] Let as assume that the USSR Supreme Soviet resolves to analyze KGB activities. Will they succeed in finding documents in KGB archives that confirm abuses?

[KGB colonel] Large-scale "sanitizing" of the archives has been under way recently. On top of this, documents are being shipped out of the archives of Union republics at the same time. As far as I know, nothing valuable is left in Vilnius and Yerevan by now.

[Sokolov] How are the traces of corruption to be sought?

[KGB colonel] To begin with it may be established where the gifts end up. It is easy to compare legal earnings with funds in hard-currency accounts. Besides, many people may be found who have suffered from these outrages. Of course, in addition to this some documents have survived thus far.

[Sokolov] Oleg Kalugin paid a lot of attention to cases of betrayal. In his opinion the current KGB leadership is also responsible for this.

[KGB colonel] He is absolutely right in this regard. The last traitor—the 22d—went over to the West in June. Every year we recall many of our uncovered employees from abroad due to failures. There have been people turned due to their weak will and those who went over for ideological considerations, but there have also been those who ended up in intelligence due to the indiscriminate approach of our personnel services. There have also been professional agents of the British and American special services who have worked successfully.

We should say that counterintelligence got interested in some of them, but their immediate supervisors ignored warnings and hampered verification and investigations for a long time. This is no accident: Many people advanced their careers on the basis of information supplied by these traitors.

Let us recall the story of Oleg Gordiyevskiy. They were recalling him in order to promote him—to appoint him resident in England. V.F. Grushko, his immediate superior who had received a good deal of decorations for the exploits of Gordiyevskiy, insisted on this. Chief of the personnel service I.N. Nazarov also supported Grushko on this point. However Gordiyevskiy got cold feet, decided that they were luring him into a trap, behaved incorrectly, and had to defect. Let us look at who was punished for Gordiyevskiy's defection—"small fries," by and large. One of them tried to object and he was fired, then died under strange circumstances in a KGB hospital. As far as Grushko is concerned he went on to become KGB deputy chairman, and Nazarov KGB party committee secretary.

[Sokolov] Still, how are all the mixed-up circumstances of treason cases to be sorted out?

[KGB colonel] I would recommend that the people's deputies request the case files of the agents of foreign intelligence services who have been shot—Piguzov, Motorin, Vetrov, Polishchuk, Martynov—from the archives of the military collegium of the USSR Supreme Court....

[Sokolov] Executions by a firing squad are the best way to cover things up. Paper will bear anything. Is there a live spy?

[KGB colonel] There is one imprisoned somewhere named Yuzhin. He may be found. However, it is easy to determine even on the basis of the trial records which subdivisions the agents worked in, who hampered their detection, what positions their former superiors are in at present, and who has been decorated. The point is that we have only been able to find these agents out thanks to other traitors, defectors from the West. The deputies will see that superiors who tried to conceal compromising facts received decorations as well.

I think that they should grill former party committee secretaries and chiefs of the personnel administration Generals Orlov and Kazarov; Secretaries of the Party Committee of Intelligence Pechko and Slavov; General Titov, the failures of whose agents they even made a movie about in the West; as well as the curators of intelligence from the CPSU Central Committee.

In the West leaders of special services resign after such disasters, whereas in our country incompetent leaders are even promoted frequently.

[Sokolov] They talk a lot at present about a gigantic KGB apparatus inside the country turning out to be incapable of averting bloodshed....

[KGB colonel] It sometimes seems to me that all talk of extremists fueling interethnic strife is just a diversion. Not one has been arrested or tried publicly so far. Being aware of the methods of the former Fifth Administration of the KGB and its leadership, which became famous for fighting dissidents in its time, I do not rule out as being quite realistic the version that specialists in disinformation and manipulating public opinion could provoke disturbances as well.

[Sokolov] Here is a question that has now become traditional: Are the KGB and the Army capable of accomplishing a military coup in our country?

[KGB colonel] Not on their own. They will not do anything without an order from above.

[Sokolov] What if there is an order?

[KGB colonel] Political differentiation is under way in the KGB. There are careerists among my colleagues, and there are plain fools. The former will shoot at the people with pleasure, the latter because this is what they have to do. However, a majority will not rise against perestroyka.

For many of them, the so-called "fight against corruption" was an eye-opener. Honest KGB employees thought that they would really give the mafia a hard time. A tremendous amount of materials on the shadow economy was procured. The attempts of B.N. Yeltsin to make the situation in Moscow healthier met with a favorable response in our organization. However everything soon ground to a halt. At times, they show the successes of the organs to the people, but they apprehend small fry whereas "godfathers" about whom a lot is known continue to prosper. This is going to be the case for as long as leaders continue to head the KGB who are capable of defending in a high forum unscrupulous individuals such as former CPSU Central Committee functionary Smirnov and of discrediting B. Yeltsin and A. Yakovlev. Someone even circulated a rumor in our organization to the effect that A. Yakovlev was recruited by the CIA during his stay in the United States.

[Sokolov] Does it not hurt you to look back into the past? As I understand it, you endeavored to serve the Motherland, but it turns out that by being silent you facilitated much shady business.

[KGB colonel] I came to the KGB in order to defend the Motherland, and the security organs were like a temple to me. I believe that their degeneration occurred before my eyes: lack of professionalism, caddishness, services to the party apparatus, nepotism, favoritism, theft.... I attempted to influence the events from the inside as much as possible but I ran into a wall. I saw that many honest people, including generals and heroes of the Soviet Union, were booted out of the KGB for criticism. I believe that they will still tell the whole truth, however, on one condition....

[Sokolov] What is the condition?

[KGB colonel] An authoritative commission of deputies for investigating KGB activities should be created which will be capable of ensuring personal safety for all those who come to testify and guarantee that there will be no more demotions and presidential ukases such as the "Kalugin" ukase.

[Sokolov] Are you personally prepared to testify before such a commission without concealing your name any longer?

[KGB colonel] I am prepared to repeat under oath what I have communicated to you today at open hearings on the issues of state security in, say, the Supreme Soviet of Russia, or 100 times more at closed hearings.... [end KGB colonel]

...We parted on a busy street and my interlocutor disappeared, having professionally faded into the crowd. A question remained: Can he be trusted?

I think that he can be trusted because this was a typical Chekist coming to us who is representative of the middle echelon of professionals unhappy with the dominance of amateurish party apparatchiks rather than a neophyte of democracy whose "eyes have suddenly opened." In terms of his views, my interlocutor is an adherent of order, almost a conservative. He is more concerned about the obvious fact that metastases of corruption and decay typical of the entire society have penetrated an office called upon to uphold law than he is about the democratization of the KGB or the enhancement of control over its activities.

The colonel holds the current KGB leadership responsible for it.

However, are only the recent and current leaders to blame for the internal crisis of the KGB given that this organization itself remains to this day a vestige of the times of "Red terror" and "iron people's commissars?" To be sure, inept people exacerbate the shortcomings of an inept system whereas gifted people alleviate them. However, it is obvious that at present even the most talented and professional people with inner integrity are not capable of making the atrocious secret police monster into an instrument of democratic reforms.

While advocating a fundamental reorganization of the present-day KGB, we cannot turn a blind eye to its internal crisis. The confrontation may break out of the confines of Lubyanka and hurt the reforms in an unpredictable manner. There is every opportunity for this. This is why I am publishing my interview with the colonel who wished to remain anonymous.

May it become one of the keys for the investigation of KGB activities by deputies which is due.

KGB 'Not Yet Ready' To Open Archives

PM1409102990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
13 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Report by A. Illarionov: "KGB Proposes Cooperation"]

[Excerpts] On 11 September the official presentation to Soviet and foreign journalists of the USSR KGB Public Relations Center took place at the USSR KGB.

The press release distributed to representatives of the mass media says that under perestroyka the task of developing public relations and building trust and support among the broad strata of the population are becoming an objective necessity for the USSR KGB. To this end a Public Relations Center has been set up within the KGB system by decision of the USSR Council of Ministers. [passage omitted]

A. Karbainov, the center chief, answered journalists' questions. Some of them concerned the details of the tragic fate of Polish officers who died in Stalinist torture chambers and also the fate of Raoul Wallenberg. Karbainov reported that the KGB does not possess documents on those crimes and that possibly if they once existed in KGB archives they were subsequently destroyed.

To the question whether the center plans to open access to KGB archives which have lost their secret nature with the passage of time, it was said that the department is not yet ready to open the doors of such archives to all who wish; however we are developing approaches to the solution of this important task.

To the question of when will personnel who fabricated cases against "dissidents" in the seventies be discharged from the KGB organs, the center chief answered that such activity by the state security organs can hardly be described as fabrication. The point is that KGB staffers operated in accordance with the laws operating at the time. Asked about the scale of such activity, Karbainov said that no more than 1 percent of KGB personnel were engaged in it.

One journalist asked: What will you do if 300,000 people surround the KGB building on Dzerzhinskiy Square and demand that you open all your archives to them?

"We will talk with the citizens and seek to persuade people to operate within the law. Glasnost is the best medicine in restructuring the work of the USSR KGB organs."

Press Briefing Held on Union Treaty Progress

90UB2781A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
7 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by A. Stepovoy: "The Search for Formulas for a Union Treaty"]

[Text] **It is not often that the leaders of our country invite journalists to their work offices. But it seems that times are changing.**

And this is not so pleasing but rather useful and important for the business that we serve, namely bringing our readers, viewers, and audiences complete and immediate information obtained first hand. And while a working meeting does take place in some important office behind a desk while people drink tea or coffee, the conversation assumes the character of a confidential talk and free exchange of opinion. This is the atmosphere in which the 5 September briefing took place in the office of the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Council of Nationalities. The subject of the briefing was the results of the preliminary consultations of the working group of the country's Supreme Soviet, which includes representatives of the republics, and further steps taken to prepare a Union treaty.

Today this subject is of the utmost importance because what we are talking about is not simply an important treaty but the very existence of our state. What will our state be like, not in the distant future but in the immediate, foreseeable future? A federation? A confederation? A union of sovereign states? Or a commonwealth? There is no end to the questions, but there can and should be only one answer that satisfies all those involved in the talks.

The bare-bone information provided by TASS, stating merely that talks were taking place at the center with representatives of the sovereign republics, could not of course enable people to form an opinion about the fate of the treaty itself or a possible time frame for its adoption or non-adoption. But now, when journalists have been provided with exhaustive information, this possibility has emerged.

All those participating in the talks on the elaboration of a Union treaty agreed that "our moth-eaten and pockmarked socialism has left us an unpleasant picture to inherit," in the words of R. Nishanov. They were also unanimous on something else: The principles underpinning the relations between the subjects of our Union are obviously outdated. But here, it seemed, the unanimity was exhausted. What should we build and what should we dismantle, what should we strive for and what should we abandon? Here the range of opinion is so great that it is problematical whether it can be reduced to a single common denominator. At least it is today.

Thus the delegations from Belorussia, Kirghizia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan brought their own drafts of a Union treaty to Moscow. Working groups from Russia, the Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Armenia presented their own views on the new Union, their vision of the provisions of the treaty based on declarations of state sovereignty adopted in the republics. Representatives of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are assuming an isolated position on the entire range of problems concerning mutual relations between the USSR and the Baltic republics which have not been participating directly in the meetings with the working group from the USSR Supreme Soviet even though consultations are taking place with each of them individually.

The portfolio of the parliamentary working group now contains seven drafts for the Union treaty presented by the republics, four from various public organizations and scientific institutions, and another 12 independent versions drawn up through the efforts of the Interregional Group of Deputies. Today, R. Nishanov said, we know of more than 200 draft Union treaties, and this is a cause for gladness.

Of course we can share this feeling of the chairman of the Council of Nationalities of the country's parliament inasmuch as the attention of political, public, and scientific circles is fixed so intently and fruitfully on the Union treaty. But we can also sincerely wonder how in this flood of legislative creativity it will be possible to unearth everything of value and importance that will ultimately help in finding a correct formula for agreement.

Have the consultative meetings with the representatives of the republic Supreme Soviets helped in this? What are the main conclusions being drawn from the work that has been done? Here I can rely only on the opinion of R. Nishanov, who has been constantly involved in all these meetings. And here they are:

—a full coincidence of views on the need for radical renewal of the Union;

—those involved in the consultations have advocated preservation of Union relations—that is have favored preservation of the Union state as a free, voluntary, and equal commonwealth built on general consensus—while a number of the republics have put forward the possibility of building the Union on a confederative foundation;

—the issue of the formation of a civic society and guaranteeing rights and freedoms for citizens regardless of their nationality or place of residence has turned out to be complicated;

—the approaches to the autonomous republics as subjects in the Union and signatories to a treaty vary;

—major differences of opinion have been registered in the discussion of the delineation of powers between the subjects of the USSR, first and foremost in the formation and sharing of property;

—representatives of all republics are unanimous in their understanding that the processes involved in the transition to the market and preparing a new Union treaty are interconnected and should take place at the same time;

—extensive and sharp discussion was provoked by questions concerning legislative activity, the courts, supervision by the procuracy, and problems associated with defense, state security, and reform in the Armed Forces;

—issues related to foreign policy and foreign economic activity have remained unresolved.

This, in brief, is the recapitulation of the outlines drawn up for the Union treaty today. So what next?

Nine groups of experts have now started work in Moscow on the main problems of the treaty now being drawn up. Expert groups and working groups have also been set up in the republics. They are working on the concepts of a Union treaty and various versions of it.

R. Nishanov characterized the present stage as preliminary, pre-treaty. Now we must form a preparatory committee to draw up a new Union treaty, made up of fully empowered delegations from the republics led by their top state officials and with the direct participation of the USSR president, the chairman of the country's Supreme Soviet, and the chairman of the Council of Ministers. It is being suggested that this committee start work in mid-September.

During the talks, journalists asked R. Nishanov many questions, a question from the IZVESTIYA correspondent was among them: "The situation that has now developed in the country is what among chess players is called a Zugzwang situation, when it is impossible to rush the adoption of a Union treaty while it is also impossible to delay. The optimists are saying that the train of time will soon inevitably leave but there is still time to catch it. The pessimists are convinced that it is already too late. Even at the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies Andrey Dmitiryevich Sakharov talked about the need to adopt this treaty, but his words were not heard.... And now, just a few days before the opening of the Supreme Soviet session at which the 1991 plan and budget are supposed to be adopted, essentially we do not know the real present state structure of the Union. What, in your opinion, are the optimal periods for adoption of a Union treaty, and in this connection is it possible that, before adoption of a full-fledged treaty, there will be any kind of intermediate document that would make it possible to resolve the questions of the state plan and budget for the next year and other economic issues?"

The response: "I share your alarm. But first of all I must say that we are all becoming more mature, and that what we carefully adopted a year ago is today obvious. It seemed to us at that time that we were late in adopting a Union treaty. This also applies to the USSR Supreme Soviet, the government, and the CPSU Central Committee. Recognition that the 1922 Union Treaty was a fiction became over time an understanding of the need to conclude a new treaty.

"I would like all our groups of experts and the various political forces to make a maximum effort to hasten the work on their own proposals. Your are right: We are losing our position and power, and the levers to manage the country.

"The draft of an economic agreement prepared by the government for the fourth quarter of this year and for 1991 has been submitted for review by the Presidential Council and the Council of the Federation. In principle it would be possible to preserve for the immediate future the existing economic ties between the republics and between enterprises and so forth, in order to prevent the collapse of our economy. But there is apprehension that the present situation may be repeated at the end of 1991, and that we shall again be saying 'give us just one more year to compile the plan.' It has therefore been decided to focus on elaborating a general document on the transition to market relations. But the provisions that will be included in this agreement should be defined in the general document on the transition to market relations. It is still difficult to say what form this document will take. But there is a need to somehow define our life through to the end of this year and for 1991. And we shall be working on that."

'Peace Champions' Movement' To Reorganize

PM1309191990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
11 Sep 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Approaches Have Changed"]

[Text] It cannot be ruled out that the Soviet Committee for the Defense of Peace will cease to exist in its customary form. Drafts of its new program and statutes providing, in particular, for the transition to a federal basis for this organization's structure were submitted for examination by the participants in its plenum which opened in Moscow 10 September. It is also possible that its name will change.

These plans are connected with the obvious need for serious changes in the nature, forms, and methods of the committee's work. The peace champions' movement intends to finally do away with formalism, overcautiousness, and bureaucratic dependence on state and party organs.

Structural and organizational changes stem logically from the emergence of new priority tasks in the international arena. Instead of the "protest movement" and the "exposure of warmongers," it is precisely peacemaking activity and the development of people's diplomacy that are becoming the chief thing.

Among the other strategic and current questions to be discussed at the plenum an important place is occupied by the task of defining the position of the Soviet Peace Defense Committee and formulating its plan of action on such "burning" issues as, for example, interethnic relations in the country.

Economic

Gorbachev Advisor Cited on Market Economy Plans

LD1309181590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1500 GMT 13 Sep 90

[Text] A news conference was given in Moscow today by Nikolay Yakovlevich Petrakov, assistant to the USSR president on economic issues and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Its theme might be briefly defined as the market and the future of the Soviet Union.

Here is a more detailed account of it by our correspondent Valeriy Kiosa.

[Kiosa] One should say at once that this news conference evoked particular interest. This is understandable since it was being addressed not only by the assistant to the country's president on economic issues, but by one of the authors of the program for transition to a market economy which is now known as the Shatalin group's program. The first question was put point-blank, as they say. Does not the Shatalin program mean the destruction of the traditional Soviet economic system? One should say that this question is not, of course, rhetorical. One need only recall the numerous, quite clamorous statements to the effect that the transition to a market economy for us a return to capitalism, a recoiling to the past, and so forth. Here is what the USSR president's assistant said about this:

[Begin Petrakov recording] We are now moving away from the monopoly of state property. State property is not the same as socialist property, and in general, when talk begins about where we are moving, socialism or capitalism, I want to first hear an answer to the question of what socialism is and what capitalism is. I do not know a precise answer to this question. If it is the system that Stalin created, then we renounce such socialism and do not want to have anything in common with it. We must create an efficient economy. [end recording]

[Kiosa] Many questions were also asked, of course, about the contradictions existing between the two programs for transition to a market economy—the government program and that of Shatalin's group. Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov spoke recently at a session of the country's Supreme Soviet about the fact that the disagreements are of a fundamental character. One of the most complex matters on which there was a failure to reach agreement is the problem of shifting to new prices. Here is how Nikolay Yakovlevich Petrakov formulated the position of Shatalin's group:

[Begin Petrakov recording] The initial point of our program is to create a firm monetary system. A disintegration of the Soviet monetary system is occurring at the present time, and it is not by chance that many republics are seeking their salvation in the creation of their own national currencies. This is to some extent a desperate step taken against a background of the disintegration of the ruble and the monetary system. If money does not function, then neither does the distribution system, Gosplan [State Planning Committee], the ministries, Gossnab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply], and so on. In this connection, we are attempting to use several measures to limit the issuing of money and to reduce the budget deficit. Only if these measures are successful shall we proceed to a liberalization of prices. If money already existing in the national economy and unable to be absorbed by the purchase of goods is somehow tied up, by means say of the purchase of plots of land or the long-term leasing for life of plots of land, the sale of housing, the sale of small enterprises, and the sale of shares; and if we are able to tie up this mass of money, a liberalization of prices will not lead to soaring price increases. [end recording]

[Kiosa] Taking issue with his opponents afterward, Petrakov said that the government program proposes to start the transition to a market economy by raising retail prices administratively to a total amount of R135 billion. It is true, he noted with irony, that the government intends to act humanely and compensate for this rise in prices. However, it is impossible to implement a fair compensation. That is what Nikolay Yakovlevich Petrakov said.

But the most important question in his view is how the compensation will be carried out. The government has no funds and so all compensation expenditures will have to be financed through the dispensing of money which, according to his calculations, will amount to no more and no less than R30 billion. Such a step was called a mighty inflationary blow against the economy by the assistant to the country's president. Unlike our program, he said, which proposes above all cutting off the channels of inflation and the dispensing of money, the government does not shrink from the final disassembling of the country's monetary system.

Of course special attention was devoted at the news conference to that section of the program which discusses future relations between the republics. Nikolay Yakovlevich Petrakov described the Shatalin group's proposal as follows:

[Begin Petrakov recording] In our program there is the idea of concluding an economic union between the republics. We believe this would be the first step toward creating a Union treaty. This agreement must of course be based on the principle of a single economic space, that is to say a single currency, a single banking system, and a single-tax system. If some republic does not want to enter this agreement, then one must regard it as a foreign state and correspondingly establish prices at the world level and set up customs duties and barriers. It is not planned to especially persuade any [republic], at least not in our program. [end recording]

[Kiosa] And, of course, the journalists were interested in one more question: What is the president's attitude to this or that program? Nikolay Yakovlevich Petrakov stressed again that the USSR president supports the Shatalin group's proposal and that this support is the result not simply of close study of the document, but it can be said of his participation in working out the concept.

Statistics Cited for 1990 Losses Due to Strikes

904F0251A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 30 Aug 90 p 1

[Article by A. Krotkov: "The Bitter Price of Strikes"]

[Text] The pages of our newspapers and magazines have recently been flooded with innumerable political cartoons among which one really stood out. A well-built, paunchy worker was holding up by his feet an anemic-looking individual. The worker was shaking money out of the man, who I assume symbolized an administrator, as if from an open purse.

That cartoon came to my mind again yesterday as I happened to come across one more report by the USSR State Committee for Statistics [Goskomstat] dealing with losses in work time caused by absenteeism—read strikes. The data given in the report are scary, to put it mildly.

The seven months of strikes that swept over the country in 1990 cost our country close to 1 billion rubles [R].

Let us take a closer look at the figures in the Goskomstat report. Azerbaijan, Kirghizia, and Tajikistan head the list of regions that fell behind target in their production volumes as a result of strikes. Azerbaijan failed to produce work in the sum of R799,500,000, Kirghizia in the sum of R60,377,000, and Tajikistan in the sum of R35,020,000. The Ukraine and Russia hold third and fourth place respectively in that list. Their combined losses make up almost half of what Tajikistan lost alone.

It was only natural that I was especially interested in the coal-mining regions of our country. I remembered the public declarations made by coal miners as they were starting their well-known strikes: Their actions were meant to be entirely political and would not hurt the country's economy in any way. The miners promised to make up for the lost time and to reach target figures, even if they had to work weekends. Well, these were nice-sounding promises. But they remain promises if one has to judge by the latest data. The country lost over R6 million because of the strikes in Donetsk Oblast, over R3 million in Kemerovo Oblast, over R2.5 million in Rostov Oblast, and over R1.2 million in the Komi ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic].

Here is another point deserving attention. The last column of the report shows the money paid to the workers who took part in the strikes. That figure topped R19 million over the entire country. But the distribution of the sums among the republics is very unbalanced. The lion's share of R16,234,000 was paid in Tajikistan which, let me remind you, is in third place in absenteeism-caused losses. It is followed by Kirghizia—the "silver" finalist of the morbid competition: Oh, Osh!

I understand it perfectly well: A strike is the extreme measure of people driven to despair. Who would have the heart to denounce many people for it today? However, if people resort to such a measure they should gauge the results of their actions against their ultimate goals. And their main ultimate goal, as the strikers have emphasized again and again, is helping to improve the well-being of the people.

Labor Collectives Protest Enterprise Law

904F0253A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 9 Sep 90 p 2

[Article by Eduard Mokhorov: "Bon Appetit, Nikolay Travkin. On Some Results of a Workers' Conference in Tolyatti, Prophecies and Oaths of a People's Deputy"]

[Text] Tolyatti, Moscow—Readers are usually allergic to the publication of resolutions drafted in quiet offices and written in the language of bureaucratic inspiration. Nonetheless, I am convinced that all workers of our country will read this document from beginning to end. It was signed by 83 participants in an all-Union conference which expressed the will of 2 million workers. Sharp arguments between people subscribing to different political views did not get in the way of a display of exceptional unanimity in determining the key issue of the economic reform and working out in several days' time a unified policy on the issues of a period of transition from an administrative-command system to a market economy.

People who differ greatly were united primarily because of their opposition to some of the provisions of the Law on Enterprises in the USSR, which labor collectives interpreted as a veiled attempt to forever codify the right of the ministerial nomenklatura to own completely the property of state enterprises and products of the labor of their collectives.

He who produces material wealth, that is the labor collectives themselves, should become the owner of enterprise assets. This is the main thesis of the radical wing of the workers' movement.

Other opinions were also aired at the conference. Some workers continue to see the main reason for the still unaccomplished reform as a decline in responsibility and discipline, low labor productivity, and group egoism which has brought about the disintegration of the economy.

However, the effect is being passed off as the cause. Meanwhile, the reason for the disintegration of ties between economic units and other woes is found in the alienation of workers from the products of their labor. For many years the argument was put to the working class that it works poorly and lives poorly because of that. Is this so?

Communist I. Baryshnikov, chairman of the Council of Labor Collective at the Volga Car Works and deputy of the USSR Supreme Soviet, used specific data from a statistical study to show how groundless this statement is. A Volga Car Works employee transfers 92.91 rubles [R] to the budget in the form of Union and local taxes from every R100 of net profits. Out of the same R100, investment in production and the social sphere comes to 6.2 percent. Only 89 kopecks from the R100 earned find their way to the worker himself as his wages. So who works poorly in our country? Is it he who earns tremendous funds or he who uses them ineptly?

The working class wants to manage the products of its labor itself and in the future to bar from the feast of distribution the "squanderer-fathers" who have, pardon the expression, blown the material heritage of socialism in keeping with the laws of dogmatic teachings, on foundations covered with weeds, unrealistic nonsensical projects, the criminal war in Afghanistan, the building of a utopian society in individual underdeveloped countries of Africa and Central America, and in a number of cases for personal gain. These forces have not yet left the scene; in some cases, they are again becoming entrenched in the corridors of power.

Extremely intense political struggle occurred at the conference. Some of those invited came here clearly intending to satisfy their group political ambitions and to foist them on the working class. Nikolay Ilich Travkin flew to Tolyatti on the second day.

Without going to the root of the matter, he immediately began persuading the workers to adopt a political resolution against the party he himself has quit. This narrow and mercenary approach to the issues which drew workers to the all-Union conference did not go over well. Representatives of the labor collectives did not allow themselves to be led by those who attempted to replace a fundamental issue on the agenda, that of the ownership of state enterprises, with the settling of accounts among politicos. The workers prepared the main document of the conference and set up the All-Union Coordinating Council which will engage in preparing the All-Union Congress of the Councils of Labor Collectives.

Incidentally, speaking to the workers Nikolay Ilich promised, figuratively speaking, to eat his hat if the newspaper RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA published a special resolution which the all-Union conference of the representatives of labor collectives would adopt.

The leader of the "Democratic Party" stated: "You may be certain that if you workers pass the text of a resolution in support of the Ryzhkov government RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA and PRAVDA will shower you with pages of laudatory odes as early as tomorrow. However, I assure you that if you dare to mention your inalienable rights all of 'their' party press will keep silent about your conference, and then they will print that a group of extremists supposedly met in Tolyatti. This is not our working class, and the decisions which were made there are not ours either."

As far as N. Travkin's irritation is concerned it is understandable. N. Travkin came to hate the newspaper as soon as RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA published an article by a scientist who does not agree with Travkin's political views.

Apparently such are the realities and motives for the political struggle which smacks of personal ambitions. It looks as if some people are skidding on slippery turns in the course of this struggle. We are not going to fall for their tricks. Let us speak openly. The all-Union conference of workers' councils adopted the very resolutions for which RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA has fought since the very day it was created, together with the working class and the democratic wing of our party. We publish the resolution in full because, as we see it, it is worthy of as many workers as possible being aware of it.

We do not publish it in response to the attack by Nikolay Ilich, though we do tell him "Bon appetit!"

[The following paragraphs are published in a box within the item.] The first conference of representatives of labor collectives and enterprise workers' committees notes that the USSR Law "On Enterprises in the USSR" adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet on 4 June 1990, while setting forth general legal, economic, and social foundations for the organization of enterprises and expanding their independence in performing economic operations, at the same time infringes on the interests of the labor collectives of state enterprises as far as developing self-government, organizing the work of the councils of labor collectives at state enterprises, and the election of managers are concerned. We believe that this is a step backward compared to the rights previously granted to the labor collectives of state enterprises by the USSR Laws "On Labor Collectives and Enhancing Their Role in Managing Enterprises, Offices, and Organizations" and "On State Enterprises (Associations)" with regard to workers' self-management at the enterprise level.

We believe that restricting the rights and opportunity of the labor collectives of state enterprises to perform self-management functions will hamper the processes of demonopolization and the withdrawal of the state from state enterprises, the assertion of their collectives as owners through leasing, joint stock arrangements, buyouts, or transfers of enterprises to labor collectives free of charge, and other forms of independent operations.

THE CONFERENCE HAS RESOLVED:

To demand that the USSR Supreme Soviet reconsider the USSR Law "On Enterprises in the USSR" at the 1990 fall session. To codify in this law the right of labor collectives to elect the form of ownership themselves, providing the opportunity for the collective of a state enterprise to select one of two variants:

—to reassign the right of ownership to the labor collective (without a buyout) and codify it in the law, including the right of ownership of the results of economic operations; the labor collectives assume complete responsibility for the results of the socioeconomic development of enterprises;

—the state is represented at an enterprise by the labor collective (rather than the management) which is entitled to manage property, including the results of economic operations, and is entitled to self-management through the councils of labor collectives.

The right of ownership of the results of economic operations is transferred and assigned to labor collectives as represented by the councils of labor collectives.

To demand that the USSR Supreme Soviet suspend the effect of the USSR Law "On Enterprises in the USSR" until a new version is adopted which takes into account the resolutions of the First All-Union Conference of the Representatives of Councils of Labor Collectives and Workers' Committees.

To ask that, proceeding from declarations on republic sovereignty, the republic Supreme Soviets:

—do not enact the provisions of the USSR Law "On Enterprises in the USSR" which affect state enterprises until the law is revised appropriately;

—extend temporarily the effect of the provisions of the USSR Law "On State Enterprises (Associations)" dated 1987 which affect the self-management of labor collectives, spreading it to enterprises of all types (regardless of the form of ownership) and deleting Article 25, and grant the rights of corporate persons to the councils of labor collectives.

To set up an organizing committee to coordinate the actions of the councils of labor collectives and workers' committees of the enterprises of our country, granting to it the authority to defend the interests of labor collectives in the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Government and powers to prepare an all-Union congress of the councils of labor collectives and workers' committees in December 1990.

To approach the labor collectives of enterprises with a suggestion to study the documents of the present conference and support its initiatives.

To suggest that the USSR Supreme Soviet committees invite the organizing committee for coordinating the actions of the council of labor collectives and workers' committees of our country to participate in developing revisions to the USSR Law "On Enterprises in the USSR."

The organizing committee will send the documents of the present conference to the USSR Supreme Soviet and the Supreme Soviets of republics.

To suggest that the USSR Supreme Soviet submit for public discussion a new draft Law "On Enterprises in the USSR" which takes into account the proposals of the first all-Union conference.

To instruct USSR and Union republic people's deputies taking part in the conference to bring the resolution and proposals of the first all-Union conference to the attention of a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR president, and the Union republics, and to argue in favor of the demands of the conference.

Participants in the conference will enlist people's deputies of all levels in their regions in implementing the resolutions adopted at the conference.

To consider the conversion of ministries to the format of concerns and their performance of the functions of lessors to be impermissible, as well as the transformation of ministries into joint-stock companies.

To approach all enterprise labor collectives with a call not to display egoistic feelings to the detriment of partners while resolving economic issues.

If the USSR Supreme Soviet fails to adopt the law on enterprises with the revisions proposed the labor collectives reserve the right to more resolute measures. [end box]

Agricultural

Agricultural Developments Reported for 5-12 Sep

LD1309023590

[Editorial Report] The following is a compilation of reports on agricultural developments in the USSR carried by Moscow Domestic Service in Russian on 5-12 September, unless indicated otherwise. Times of broadcast, given in GMT, are in parentheses at the end of each item.

5 September

According to the report of the agro-industrial committee of Kustanay Oblast, an area of 1.015 million hectares of grain crops has been cut, and 580,000 hectares have so far been threshed in the oblast. (Alma-Ata Domestic Service in Kazakh 0100)

6 September

Ten million tonnes of grain have so far arrived from collective and state farms in Kazakhstan, of which more than 3 million tonnes have been handed over to the state. (0100)

An emergency has been declared in the potato and vegetable harvest in Komi Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, with the republican Supreme Soviet calling upon the entire able-bodied population to help. Great losses of produce are threatened, and the already meager supply of potatoes and vegetables could deteriorate further. (1300)

Barnaul. The state order for the sale of rye has been fulfilled by the bread grain growers of Altay Kray. The kray's elevators have received 100,000 tonnes of grain. This year, when Altay Kray suffered from an exceptional drought, each hectare of rye that was harvested yielded double and even three times the yield produced by spring bread grains.

Tambov. In the northern rayons of the oblast 180,000 hectares of grain crops have not yet been reaped. Most farms in the oblast have already completed the harvesting campaign: 720,000 tonnes of bread grain, or 75 percent of the state order, have been transported to elevators and to covered threshing floors. (1800)

7 September

The results of harvesting in the Russian Federation have been summed up. By 3 September the state and collective farms of the Federation have gathered the harvest on 35 million hectares. This accounts for about 62 percent of all grain and bean crops. Continuous rain hampers the harvest progress. (1200)

8-9 September

No significant developments reported

10 September

Over 9 million hectares of bread grains have now been threshed in Kazakhstan. Despite the unstable weather, wheat was harvested from 500,000 hectares yesterday. Large-scale harvesting is in progress in Kustanay, Kokchetav, and Tselinograd Oblasts where the republic's main area under grain is situated. The flow of grain to the elevators is increasing. In the past 24 hours, bread grain procurement workers received 200,000 tonnes of wheat. (0900)

11 September

The northern oblasts of Kazakhstan have sold the state the first million tonnes of grain from the new harvest. First of all were the grain farmers of Kustanay and Kokchetav Oblasts. To date a further 2 million tonnes of choice grain is at the threshing floors. The reason for the disruption of the regular unloading of grain at the elevators is the frequent rain which does not allow the threshed wheat to dry. (0400)

12 September

No significant developments reported

State Statistical Committee Reviews Harvest Work

LD1309055490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 2300 GMT 12 Sep 90

[Text] The country's State Statistical Committee has summed up the results of harvest work in the country. As noted by our commentator, its rate has increased somewhat compared with last week. In the country's collective and state farms, grain and bean crops have been harvested on 75 million hectares and have been threshed from 60 million hectares. This is 69 percent of the area to be harvested. The yield throughout the country as a whole remains high, and amounts to approximately 25 quintals of grain per hectare. The harvesting has been practically completed in the oblasts of the central Non-Chernozem Zone of the Russian Federation, Volgograd, Kaliningrad, Belorussia, Lithuania, and Kalmykia.

In a number of oblasts, however, the rates of harvesting still remain low. There more than half of the harvest still has to be gathered in. This applies to Tver, Kostroma, Yaroslavl, Chelyabinsk, Kustanay, and Tselinograd Oblasts as well as in Krasnoyarsk Kray. The main reason for this is the uninterrupted rainfall. People are constantly in the fields, are on duty, and are harvesting at every possible time, but the rate of threshing is slow because of the excessive moistness of the soil and the damp threshing flails. Over the last week grain has been threshed on only 7.2 million hectares throughout the country, while threshing could perfectly well have been carried out on 12 to 13 million hectares.

As far as the rates for handing grain over to the state are concerned, they are not increasing. Over the last week only 2.4 million tonnes have reached the elevators. The main reason is again the slow rates of harvesting. At the present time grain should be coming in from the Urals, western Siberia, and northern Kazakhstan, but there the harvesting rates are low.

The harvesting of vegetable crops and especially potatoes is going very slowly. It is sufficient to say that potatoes have been dug up on only 17 percent of the area planted with them even though we are approaching the middle of September. Here the main reason is insufficient help from the towns, rayon centers, industrial enterprises, and institutions. The collective and state farms themselves cannot of course harvest what has been sown by themselves. If the towns and industrial centers are not mobilized, the probability exists that potatoes will not be gathered in in time, and that there will be very great losses of potatoes. It should be mentioned that not all that many potatoes were planted this year; one cannot afford to waste them.

Scientific

Explosion, Fire Erupt at Nuclear Fuel Plant

No Casualties Reported

LD1309121790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1000 GMT 13 Sep 90

[Text] Ust-Kamenogorsk, 13 Sep (TASS)—An explosion which caused a serious fire occurred yesterday at the Ulba Metallurgical Factory in the cellars of one of the workshops producing beryllium.

The fire was put out in approximately an hour and a half. The gas emission has stopped. There are no casualties, several people were wounded; no contamination has been discovered.

The radiation background level is normal, I.Tutevol, chairman of the oblast soviet of people's deputies, reported.

The factory is a great producer of fuel for a Nuclear Electric Power Station. The preliminary analysis on the accident site revealed twice the permitted level of beryllium and beryllium compounds. Air and soil samples are being taken throughout the town.

Caused by 'Hydrogen Explosion'

PM1309191390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by V. Mirolevich: "What Happened at the Nuclear Fuel Plant"]

[Text] Ust-Kamenogorsk—On 12 September there was a powerful explosion in the beryllium production shop at the "Ulbinskiy Metallurgicheskiy Zavod" Association and a fire began.

The fire-fighting operation lasted about four hours. The structure of the shop was damaged, the ventilation system was destroyed, and harmful substances were partially discharged into the city's atmosphere. By sheer luck there were no casualties.

According to the preliminary information, the accident was caused by a hydrogen explosion. It is not yet known why the explosion occurred. Nor is the true scale of the damage to the city known. In any event, as Association Director V. Mette stated in a special broadcast on local television, there was no major leak of material.

News of the accident at the Ulba metallurgical plant spread across the city immediately. Thirty minutes after the explosion the telephones were cut off—the exchanges could not take the strain and the fuses blew—and people hurried to warn one another: Do not go out of your home, close the doors and windows.

The situation was aggravated by the fact that there was no wind, so the gas and mist hung over the streets like a shroud. Everyone who had gas masks and respirators wore them when they went outdoors. Drivers wore gas masks as they drove through the city—it was like scenes from a horror movie in real life.

All enterprises near the plant stopped work and the residents of surrounding districts hurriedly left their homes; many fled the city. The stress caused by the news of the accident at the metallurgical plant cannot be compared even with people's reaction to recent earthquakes—everyone realized their utter defenselessness. It was no secret to anyone in Ust-Kamenogorsk that a nuclear fuel plant—the until recently top-secret brainchild of the Ministry of Atomic Energy and Industry—has been operating under the current name of the "Ulbinskiy Metallurgicheskiy Zavod." Sited in the center of the oblast capital on the casual whim of monopolists from the secret departments, it long ago made the city hostage to a permanent test site. It should be noted that in the United States, beryllium production of this kind is located almost 100 km from the nearest human habitation and work is conducted by the tour of duty method.

Meanwhile, emergency measures are urgently being taken—the only thing that we are good at after the event. Departmental and emergency commissions are at work studying the situation and ways to clear up the aftermath. Specialists from the plant's monitoring service state that the concentration of beryllium at the heart of the accident is twice the maximum permissible amount and that this time the worst did not happen.

IZVESTIYA will report soon on what actually did happen and what conclusions the experts reach.

Soviet Research Ship Studies Chernobyl Aftermath

PM1109132890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 6 Sep 90

[Report from Kaliningrad by S. Chekalin, V. Belousov from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Chekalin] World public concern at the state of the world ocean both in connection with sea-based nuclear weapons and the consequences of the Chernobyl disaster—yet to be exhaustively analyzed by science—have made this expedition necessary. It was organized on the initiative of UNESCO, the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency], and Greenpeace and entrusted to our country. The USSR Academy of Sciences assigned the scientific research vessel Akademik Boris Petrov to carry out this task. It is the most advanced specialized scientific vessel to date, equipped with unique apparatus and instruments designed to detect even insignificant doses of cesium-133 and strontium-90 in the water and on the seabed.

[V.S. Karpov, head of the expedition] The 15th trip of the Boris Akademik Petrov scientific research vessel has ended. The main scientific tasks of this trip were first, to practise new methods of remote monitoring of the presence of sea-based nuclear weapons using Sapfir [Sapphire], a unique complex developed at our institute. And second, to study the ecological situation in specific parts of the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, the North Sea, and the Barents Sea resulting from the Chernobyl disaster. As a result of the studies which have been carried out, unique material has been obtained which will make it possible to draw certain conclusions as regards the effect of the Chernobyl disaster on the ecological situation in these regions.

[Belousov] The expedition's results will be thoroughly studied in Moscow, but it is possible to say right now that there is heightened radioactivity in a whole series of areas of the world ocean. Scientists are sounding the alarm and intend to to thoroughly brief the world public on this matter at an upcoming international conference in Goteborg.

Conversion Said To Impede Airplane Development

PM1209132790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 10 Sep 90

[Report by V. Shishkovskiy and A. Rudakov from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] An international air show in Britain has ended.

[Reporter] It is nice to report the great success of Soviet aircraft at this air show. This fact is confirmed by the heightened interest shown by the many visitors and specialists in the displays by the Soviet MiG-29 and Su-27 fighters, the Su-26M aerobatic aircraft, and particularly our giant—the An-225 Mriya which has no counterpart anywhere in the world. Its payload of 250 tonnes is twice as big as that of the U.S. C-5 Galaxy. During talks at Farnborough agreement in principle was reached on the utilization of the Mriya to carry a British spacecraft into orbit. London's FINANCIAL TIMES assesses this commercial deal as being worth 2 billion pounds. There were also talks on fitting British engines to our Tupolev and Ilyushin airliners which will help to improve their competitiveness in the Western market and earn considerable foreign currency revenue. Our gas-powered Tu-155 is also very promising in this respect. In this connection many of our specialists in conversation with us complained about resolutions handed down from above forcing them to start producing machines to pit pears and process fur. You will agree that this approach could leave us no further on—we may have fur wraps and jars of pear jelly, but we will be bidding farewell forever to our dreams of advanced aircraft.

[Announcer] This simplistic approach is the way that some of us view conversion.

Military

Possibilities of Military Coup Assessed

90SV0054A Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 Sep 90 pp 11-12

[Article by Vladimir Sokolov, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA editor for socioeconomic issues: "Reflections on the Variants of Our Immediate Future. To a Market Economy Under the Cover of the Army?"]

[Text] Every successive shortage in our country is accompanied by an outbreak of mass belief in something special. At the height of the shortage of detergents, the country agonizingly waited for Gdlyan and Ivanov to arrest the entire Politburo, confiscate the stolen billions, and hand them out to common working people any minute. Later, when drugs began to disappear from drugstores, Chumak and Kashpirovskiy began to perform miracles for us on TV in a wholesale manner. The salt and vegetable oil panic was accompanied by UFO landings everywhere. Now, tobacco products and bread have disappeared. We have come to believe in market programs.

1. This belief began to sprout as early as election time. After all, there was not a candidate people's deputy without his own program of restructuring the economy of the country, republic, city, or rural soviet depending on the level at which the particular comrade was nominated.

As it were, the similarity of the programs of deputies at all levels became apparent quite soon. Actually these were combinations of generalities from the perestroyka-minded press. We the voters understood that the resounding phrases of "our" candidate would not heal the ills of our society and would not even fill the shelves of empty stores. But what if? At any rate, our immortal hope for a miracle helped us justify our choice.

Compiling programs—once again consisting of generalities, though refreshed ones—has become our national sport during the tenure of soviets of the new term. As the situation deteriorates the debate on the programs becomes increasingly entrancing, and the belief in their magic and self-sufficient power becomes increasingly metaphysical. Last year, we criticized Ryzhkov for a **poor**program; this year we berate him once again for a **very poor** program. However, by September we expect to have a nongovernmental and therefore **good** program, mystically calling it "500 Days" ahead of time. We also know ahead of time that Abalkin's team will come up with a **so-so** program as if we were sitting at horse races and discussing the virtues of trotters ever more passionately. Fervor is easy to understand to a degree for the stakes are much too high. However fervor is also mysterious because, regardless of who is released by the starting shot, there is no track in front of the programs! Instead there is rough terrain full of potholes, swamps, and obstructions, and this impassable landscape keeps changing all the time; little local volcanoes swell, and in some places it is already burning.

Switching back from metaphors to plain language, I would like to state my conviction that under our current conditions **no** program—even if prepared by the best economists of our country and the world, run as a model on the most powerful computers, bolstered by the involvement of monetary funds, and so on—can be implemented as a logical and coordinated succession of actions by the government and the people. I am afraid that it will not be possible to even initiate it in the manner conceived by the authors because only God himself knows where and when miners may strike or an interethnic conflict erupt, where refugees may flood from, whether yet another republic may decide to secede with Union enterprises or merely with a piece of its neighbor's land, or when yet another chemical combine or reactor may blow up; this is to say nothing about political hysteria of the kind of railway blockades. After all, any such event will easily undermine more than just one point of the program and will turn the 500 days into

700, 1,000, and so on, in keeping with the painfully familiar calendar of five-year plans.

Undoubtedly both reformers and the immediate authors of the programs—future scapegoats—understand this very well. For example, after a report by the A. Aganbegyan commission to the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers, many speakers emphasized that stability as well as the rule of law and order in the country are key conditions for a transition to a market economy. However nobody said how these conditions are to be ensured, at least not in the 18 August TV broadcast.

2. At present the sociopolitical situation in our country is the focal issue rather than the program. Peasants will not take land free of charge—to say nothing of taking it for a fee—until they come to believe firmly that nobody will ever again take away their lots, their crop, and their belongings. City dwellers will not invest their savings in their own businesses—to say nothing of investing their entire lives—until they make sure that racketeers will not stick sawed-off shotguns between their ribs and laws will not change "just like that." Foreigners will not come to us with their technology until their investments are 100 percent safe from revolutionary expropriations. Neither domestic nor foreign capital will finance all of them in the absence of certainty that debts will be repaid, and with interest at that. This means that the STABILITY of laws and economic contacts, the CONTINUITY of obligations of changing authorities, and PROTECTION against crime and social disturbances are more important than all other conditions for these main players in a market economy—peasants, industrialists, financiers, and foreign businessmen.

For now everything is the other way around in our country. If laws are not repealed they are not used; new soviet chairmen cancel the instructions of the previous leadership; crime is rampant; and by now the explosions of discontent of the working people frequently cannot be distinguished from it. However, the main trouble is that economic contacts are being severed by the mounting waves of separatism, the barbaric strikes of monopolistic producers, and the blockage of transportation arteries. The results of this are now already apparent, however in the future they will threaten our economy with outright paralysis. Whatever the adherents of "sovereignty" say about direct contracts, the disintegration of the USSR as a united state means the disintegration of a Union market. A power struggle inside "sovereignty" will interfere with the execution of most of these contracts; others are going to be frustrated as soon as the first hard-currency buyer appears. From the economic point of view this turn of events will set "sovereign" republics far back, including the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], even under a peaceful scenario. If on top of this quarrels break out—as well as the division of land, water, and enterprises—and if on top of this the division begins to be accomplished by force... God save from this our children and all the rest of humanity who are not at fault!

However, what forces are capable of opposing the disintegration of the national-economic complex of the USSR at present?

There was a time when the administrative-command system was the most powerful force of this nature. Its remnants continue to manage the economy of the country. However, republic echelons intercept the management of property from the center vigorously and in full view of everyone while retaining this property as state-bureaucratic at their republic level. In the course of its decay, the administrative-command system turns from a unifying force into almost the main destructive force pulling the economic complex apart into regions and republics with a view to maintaining previous arrangements "in the field."

The feeling of commonality of the people, of common goals, common threats and challenges, common pride in accomplishments, and common history and culture should apparently be a unifying force. This is the case with other states. In our country, common fear of the camps was the main part of the "common" for too long. It appears that when this fear disappeared the Soviet people's main category of commonality collapsed. The Soviet people dispersed with unimaginable ease into nations, strata, and groups which turn into mobs at the first opportunity.

Concern about the efficiency of the economy has also ceased to unify us. First, we have impressed on ourselves that the economy is inefficient anyway, otherwise why restructure it? Second, at present the leaders of the periphery, from prime ministers to strike committee chairmen, could not care less about the problems of the recipients of their products in other republics to say nothing of the hated center. Third, the center itself has already shown a good number of examples of reckless bravado in its economic decisions, from the anti-alcohol campaign to writing off the debts of collective and state farms. Fourth... actually, the fingers will not be enough in this case. It is significant that apparently the only people who are concerned about the crisis of the USSR economy are those who by virtue of their positions are responsible for it to the Supreme Soviet and the president. Besides, given our liberal times it is not clear what kind of responsibility this is....

However, nature abhors a vacuum; if old centripetal forces are weakening, this does not yet amount to a sentence. New forces may appear with the same center-bound vector; the forces nobody reckoned with yesterday may grow stronger. Thus the interests of the world community are becoming a new "center-bound" force. The developed countries have a vital interest in the integrity of the "Soviet empire" regardless of their attitude toward the Union's past and the personalities of our leaders. We see that they are cool toward our separatists and prepared to aid reforms issuing from Moscow. We will yet see that these countries are prepared to pay increasingly more as they grasp their dependence on the outcome of our trials.

"Aliens" are a force we did not notice before. At issue is a tremendous number of people who, as it turned out when nationalism mounted, reside in republics other then "their own." Tens of millions of Russians live outside the RSFSR and an equal number of people hailing from other Union republics are present in Russia. "The ancestral lands" of non-Russian peoples are suddenly becoming distinct inside Russia, and here we have Russians fleeing Tuva. Territorial claims made by "sovereign" republics against each other are in store for us, and even inside the republics there is much sorting out of the purity of blood lines to be done. Our country has tens of millions of obvious half-breeds—where is their land?

"Aliens" are merely maturing into a political force, but the lot of hundreds of thousands of refugees speeds up this process. "Aliens" are the most reliable social base for anyone who will engage in a struggle for the unity of the country. I will observe that separatists understand this and will not reconcile themselves to the presence of "aliens" in "their" republics regardless of the ethnic harmony they promise after secession.

Finally there is a third force—third in terms of the free flow of my reflections but not at all in terms of significance. The most venturesome of the secessionists seem to fail to notice this force, which of course does not cancel the fact of its existence. Go and try canceling this force; being one of the mightiest in the world, well-organized and equipped, possessing its own infrastructure and tremendous material resources, under the same command from Brest to Chukotka, from Novaya Zemlya to Kushka, and finally armed, it may itself cancel anybody. Of course it is clear to you that I mean not only the Army but also the entire military-industrial complex of the USSR.

3. So far the position of the military-industrial complex is not very distinct. However, reality is already infringing on the vital interests of this complex, and quite painfully on occasion. At issue is not conversion or the stock of weapons; incredible stocks have been accumulated and we can spend a lot of time disarming. But here we are withdrawing our troops from East Europe, and we immediately run into not just a problem but a fire-breathing dragon: housing. Tens of thousands of career officers are without apartments, and one-third of them are pilots, the elite of any army! Now they are saying in the republics as well that alien troops—that is, those of the Union—should leave the sovereign territory. Where are they to go to? Who is waiting for still more homeless lieutenants and colonels? Would you have them fight their way into the blocks of Russian cities and use tanks to pack in peaceful residents?

Military installations are another sensitive problem of any military-industrial complex. What is to be done about defense industry plants and their suppliers dispersed over one-sixth of the globe without anticipating "sovereignty?" What is to be done about, say, air defense complexes somewhere in a southern republic? Where are billions of rubles to be found for building new complexes, and on what border are they to be built—that of Moscow Oblast? What is to be done about existing complexes? Are they to be left to the sovereign republic? This may turn out to be sovereignty that bites. Are they to be dismantled, destroyed? This costs a lot of money. Should a treaty be signed for them to remain with the status of a foreign military base? However this very southern republic will form its own armed forces which after a while will develop their own point of view on this treaty....

In a word, the military-industrial complex will calculate all variants using its computers and may determine that the most inexpensive and reliable way is to stage the very military coup that politicians and journalists have been scaring each other with for about two years now, making the populace shiver. It is surprising how much we like tweaking a genie's nose and imagining that we can stuff it back into the bottle at any time!

At this point many readers holding democratic beliefs will shrug it off: "Oh really! A coup is impossible, a civil war will begin!"

I maintain that no civil war will begin in our country. Not a single rayon soviet in the country is capable of organizing potato harvesting on its territory. The Communists are fiercely dividing up party assets. People's fronts are not in a position to disarm bandits in their republics. Who is going to rally the people to fight the Army? What people? In the name of what will neighboring nations that hate each other face automatic weapons fire? "Equality, fraternity, and happiness?" Also take into account the fact that no foreign country will censure this mode of action by the military or aid the eventual resistance because for the outside world this scenario will mean first of all a step toward the desired stability in this indefatigable USSR and regaining at least some control over nuclear weapons, nuclear power stations, and other sources of a global threat.

However, such a coup will signify the end of perestroyka, will it not? To my mind, it will. In this case generals will be able to lean on only the most conservative strata of the population, and they will have to crack down on the reformers. Otherwise they will not be able to explain their coming to power to the people. Naturally, glasnost will be replaced with propaganda, and parliaments will be "temporarily" dissolved forever. Parties will be "suspended" and so on in keeping with the routine of many military regimes.

Rationed sales, combating crime, production losses, and speculation under martial law will improve the life of the common people perceptibly and win back the sympathy of the masses for state property, leveling, and the communist perspective. "The defense sector" will once again be able to skim off the cream of the best resources of society and rival the imperialist Strategic Defense Initiative. There will be more generals with dachas and without troops than we have now. The military-industrial complex will begin to bite off even larger slices of the budget of the country. This is how we will smoothly return to stagnation for generations to come.

4. If we do not desire the above we should not pretend that only politicians and economists act in the course of perestroyka and that the military exists in order to have somebody to disarm and reeducate. It is time for us, together with servicemen of all ranks, to figure out the actual mood and political objectives of the gigantic organism called the Soviet Army.

I do not doubt that specialists will do it better; they may have already done it. Yet I would like to outline for the readers my judgment about the attitudes of various echelons and generations in the Army.

Most of the generals, while having formal power are hardly moral authorities for their subordinates because they have served to advance to their positions in a time of peace and stagnation. Many of them have been persecuted by the press and are as angry as can be. The best means to hold on to their positions for these people is to restore the treasured past in keeping with the above scenario. As we see, separatists in the republics are their best helpers in this instance.

Senior officers, and together with them a number of young generals, are not just the next generation but also a different formation; these are different people. Most of them have experienced Afghanistan, have been under fire, lost friends, and gained real combat experience for which servicemen have no substitute. They have a feeling of frontline camaraderie. Their authority in the units and among the people is equally high, but many are profoundly disappointed by the fact that, as it turns out, they were not fighting a righteous war—incidentally, on orders from the military commanders of the time of stagnation. They carry out the orders of the latter at present as well. However, they are aware of their right to advance to key positions in the Army. But for what purpose? In order to move into dachas themselves and carry on the "invincible and legendary" traditions of Stalin? Or in order to create a modern, well-equipped, and well-trained Army of professionals that is capable of carrying out any mission in combat rather than in patriotic songs?

If the latter is correct—speeches in the Supreme Soviets by deputies who are servicemen of this generation leave no doubt as to this—this formation of officers and generals desperately needs a market economy. They need economic reform. They already know, for example, what the U.S. Army is about. They clearly understand that only a market economy will provide enough funds and domestic technologies for a leap ahead. They do not need a military dictatorship because they do not need an economic impasse; they do not want to languish in humiliating and dangerous poverty compared to a rival who is pulling further ahead and higher.

However, they will likewise hardly agree to the disintegration of the Union which will destroy the integrity of the Soviet Army, split the officer corps by nationality, and in some cases force them to fire on former comrades in arms. This is why this generation may obey the fateful order at a dramatic moment of perestroyka when it seems that the motherland is indeed in mortal danger.

Still, the interests of this generation in the main cannot coincide with the interests of stagnation-time generals. They are coming to contradict the separatists in the most serious manner, and they are more and more clearly drawing closer to the political interests of the adherents of a renewed federation.

5. Of course, only our readers in uniform may confirm or refute these reflections. However, if I am right, the leaders of our country should have started thinking long ago about who to bet on in the Army, what to promise, and what tasks to assign to whom. So far the public has seen no signs of that. Well in this case it is all the more useful to recall something that the world knows well: A transition from a socialized—or destroyed, or just poor—economy to an efficient market economy is quite frequently carried out under a state of emergency or even war. Successful examples such as Greece, South Korea, and Chile come to mind. These countries, which have been under the much-abused "black colonels" and which our newspapers have mourned and grieved for, have long surpassed us in affluence. Even such brilliant examples of prosperity as the FRG and Japan laid the foundations of their success when occupied rather than as democracies. In these countries the U.S. Army was a guarantor of stability and of the practicability of the Marshall Plan and other programs to restore these semidestroyed states. We denounced the occupiers in every way possible; meanwhile they were hard at work forming parliaments, preventing parliament members from fighting, organizing local business, teaching business to the population which had grown dull due to what it had gone through, apprehending bandits, and making all people without distinction comply with the norms of civilized coexistence.

Of course nobody is going to occupy us, even if we pay them for it. However, with every passing day we are becoming convinced that we need a guarantor as well, and much more than the ethnically homogeneous Germans, Japanese, or Koreans. Who may and should become such a guarantor in our country?

The reader will expose me: "Here it is! After all, he is calling for a coup!"

No, I am not calling for it. I am researching some of the variants of our immediate future and trying to understand what we are prepared for, what evil may be awaiting us, and if it is unavoidable how to turn it into the necessary benefit and transform it into good.

I see a possibility that does not run counter to either our peculiarities and conditions or the experience of other states.

Nobody should interfere with the development of democratization in regions where it proceeds peacefully, even if through arguments and mistakes. We will become wiser and more civilized, work better, and live better; thank God for that. However government will inevitably be taken over by representatives of the USSR president and performed by military authorities in areas where bloody conflicts and mass disturbances erupt and where the infrastructure of the country, its vitally important organs, are endangered—railways, ports, air routes, communications systems, power industry facilities (especially nuclear), large monopolistic enterprises, sources of the most important raw materials, and so on. So the military authorities should guarantee the application of the key laws of the economic reform by order of the president, unlike their current narrow role—in Karabakh, Frunze, Baku, Dushanbe, and so on small forces of the Internal Troops merely ensure a minimum of order. These are first of all the laws on land, ownership, enterprises, taxation, and entrepreneurs.

Yes, this is exactly what I want to say—new economic relations, new estates and classes may begin to emerge not only in the thus far prosperous areas but also here (perhaps first of all here) in territories driven to desperation and mutiny. Without wasting precious time we may embark on creating new owners here by protecting their property against the ups and downs of the period of transition by means of military force. After all, civil administration, even if it has been elected democratically many times over, still does not control the situation in places where it has come to pogroms and it will not be able to oppose the class hatred of mobs reduced to lumpens. The Army may be able to.

Presidential rule supported by the military may cut one more Gordian knot which is too tough for democracy—the problem of ownership and ethnicity. Who will be able to become a full-fledged owner of land in, say, Nagorno-Karabakh? Armenians only? Azeris only? Will one of the feuding republics rebel? Can both rebel? Nationalists in both republics will not go along with this. Only an armed force of different ethnicity will be able to shelter the residents of Karabakh from the ambitions of their neighbors, defend their work on their own land, and allow them to perceive themselves as the people of Karabakh regardless of language and culture.

In regions such as the Fergana Valley, the release of property by the state is hardly conceivable except under military protection. They tried to transfer several hectares of land in Osh Oblast which were farmed by the Uzbeks to the Kirghiz in an administrative manner, and look what happened! What kind of a flareup will there be if you sell regardless of ethnicity?

This form of government will make it possible to accomplish several tasks at the same time: to unerringly marshal the resources of the state to where they are needed the most—the territory itself sends a signal to the center that things are unbearably bad here already!—using them with the best return by setting in motion the market mechanism of self-development; to weaken "the dissatisfaction of a transition" to market arrangements because people stand to lose nothing in places where the civilian administration has failed; to implement, in places where the civilian administration is coping, the reforms at a slower pace and naturally with smaller losses. It is easier to monitor and guarantee the rationality of foreign aid on territories under presidential rule; this is where they may begin to solve the problems of the Army as well since market mechanisms take years to emerge, units should be set up rapidly and formidably, including quality housing for officers which will later be sold to the local populace. Professional units may be formed here and the territorial militia principle may be tested. Finally, along with new owners—farmers, merchants, industrialists, shareholders, and so on—genuinely new parties will begin to emerge that will unite people speaking different languages and lay the foundation of new civilian democratic authorities.

6. Indeed, I would like very much to see us make a transition to a new condition of our society in a civilized and noble manner, making intelligent decisions in parliaments and executing them precisely at our work stations. I would very much like the force of reason to be the only driving force of perestroyka, and the calculations of economists and wisdom of leaders to be the only arguments. I dream about the struggle of ideas remaining as the only type of struggle in our long-suffering motherland, and platforms and newspaper pages being the arena for it.

However, here I am writing it as still new abscesses continue swelling on the political map of our country. Here the Lithuanians declare Soviet border guards dismissed, there the Abkhaz declare their republic sovereign, and in response the Georgians block a railway. In Chelyabinsk the Russians ransack their own city due to the lack of vodka. Armenian commandos shoot an Armenian people's deputy calling for peace. The country, inflamed with shortages and speculation, boils and rocks. People have begun murdering for clothing. In Moscow retirees are drying out bread to make rusks, and the harvest is of no use; the output of the most needed items is falling. The resources of society are more tightly controlled by the new national-officialdom tighter than before, and talk of a market economy remains just that—talk. We are waiting for a program. However nobody in the country has enough power to improve the situation of the people even a little. Meanwhile even the small groups of fools in the apparatus, politicos, and terrorists are now capable of making this situation worse, which occurs on a daily basis. Academician Shatalin was right when he softly made his remark: "We are proceeding toward the sovereignty of oblasts, settlements, and streets, but we do not have the main one—the sovereignty of individuals."

Perhaps some people like living in a sovereign oblast in keeping with the instructions of the oblast chief. However, I hope that a considerably greater number of my fellow citizens would prefer to become sovereign individuals in a modern, rich, and strong state capable of defending their rights on its entire territory and everywhere in the world. It is possible that in our case this is only attainable through a period of emergency measures.

How can we walk along the blade of democratization without falling into either a military dictatorship or the chaos of disintegration? We will have to ponder this no matter how unpleasant such reflections are for us. We will not find the right way if we squint blissfully, or if we are blinded by the blood of fury and ambition.

Airborne Troops in Moscow To Prepare for Parade

PM1309120790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 12 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 6

[Report by correspondent V. Litovkin: "What Airborne Assault Troops Are Doing in the Capital"]

[Text] USSR People's Deputy G. Burbulis asked a question at the USSR Supreme Soviet session 10 September. He said that an Airborne Troops regiment is moving from Ryazan to Moscow and its winter quarters are being occupied by another regiment, and he asked why the soldiers are being relocated.

USSR Supreme Soviet Chairman A. Lukyanov said in reply that the airborne assault troops are preparing for the 7 November parade. But the people's deputy doubted his words.

Our correspondent contacted Colonel General V. Achalov, commander of Airborne Troops, and asked him to clarify the situation.

"Unfortunately I did not see the USSR Supreme Soviet sitting," Vladislav Alekseyevich said. "I was very busy with scheduled command staff exercises and there was no time for television. As for the Ryazan regiment, it has indeed gone to the capital like another airborne assault regiment, in response to the Moscow Military District commander's 30 July Order No. 19, to prepare for the Red Square parade in honor of the 73d anniversary of October.

"Preparations always begin two months before the parade. These units traditionally participate in it. They are invariably massed in the parade area near the Polezhayevskaya subway station.

"The railroad was unable to provide us with either cars or flatcars, so we had to move under our own steam Saturday night and early Sunday morning when the highways were as empty as possible.

"Why has another regiment turned up in Ryazan? Many airborne assault troops are assisting Ryazan, Tula, and Pskov Oblast farmers in the harvest. But we have to conduct command staff exercises. I signed the schedule for them back on 20 August and I never suspected, of course, that anyone would see our scheduled exercises as a 'threat to democracy.'

"The point is that these are also traditional exercises for us. The summer training period is coming to an end and young soldiers from the spring draft have entered on duty. We are checking on their proficiency and on subunit cohesion, and we are dealing with the usual matters of staff and unit coordination and other problems.

"On Friday and Saturday we are planning an airborne operation for our boys in a training area, so I trust they will not be suspected of any antipopular actions. Such fears are groundless and, of course, we were extremely surprised to learn of them."

Armed Forces Official Denies Rift in Ministries

LD1309112990 Moscow TASS in English 1036 GMT 13 Sep 90

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow, August 13 [date as received] TASS—There is no rift between the Soviet Defence Ministry and the General Staff, on the one hand, and the Foreign Ministry, on the other, a Soviet Armed Forces chief told TASS. "Not a single military problem is discussed by Soviet diplomats without taking into consideration the opinion of the Defense Ministry and the General Staff," chief of the board of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, Major General Fedor Ladygin said in an interview with TASS. These thoughts are often expressed regarding the Geneva and Vienna negotiations.

Ladygin said that the country's military leadership has normal working contacts with the Foreign Ministry, just as with all other agencies interested in ensuring the country's security.

Ladygin recalled that the defence agency proved the objective relationship between strategic offensive arms and antiballistic missile [ABM] systems. The military leadership proved that deep cuts in strategic offensive arms cannot be made without the observance of the ABM treaty.

All the agencies, including the Soviet Foreign Ministry, went along with this. The Soviet stand in Geneva is based on this coordinated opinion.

Ladygin said that Soviet diplomats suggested to [word indistinct] ministry cuts in heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles to ensure the success of the talks. After thoroughly analysing the problem, military circles proposed that the number of these missiles be cut by half. This opinion was endorsed at the Washington meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush.

"In a word, there is no reason to say that diplomats do not take into consideration the opinion of leaders of the Defence Ministry," Ladygin said.

British, Norwegian Inspection Groups Arrive

LD1309171890 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0920 GMT 13 Sep 90

[Text] Moscow, 13 Sep (TASS)—Inspection groups from Great Britain and Norway arrived on the territory of the USSR today. They have begun carrying out inspections of military activity in notified regions.

On 11 September 1990, in accordance with the provisions of the document of the Stockholm conference, the governments of Great Britain and Norway made requests to the Government of the USSR to carry out inspections of military activity in the Belorussian and Leningrad military districts respectively.

Baltic Republics

Baltic States' Internal Draft Plans Questioned

PM1309161190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent Nikolay Lashkevich under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Borders About To Be Restored"]

[Text] Vilnius—A conference of representatives of the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian Supreme Soviet commissions for territorial protection [okhrana kraya] and leaders of departments has ended in Vilnius.

After discussing problems of the protection and control of the borders, the collective security system, and the preparation for talks with the USSR, the participants in the conference reached a conclusion on the need to create a permanent agency which would study questions of the three Baltic republics' national security.

Let us recall that two months ago Lithuania adopted an interim law on duty to protect the territory which assigns an important role to service by young people in border protection subunits. A territorial protection department has been set up especially to implement this law. The conscription of recruits who, under this law, will perform 1 year of active service between the ages of 19 and 27 will take place in April-May and October-November. This means that the law is due to go into operation in just a few weeks. But how? Where will these 19-year old draftees go? What uniform will they wear? What will happen to those who have gone to serve in the Soviet Army and in particular those who are still "on the run"? How much will the new form of service cost the Lithuanian taxpayer? And most important—how are all these ideas about instituting border and customs services to be realized when relations with the Soviet Union remain unresolved? It is possible that in the course of its work the future coordinating agency, which will pool the efforts of the three Baltic republics' territorial protection departments, will find more specific and clearer answers to these questions. After all, the next draft into the Soviet Army is due soon. Will there be more conflicts then?

Latvia Demands Iraqi Military 'Specialists' Leave

PM1309202990 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 14 Sep 90 p 1

[K. Markaryan report under the rubric "Hold the Front Page!": "Neither Friend nor Foe—What, Then?"]

[Text] Last Sunday's transmission of "Labvakar" ("Good Evening") on Latvian television showed some pictures from the Riga garrison of the Twice Red Banner Baltic Fleet. They were accompanied by a report that military specialists from Iraq are undergoing training there. This was no big sensation, however, at least not for the people of Riga.

Military specialists from various Near East countries long ago began brightening things up with their antics in some of the city's cafes. Nevertheless, for an official opinion I turned to the command. After some discussion I managed to speak with Captain First Class S. Sharov. Unfortunately, our conversation was brief.

"In addition to servicemen from other countries, there is indeed a group of Iraqi specialists at the garrison at present undergoing training in the servicing of ship equipment related to defensive types of armaments," Sergey Yevgenyevich said. "I am not authorized to give any other information, unfortunately, although I understand that much has already long been an open secret."

Yesterday evening there was a session of the Latvian Supreme Soviet Presidium. The resolution adopted says: Complying with the condemnation of the aggressor state Iraq expressed in the 3 August 1990 statement of the Latvian Republic Supreme Soviet and the support expressed for the people of Kuwait and its legitimate government, it resolves:

1. To express a categorical protest at the presence and training on the Latvian Republic's territory of servicemen from the armed forces of the aggressor state Iraq as permitted by the USSR Armed Forces command.

2. To demand that the servicemen of the Iraqi Armed Forces leave the Latvian Republic....

Iraqi 'Technicians' Train in Riga

LD1309102890 Stockholm International Service in Swedish 0930 GMT 13 Sep 90

[Text] The training of Iraqi military personnel in the Soviet Union is continuing, despite Soviet condemnation of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The Latvian news agency, LATINFORM, reports that Iraqi military technicians are being trained at a naval base near Riga in Latvia. According to base commanders, the training involves maintenance and purely defensive tasks. However, the base claims not to be training any fighting forces. A spokesman for the Latvian Foreign Ministry confirms that Iraqis are at the base, but will not say how many are there or provide other details.

Latvian Supreme Council Session Detailed

LD1209160390 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 1730 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Text] At the plenary sitting of the republic's Supreme Council today, a law on religious organizations was adopted. Of the 143 deputies present, 103 voted in favor. The law envisages individual or group acquirement of religious instruction at religious organizations; schools and sunday schools, and also on a voluntary principle in extra-mural studies at educational establishments.

Deputy Talavs Jundzis, chairman of the Commission of Defense and Internal Affairs, reported on procuratorial supervision in the Republic of Latvia. The Supreme Council adopted draft laws on procuratorial supervision in the Republic of Latvia, and on alterations and addenda to the constitution on the questions of procuratorial supervision in the Republic of Latvia, at the second reading.

The situation which arose today at the republic's procuracy still remains unclear, that is, why there are additional armed guards there from a specialized unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, because as Minister of Internal Affairs Alois Vaznis told a group of Supreme Council deputies, he had given no such instruction. Deputy Talavs Jundzis, who went to the procuracy today, reported at the plenary sitting that deputy to the republic's procurator, Andris Reiniks, had called for this because the criminal situation is becoming more acute in the republic and there are at present a number of criminal cases in train against workers of law protection organs.

The Supreme Council commissions are seriously working on the question of regulations to ensure effective legislative activity. One of these questions is ensuring a quorum when adopting important resolutions. This question was examined at today's plenary sitting, at which the version submitted by the commission of legislative questions on alterations to two articles of the constitution was adopted at the first reading. One of them envisages that the Supreme Council at its plenary sittings will be able to adopt laws, resolutions, and other acts if a majority of the people's deputies of Latvia who have participated in voting will have voted for them. The other article concerns the Constitution amendments. The commission of legislative questions proposes the adoption of a norm which would allow changing the fundamental law with at least a two-thirds majority of votes of the voting deputies of Latvia, but with not less than half the total number of deputies present.

'Special Militia' Guards Latvian Procuracy

LD1309225990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2017 GMT 13 Sep 90

[From the "Television News Service" Program]

[Text] On the day of study of the second reading of the draft law on procuracy supervision in the Latvian Republic by the Supreme Soviet, the procuracy building is guarded by sub-machinegunners of a special militia detachment. (Andreas Reinieks), acting Latvian procurator, explained that he considers the guard of the procuracy to be insufficient. Therefore, he decided to invite the Viking cooperative to guard this building.

The boys themselves said they are subordinate to the Union bodies and that they are here in accordance with the decree of the USSR president and the instruction of the deputy procurator general of the Union. Listen to an excerpt of the conclusion of the members of the commission on defense and internal affairs.

[Begin recording] [(Talavs Yundis), chairman of the commission on defense and internal affairs, in Latvian fading into Russian translation] Aloizs Vaznis, Latvian minister of internal affairs, has explained to us that he has not given any decrees or other instructions for the use of the black berets in the procuracy, for, I would say, the execution of duties unusual for them. This is an obvious infringment of the law, a very crass infringement. [end recording]

It remains to be hoped that the deputies, under the guard of cooperative sub-machinegunners, will correctly resolve the issue of procuracy supervision.

Militia Group Organizes, Elects Commanders

LD1209172290 Riga Domestic Service in Latvian 0900 GMT 12 Sep 90

[Text] The structure of the Aizsargi organization [Latvian Militia] of Balvi is being perfected.

They have been divided into secitons; commanders have been elected. The Aizsargi will soon swear a solemn oath to defend the lawful government of Latvia and the state of Latvia.

The oaths sworn to the occupation power's establishments are no longer in force. The Aizsargi of Balvi will not accept into their ranks CPSU members. At a regular meeting, the Aizsargi decided to begin customs checks at the border of Pitalovo rayon and to set up a mutual assistance fund for various accidents.

Latvian Rights Group To Meet People's Deputies

LD1209195190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 12 Sep 90

[Text] Latvian Supreme Soviet deputies who represent the Equal Rights Faction think the draft laws on citizenship being discussed in Latvia infringe upon human rights and discriminate against the Russian speaking population of the republic.

On the faction's behalf, a group of parliamentarians arrived in Moscow to give people's deputies of the USSR and Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviets their opinion. Deputies said the Russian speaking population is being intimidated in the republic, prompting the question at meetings with voters: When do we have to leave Latvia? The Equal Rights Faction, which unites 59 deputies—there are 200 in the republican Supreme Soviet—is unable to withstand the adoption of an antidemocratic law on citizenship. We appeal to Russia's people's deputies, who are famous for their democratic views, not to ratify the treaty with Latvia unless a law on Latvia's citizenship is adopted, Deputy (Yegubets) said. The aura of democracy which has been created by some mass media and public and political movement in the Baltic republic is now a thing of the past. There democracy of late reminds of the return to nationalism and totalitarism.

Latvian Bureau Assails Lenin Monument Desecration

LD1209165890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1530 GMT 12 Sep 90

[Text] At a session of the bureau of the committee of the Communist Party of Latvia, attention was focused on the inhuman campaign of dismantling and destroying monuments to Lenin in the republic. It was noted that in spite of protests from labor collectives and a number of public organizations and residents, a systematic campaign continues in the republic to desecrate the memory of the communisty party. The bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Latvia resolutely denounced these unlawful acts.

Army Officers in Lithuania Express Concerns

LD1309223790 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 13 Sep 90

[Text] A group of Soviet Army officers from the Vilnius garrison has published a statement in a Lithuanian newspaper. The officers express their concern over the vagueness and ambiguity of their position. Recognizing Lithuania's act of independence of 11 March, the 11 signatories of the statement fear that the Soviet Armed Forces may be used not for their proper purpose, as the officer put it. Obviously they hint at the possible use of military force in order to settle the issue of the independence of the Baltic states.

The officers of the Vilnius garrison assert in their statement that the situation in the Soviet Army is now critical and hard to predict. There is an increase in tension between junior and senior officers, and discipline is sharply on the decline. The signatories of the statement speak up for the right of all republics as independent states to have their own armed forces, for full depoliticization of the Army, and for the setting up of a professional army.

Landsbergis on Soviet Talks, Polish Autonomy

LD1309221990 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 13 Sep 90

[Text] Chairman of the Lithuanian Parliament Vytautas Landsbergis has expressed hope that the agreement on the unification of Germany may bring closer the beginning of talks between Lithuania and the Soviet Union, but that will depend on the goodwill of the Kremlin. On the other hand, he noted, speaking on Lithuanian TV tonight, the talks may be delayed by the intentions of a certain part of the population in southeast Lithuania to proclaim the area a Polish autonomy within the Soviet Union. Vytautas Landsbergis said he hoped the population there will not get lured by the promises of Moscow emissaries, who are soon expected to come to southeast Lithuania.

13 Sep Lithuanian Supreme Council Session Viewed

LD1309174590

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 0700 GMT on 13 September carries a live relay of the Lithuanian Supreme Council session from Vilnius.

At 0710 GMT, Vytautas Landsbergis opens the session by introducing distinguished guests, including Poet Kazys Bradunas with family and Professor Leon Brodovski, chairman of the Polish Friendship With Lithuania Society, and his wife from Poland. He invites Professor Brodovskiy to say a few words.

At 0715 GMT, Professor Brodovskiy greets the session in Polish, with Lithuanian translation. He compares Sajudis' victory to that of Polish Solidarity. He characterizes his club as apolitical, but says it seeks to establish good relations between Lithuanians and Poles. He refers to a document recently published by his club. He notes his club's stance against a Polish autonomous region in Lithuania. He announces forthcoming the conference on Polish-Lithuanian relations and invites deputies to attend the conference, to be held in Poland and Lithuania. He presents a copy of the club's publication. The Assembly applauded.

At the 0720 GMT, Landsbergis invites Deputy Aleksandras Absala to assist in chairing session until the Regulations Law is adopted.

At 0725 GMT, Deputy Abisala introduces the agenda, to include market protection measures and regulations completion, Ministry of Energy winter preparations and bank administrator reports. He invites commission chairman to give his report. Deputy Jonas Prapiestis, commission chairman, discusses aspects of draft law governing trade goods sales and export. Differences between goods produced by state and nonstate enterprises are explained. Changes and amendments discussed concerning fines for illegal transactions. He notes some assistance from economists is needed to revise law formulation. He details some new paragraphs, included in the draft, noting provisions need to be made for dealing with minors, involved in unsavory trade activities.

At 0740 GMT, Deputy Vaitiekunas asks question concerning shades of criminal activity and responsiblity, such as "organizing," "incitement," and direct criminal activity involvement. Several deputies enter into discussion on the role of drug speculation.

Deputy Albertas Simenas is asked to define in economic terms differences in enterprise goods released for sale purpose. Discussion ensues, with several deputies participating, on fine and penalty impositions for sale of goods for above state-established prices.

At 0750 GMT, an unidentified deputy raises question of regulating national treasure category items. Explanation notes, a list has been compiled to indicated items in this category. Deputy raises questions of speculation in services, rather than food and other trade goods categories. Cooperative auction practices and farmer market pricing questions are discussed. The question is raised of special permits to take goods out of Lithuania, as in the case of several thousand Lithuanian students in Poland. The deputy implies government will make provision for such permits. Deputy Juknevicius raises problem of who will be entitled to issue protocols, arrest orders, etc. Deputy Abisala introduces heard of Ciurlonis Ensemble, Vladas Meckaitis and another person, whose name is indistinct. This person addresses the session, expressing desire to share Lithuania's joy in entertaining Lithuania with his ensemble performances. An Australian guest is introduced.

At 0800 GMT, Deputy Glaveckas is invited to comment on the Draft Law on Responsibility. He discusses speculation and corruption, noting this law acknowledges existence of such practices. He cites skyrocketing price increases. He stresses the need for economic reform and privatization and notes, these will be effective in turning the economy around. Deputy Abisala asks whether voting could be initiated on the responsibility law. He names deputies wishing to speak, asking them which draft document they wish to discuss. Deputy Survila proposes a vote on both documents. Discussion continues on the proposal. Deputy Abisala initiates voting on how these documents should be treated.

At 0820 GMT, a vote is taken. The vote is in favor of individual consideration of each document.

Deputy Vagnorious proposes examination of document's potential effectiveness. He notes violators should be dismissed and fined. Violators are to be considered in all areas such as those of speculators, law enforcement authorities, and judicial authorities. He stresses the need for incentives, obtained from fine percentages, to be given to those who engage in law enforcement and legal case aspects, as well the stiffening of penalties and fines.

At 0825 GMT, Deputy Albertas Simenas discusses differences between goods and production and proposes appropriate changes in draft law wording. He discusses private production, such as home-produced butter, etc. and suggests several changes in wording to accomodate such instances.

The session adjourns for a short recess.

The Supreme Council session resumes at 0900 GMT. Deputy Benas Rupeika is the first speaker. He notes social and economic needs have been relegated to a lower priority, but now need to assume first priority, along with political issues. He notes the risk factor will be increased by imposing exceedingly high penalties. He details speculation practices and price escalation. "Repressive measures will augment temptation for risk-taking," he says. He stresses the fact this law will only be conditional, temporary. He raises the need to discuss question of winter supply prospects. He cites the insufficient staffing of customs control facilities.

At 0915 GMT, an unidentified deputy questions the effectiveness of government control, without establishing a conscientious and honest regulatory mechanism. He cites a lack of trust and a degraded trade system. He asks for municipal authority commission to issue protocols, he sees no other effective application of the draft law. An unidentified deputy then reads amendment proposals concerning monetary fine amounts. He includes specific penalty recommendations for individuals in specific posts. Incentive pay is also included in these proposals.

At 0925 GMT, Deputy Vagnorius speaks. He notes economists should be charged with establishment of economic order. Documents are needed to govern the transitional period, he notes. He comments on the size of fines, noting they should be regulated in accordance with the type of speculator and goods in question. An unidentified deputy then discusses activities of control departments. He notes such controllers are already in place in certain areas municipal administrations and they need to be accorded rights to continue their work effectively. He also discusses penalty collection distribution to be used for incentive funding. An unidentified deputy proposes establishment of deputy groups, within municipal administration to enforce economic control.

At 0945 GMT, Vytautas Landsbergis observes various crimes and transgressions resemble theft and they are dealt with in the Criminal Code. He cautions against existence of gaps, such as problems involving minors. He proposes another paragraph included in criminal responsibility, that would provide for double penalties, including one emanating from criminal responsibility. He proposes the economists should examine this problem.

Minister of Justuce Pranas Kuris then discusses the order of administering penalties. He discusses existence of legal measures, that should be effective and legally enforced. He describes the Landsbergis' proposal as unexpected and perhaps not entirely legally acceptable. An unidentified deputy observes this draft document has been adequately prepared by the procuracy and other legal experts. He suggests it be edited quickly and adopted without delay. Another deputy raises some new considerations, involving accusations against innocent people, to give them recourse to turn to the procuracy to investigate such complaints. Deputy Prapiestis notes issues are becoming confused.

At 1000 GMT, Deputy Juknevicius notes the other variant did not contain anything new. He notes collection of fines and administrative arrest, following failure of payment, should be included in law. He proposes the draft be adopted today. He points out the procurator's role is that of a free agent, this mechanism has always been in existence, has not been abolished. There are some questions from the floor, concerning who is considered competent to draw up protocols. The discussion continues, on incentive funds, its allocation and disbursement control. The question of establishing a special service to battle infractions against trade control, is discussed. Deputy Juknevicius next elaborates editorial changes of document.

Vytautas Landsbergis expresses concern over simplifying things for the criminal, by imposition of administrative penalty, only. Deputy Gediminas Vagnorius is called upon to present the draft of the second part of the law—new economic laws, which are not to impede economic reform. He notes this draft is geared to deal with situation, imposed by the Soviet Union. He mentions borders, with the Soviet Union and other states. He regards the borders as not truly existent. He discusses the monetary problem, whereby the USSR does not follow any defined course in its monetary system. The currency problem needs to be addressed. He recommends introduction of currency coupons, that would be used along with the rubles. He explains what categories of goods these coupons would be used for. The coupons would be effective for several months. He further explains in detail the coupons' use and price regulation practices. He stresses need for government to address preparations for winter measures. He says currency exchange facilities to be opened soon. State economy prices need to be considered, as long as a total market economy system does not exist, he notes.

There is a proposal to make some changes, to introduce currency type payments, and to align currency exchange with realistic exchange rates.

The session again adjourns for a recess.

The Supreme Council session resumes at 1200 GMT. Deputy Gediminas Vagnorius answers questions. The suggestion is made to wait three months to test whether the government program is working. Vagnorius replies they may not survive that long, especially since winter will be a time of difficult trials. The government should enforce contract fulfillment with regard to all enterprises whether they are under republic or other jurisdiction. Discussion continues of various sections of the draft proposal. Vagnorius points out cooperatives have to register as enterprises, also.

The question is raised what would happen in the event of discord between the government and the production area managers.

At 1215 GMT, Minister of Economy Vytas Navickas reports on government proposal variant, discussing the differences between government proposed checkbooks and the currency coupons described in the draft document, under discussion. He notes enterprises will continue under existing regulation framework until a new enterprise law is enacted. Deputies ask questions concerning currency and government-proposed identification "business-cards" cards to be introduced on 1 October. Minister explains possible raw material supply interruptions. He notes this draft law was presented to government very belatedly; he does not consider this as contributing to fostering of good will.

At 1240 GMT, the question is asked regarding definition of the duration of the temporary period of time, alluded to in documents. The minister feels this will be developed along with economic development. The deputy cites statistics on penalty decreases during the past year, for economy-related criminal activities for state property misappropriation. She cites only 12 criminal proceedings instances as having been initiated during the past 8 months, in Lithuania. She notes this shows economic blockade measures were ineffective. She stresses importance of administrative and criminal responsibility legislation, but warns it will be ineffective without an enforcement mechanism, established to implement these laws. She proposes immediate formation of a deputy commission to oversee implementation of such laws.

At 1300 GMT, Deputy Survila expresses hope new laws will complement one another and discusses discrepancies in fund distribution. Cautions against spurring negative reactions that propel goods export to other states, since producers are not given incentive.

At 1305 GMT, a motion is proposed to approve Bank of Lithuania officials. Kazys Raskevicius is proposed for the post of Bank Administration deputy chief. Speaker reads candidates biographical sketch. The following are proposed for bank administration membership: (Juozas Bacevicius), (Bronius Povilaitis), (Professor Stasys Uosis), Vladas Terleckas is unable to accept the candidacy. Candidate for lithuanian bank revision section chairman nominee is Edmundas Zukauskas. The candidates answer questions from the floor.

At 1320 GMT, voting for the candidacy of these Bank of Lithuania administrators takes place, for each individually. The candidates are confirmed. Motion is made to approve the bank administration proposal. The resolution is unanimously approved. Voting for Edmundas Zukauskas takes place separately. The resolution is passed.

A recess is then called.

The Lithuanian Supreme Council session resumes at 1400 GMT.

At 1407 GMT, an unidentified deputy discusses the need to concretize some of the government decisions. He discusses specific points of the government document that lack clarity.

At 1415 GMT, Deputy Sepetys discusses commercial trade questions, citing examples of where the newly adopted law is not being implemented in Vilnius stores. He stresses the need for more clarity on hard currency being available to enterprises who sell abroad, but which is not handed down to farmers who supply raw materials for enterprise production. He stresses that Lithuanian independence and economy questions must be decided in Lithuania and not in Moscow.

At 1420 GMT, an unidentified deputy discusses budget balancing. Every resolution must have financial expression, he notes. He goes on to express concern because of lack of common effort, with one document prepared and another presented for approval. He questions the currency proposal and also expresses doubt about auction proposals.

At 1425 GMT, Deputy Eduardas Vilkas takes the rostrum. He wishes to touch upon the general logic of the proposed documents. He notes speculation reached zenith proportions during the blockade. "We are going to improve the speculator class," he says, and adds that our proposals will catch the less adept ones, leaving the professionals in control. He stresses the need for beginning serious economic reform. To this end, the managing of our own economy will pave way for true economic reform. He feels this will be negotiated with the USSR. He alludes to the USSR's radical reform, which is to begin 1 October. He adds that lack of agreement with the Soviet Union is no longer a problem to beginning economic reform. He also discusses privatization questions.

Vilkas examines several possible variants related to ruble conversion methods. The economic reform program must be completed by 1 October and implemented a week later, he says. Vilkas states his approval for the adoption of this document.

At 1435 GMT, Deputy Rudis proposes ceasing discussion of this document and forming a group composed of Vagnorius, Glaveckas, Terleckas, Vilnius Baldisis, and Minister of Economy Navickas to discuss the question thoroughly and make their recommendation.

At 1445 GMT, Vladas Terleckas questions the trade balance with the USSR. He regards commercial banks as speculation organs, saying they need to be normalized. Incentives are necessary, as well as regulations. He feels the variant still needs some work. He discusses the role of coupons and check books.

At 1455 GMT, tractor sales are discussed.

At 1505 GMT, variants proposed by Deputies Rudis and Glaveckas are discussed.

At 1520 GMT, an unidentified deputy asks Abisala a question on whether an unofficial vote could be taken despite the absence of a quorum. The named deputies are to be personally responsible in preparing such a recommendation, and several other deputies are invited to assist them. Deputy Eduardas Vilkas is included among them. Minister Navickas takes the rostrum and says that attempts will be made to reach a quorum. Only 91 deputies are present.

The Lithuanian Supreme Council session continues at 1530 GMT with Vaidotas Asmantas', minister of power engineering reporting on the situation concerning power engineering. The minister says the situation does not look too bad; gas supplies are continuing at the moment, which ensures power engineering, and alleviates concern about winter season heating.

Questions then follow. The first question is about the readiness of boiler houses to start the heating season. Answering a question as to whether the republic had signed any contract with Western countries concerning oil supplies, the minister says that no contracts have been signed because there can be no financial guarantees for the investment of foreign capital and financial loans while Lithuania remains part of the Soviet Union. Foreign loans and oil supplies will become possible only after Lithuania has achieved complete sovereignty from the USSR.

The minister declined to answer a question concerning current fuel reserves in case the economic embargo was reimposed, saying that this is a strategic matter.

At 1600 GMT, concerning the export of gasoline from Mazeikiai oil refinery, the minister says that gasoline export to Poland is possible only because the quality of gasoline did not meet international standards and would be unacceptable by Western countries.

At 1604 GMT, a draft law is adopted concerning penalties for the violation of trade regulations. Each article of the draft law is presented and adopted by taking a vote on it.

At 1623 GMT, debates ensue concerning the fixed prices of goods produced by cooperatives and private enterprises which aim at curbing price inflation.

At 1642 GMT, a vote is taken on the entire draft law concerning violations of trade regulations and illegal exports of goods from the republic. Seventy deputies vote in favor, and the draft law is adopted by a majority of votes. Following this, Deputy Juknevicius presents the regulations concerning the application of this law.

Debates continue on some points in the application of the law.

At 1707 GMT, regulations for the application of the law are adopted by a majority of votes.

An announcement states that the Supreme Council will work on Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday of next week.

At 1713 GMT, the live relay ends.

Lithuania Resumes Debates on Protecting Market

LD1309224490 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 13 Sep 90

[Text] Today the Supreme Council of Lithuania resumed debates on measures aimed at protecting the Lithuanian market. The discussions lasted throughout the day, and only one of the two intended legislations was finally adopted. It is a decree which provides for much better responsibility for violations of the order of selling goods or for taking them out of Lithuania. Big monetary fines up to more than 10,000 rubles, as well as other strict punishments, will be applied to those individuals and cooperatives who resell goods with the purpose of getting easy money. Equally strict measures are foreseen for attempts at unlawful trafficking of merchandise and other (?values) across the border of Lithuania.

The adopted law is temporary and it is believed to be in force for some three months. Only, though no definite terms are given in the document passed by parliament today. The law will come into force on Monday.

The Lithuanian government and parliament were forced to take such strict administrative and command measures because of the thriving black market and owing to the large-scale shipment of Lithuanian production out of the country. Some economists believe that legislative and punitive measures are a poor remedy to the ailing Lithuanian economy, while others consider that the decree passed by parliament today is one of the most significant legal documents adopted recently. Another intended law on protecting the Lithuanian market, that of economic measures, will be discussed next week.

Lithuanian Procession Sets Out in Central Moscow

LD1209220690 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1900 GMT 12 Sep 90

[Text] Today, starting from the Lithuanian Mission Building in central Moscow, a procession of some 50 people set out for the very center of Moscow. Petras Cizikas [former political prisoner] carried a large cross at the head of it.

It had been planned to carry the cross to the Moscow Kremlin. [words indistinct] the way was barred, three times, by public order officials, who diverted the march into side streets.

The crowd, guided by the Moscow militia and joined by more and more Muscovites, turned in the direction of the famous Lyubyanka. Saint Ludwig's church is located near the famous KGB headquarters. Holy Mass was celebrated at this church.

Planned Soviet Broadcasting Laws Condemned

LD1209135390 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 11 Sep 90

[Commentary by Radio Vilnius correspondent Jonas Buarys]

[Text] This week marks three important dates for Lithuania. Today, Lithuania celebrated the six-month anniversary of its declaration to restore independence. But if any champagne can be found it should be drunk judiciously, for its cost—of course cooperative prices—for a bottle are more than a week of pay. (?Of course), negotiations with Moscow are stalled before they even begun. On Wednesday, the "two-plus-four" talks begin in Moscow and demonstrations at the embassies of the United States, France, Britain, and the Germanys are expected to keep attention on these talks in hope that the borders of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are not traded as bargaining chips to the Soviet Union in exchange for their agreement to unite the two Germanys under NATO.

Later the same evening in Washington D.C. a third important event will be taking place shortly after James Baker and Eduard Shevardnadze close up the opening day of card playing, and it too concerns the issue of survival. A spokesperson for Radio Vilnius will address the International Broadcasters' Conference, sponsored by the United States Voice of America. She will speak to the international broadcasting community, including representatives from Radio Moscow, about new draft laws under consideration in the Soviet Union, laws, which if enacted, would put an end to the very broadcast you are now hearing.

While behind the scenes in Moscow Wednesday afternoon diplomats may play a part in Lithuania's future, quite out in the open bureaucrats in that same city are proposing laws which would prohibit radio broadcasts by republic stations into regions other than their immediate area. For Radio Vilnius these laws, if passed, would limit foreign broadcasts to Poland, or perhaps Scandinavia, but no further. As most listeners already know, Radio Vilnius is broadcast through Moscow and the station in Vilnius has little control over the quality of the transmission or if the programming is broadcast at all.

During the crisis this spring, particularly after the Soviets expelled foreign journalists from Lithuania, listeners reported the broadcast quality was poor and on many days virtually nonexistent. Even the suggestion of these new laws by Moscow is an insult to the profession of journalism and, like their intervention this spring into Lithuania with troops, tanks, and a continuing blockade, underscores that the glasnost and perestroyka hyped by Moscow is more air than substance. It is yet another example of the contradiction between what Moscow says it does and what it actually does.

The schedule of tomorrow's International broadcasters' Conference includes speakers from Radio Moscow. Perhaps they too were coming to protest at the same news censorship laws proposed by their employer.

For Radio Vilnius, this is Jonas Budrys.

Moscow 'Electronic Spying' in Lithuania Reported

90UN2771A Vilnius LETUVOS RITAS in Russian 13-18 Aug 90 p 1

[Article by R. Pleykis: "Moscow's Ears on Linksmakalnis"]

[Text] Experienced journalists have appropriately called secret listening microphones "ears." At the height of the KGB's activity, even bedrooms were riddled with them. It was very easy to find out who was whispering what to the chambermaid. It was much more interesting (and, unfortunately, much harder) to listen in on the news at

Army headquarters. You cannot install a wire or mount "ears" there, so one has to set up gigantic "radio ears."

Unfortunately, all the civilized countries engage in electronic spying. Just such elephant's ears have operated in the Republic of Lithuania up to the present time as well. A vigilantly guarded Soviet Army center for electronic espionage is located south of Kaunas. Our radio specialists and amateurs have already succeeded in uncovering a few things in the postwar years.

For example, it is no secret to Gintautas Tamulis, chief of the Kaunas radio and television broadcasting center, that a military (or, perhaps, belonging to the KGB?) radio monitoring station is situated in Islauza (Prienai Rayon) and that transmitters are set up in Garliava. What is the meaning of these "twins"?

According to the testimony of Petras Mikalojunas, shortwave enthusiast and international class master of amateur radio, the Islauza boys bragged without constraint in private conversations that "We are the western ear of the Soviet Union." It would seem that this is true. In Islauza (or, more accurately, in Linksmakalnis), thick parabolic antennas lazily lie near ponds for breeding fish. The antennas are intended for reception of signals from satellites in space. At that same spot, the towers of directional short-wave antennas occupy dozens of hectares.

Recently there were reports in the press and on television about a mysterious military communications facility in Prienai Rayon. The local residents and the "greens" protested its construction. According to information from the self-government chairman of Prienai Rayon, the minimum estimated cost of the facility was 15 million rubles, and it takes up 30 hectares.

Back in 1982 the government of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic, obedient to the will of Moscow, detached that land from the lands of the Daugsiagiriai horticultural sovkhoz [state farm]. Stasys Grigaravicius, director of that farm, told me that under public pressure it seems that construction has been halted for the present but that soldiers guard those 30 hectares of arable land that were once given to the military. It seems that the military has decided to move the former Garliava broadcasting center, which works in "tandem" with the Linksmakalnis monitoring station, to a more distant place. S. Grigaravicius said that a secret building site situated in the vicinity of their farm has already been joined with the Linksmakalnis "center" with an excellent communications cable of Finnish make.

Garliava is getting rid of the "spare" communications people at the center of the garrison, but the residents of Daugsiagiris do not want them to be moved there. And they are right to feel that way.

Premier Prunskiene Visits Czechoslovakia

WA1409124490

For Czechoslovak reportage on the visit by Premier Prunskiene to Czechoslovakia on 14 September, including reports on her meetings with Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel, Czechoslovak Premier Marian Calfa, Czech Premier Petr Pithart, and Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar, please see the Czechoslovakia section of the 14 September East Europe DAILY REPORT and subsequent issues.

Estonian Communist Party on Economic Problems

LD1309225390 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1620 GMT 13 Sep 90

[Text] Tallinn, 13 Sep—TASS correspondent Aleksandr Kharchenko reports:

The Estonian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau thinks that when drawing up the republic's economic policy, one must not sacrifice the people's standard of living and quality of life for the sake of expected future successes. As is noted in its document on the economic situation, published here today in the newspaper MOLODEZH ESTONII [YOUTH of ESTONIA], "measures to surmount the difficulties connected with the present crisis must be combined in a balanced fashion with forward-looking economic efforts."

The public at large still does not know the industrial and economic sectors to which the current leading forces and parties in Estonia hope to give priority development in the nearest and distant future, the document says. The Estonian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau condemns the senseless selling-off of society's national wealth. In its view, "the poverty of the people and the state cannot serve as a justification for the piecemeal selling-off of Estonia." Heeding the will of the people, the republic should implement a series of special-purpose economic programs without which state independence is unthinkable, the Estonian communists think. This includes the program for Estonia's self-sufficiency in breadgrain and fodder grain, and for the restoration of offshore fishing and trawling, and the organization of the economy's fuel and power sectors with the use of local raw materials.

The Estonian Communist Party sees the source of the appearance of private property as being not the direct denationalization of enterprises, but the sale to the population of shares in major state and municipal enterprises. While supporting the transition to a market economy, it regards it as essential to introduce state and public supervision of the distribution and use of national wealth, and supports the introduction of measures to regulate the market.

Estonia's Savisaar Says Worse Times Ahead

LD1309172290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0915 GMT 13 Sep 90

[TASS correspondent Albert Maloveryan report]

[Excerpt] Tallin, 13 Sep (TASS)—We must honestly tell the people that life will become even worse in the future, Edgar Savisaar, chairman of the republican government, said at a meeting with residents of the Estonian capital.

He called on everybody to give up illusions and to understand that the sooner and more resolutely one enters the crisis, the sooner it will be overcome. In the view of the head of the Estonian cabinet of ministers, the way out of the crisis is inevitably linked with adopting unpopular measures.

Such measures include a three-to-four-fold rise in retail prices for meat and diary products, starting from 1 October, and a proposal to increase income tax which has not been yet approved by the republican Supreme Council. The government's urgent steps aimed at overcoming the crisis will cause a marked drop in people's living standards in the near future. [passage omitted]

Arnold Ruutel, chairman of the Supreme Council, supported the head of the Estonian government. He called on the participants in the meeting to give the government a mandate of confidence and broader powers to overcome economic difficulties.

Troops in Estonia Hit Again by Rising Prices

PM1309103590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Sep 90 First Edition p 1

[Report filed from Tallinn by Colonel A. Yurkin under the "Direct Line" rubric: "The Poverty Line Again?]

[Text] The upcoming rise in prices for basic foodstuffs is going to put military servicemen's families below the poverty line again. This is the conclusion being drawn by officers and warrant officers performing their service in Estonia. The salary top-up awarded by the country's government afforded merely a brief respite. Retail prices in the republic for bread products alone have doubled, and vegetables, fruit, and fish have shown frequent price rises. Last year prices leapt 12 percent, this year by more than 30 percent. And prices are set in the republic even for those products which are received here in accordance with the plan from union stocks.

The fact that the Estonian government puts the frequent price increases for foodstuffs (meat, for example) down to budgetary difficulties also bewilders military servicemen. These clearly do really exist, but how then are you to understand the proposed pension reform in the republic which establishes pensions for those participants in the war who spent it as members of Hitlerite units? And you cannot fathom at all why the bandits from the detachments of "forest brothers," henceforth to be described as members of the resistance, no less, will receive a pension of at least 100 rubles for their special services. To these and other questions the leaders of the Estonian People's Front give no answers.

Estonian Agencies Encourage Draft Evasion

PM1309095390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Sep 90 First Edition p 3

[Colonel A. Yurkin report under "Direct Line" rubric: "Calls To Break Law"]

[Text] Tallinn—In the Estonian mass media nowadays there are increasingly frequent appeals to young people: "If you are liable to be drafted into the army of occupation you can apply for labor service," and addresses are given where each day those who want to be freed from performing their constitutional military duty have their wish granted with a single stroke of the pen. Incidentally, many draftees did just that this spring—but they have not turned up either for military service or labor service. Major General R. Pyder, the republic's military commissar, warned that this would happen. However, his protest on the adoption of the law "On Labor Service in the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic" went unheeded.

Now it is fall and the story of the draft is being repeated. Admittedly, opportunities for "circumventing" the USSR Law "On Compulsory Military Service" have increased in the republic. For example, A. Vaymel, chairman of the Tallinn City Soviet labor service commission, is advising young people from the city and all the republic's draftees to join the police. If they do not like the 6-month police school, after which there is monthly wage rate of 500 rubles, they can enter police college and become an officer. Finally, you can join a police auxiliary subdivision and also be paid. And if even that isn't suitable, you can do labor service near your home.

Vaymel says that all who do their service in this way are protected by the Estonian Republic. They, as it is stated, are "not available to the corresponding services of the army of occupation." Agitation of this kind is hardly appropriate in a rule-of-law state. Urging youngsters to break the law is immoral, to say the least.

RSFSR

Yeltsin Interviewed on 500 Days Program

LD1309210390 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1740 GMT 13 Sep 90

[Interview with Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, by unidentified correspondent from the "Topical Interview" program; date and place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Unidentified correspondent] The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet session approved and voted nearly unanimously for the program for a transition to the market—the so-called

500 days program. I would ask you to briefly describe its main phases and the main features of this program. What will it give the Russians in the near future?

[Yeltsin] First, I would like to speak briefly about how the program was born. Since the Union government's program several times failed to be adopted, and since it was met with the people's disapproval—I have in mind the Russian Federation; we feel this clearly, and I, for one, saw this quite clearly during the trip—a proposal emerged to set up a group of absolutely independent and originally thinking economists and other specialists to develop a new program on a fundamentally new basis. And taking into account the fact that it had to be a Union-scale program, President Gorbachev and I signed an instruction to set up such a group: the group of Shatalin, Yavlinskiy, Petrakov, and others.

[Correspondent] As I understand, representatives from Union republics joined the group, too.

[Yeltsin] Yes, I wanted to say precisely this. Apart from specialists here who indeed proposed several alternative programs which were not accepted by the Union government and who developed the concept of the Russian program, a Union-scale program had to be developed on the basis of this Russian program. [as heard] Certainly, this program counts primarily on the majority of the Union republics adopting declarations of sovereignty; and the program proceeded first of all from the premise that the program would be implemented precisely through these republics, through their legislative acts, and through the laws which would be adopted by republic supreme soviets. This is very important; and except for Estonia, representatives from all the other republics were present, and practically—of course, after long debates with this group and with specialists—they agreed and signed this program.

Well, the two programs differ in very many ways. Despite certain improvements to the program, a rigid command-administration system is after all stipulated. Everything gravitates toward the center; all decisions will be made at the center. However, our 500 days program is designed in such a way that the main emphasis will be placed locally, and only then some legislative portions, especially at the initial stage. When a credit and finance system and the stabilization of the ruble are examined, a number of very tough laws or presidential decrees should be adopted.

These 500 days have been split into several stages—into four stages—and the first 100 days are, perhaps, the most responsible: the stage of stabilizing the ruble. The ruble must be stabilized. Further, about prices: There is a new approach in principle. It was immediately stated that rising prices were the only way, while we are saying that corresponding social compensation is needed, too. Our people have a very uncertain and skeptical attitude about this social compensation; therefore, this program is designed in such a way that a long list of food items and staple goods, especially for people on low income and so on, remains stable.

Only gradually will a number of goods be transferred to market flotation, and at prices which later, on the contrary, are going to fall after some time. On the whole, we think the transition to a market will not entail a decline in people's living standards, especially if a proportion of our available reserves is used—they should be put into circulation at this time—and then the negative processes which are possible, although only during the first stage of a transition to the market, can be halted.

[Correspondent] Well, heated debates are currently under way at the USSR Supreme Soviet. A reconciled program has been proposed. In your view, is it possible to take into account, to a certain degree, the interests of the governmental program and those of the 500 days program and to find a certain version; or can the program—I have read it, it has a very integral nature, it is very well elaborated, and well thought-out—work on its own, after all?

[Yeltsin] Our program?

[Correspondent] Yes, your program.

[Yeltsin] It is impossible to blend them. When the Presidential Council decided to ask Academician Aganbegyan to try to integrate them, he said that if one borrowed two or three details, then perhaps something would come of it; however, on the whole, it is 99 percent the program of Academicians Shatalin, Yavlinskiy, Petrakov, and others—let us term it this way—of this working group. They are impossible to blend together because they proceed from absolutely different principles.

The Russian parliament adopted this 500 days program after discussing it in committees, commissions, at separate sittings of the chambers, and at a joint meeting of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. It adopted the program after discussion and in the following way: There was one vote against.

[Correspondent] This can be seen as the program's success, all in all?

[Yeltsin] Yes, and moreover we think that this now gives us confidence. We call on all the republican supreme soviets, and even on the Union Supreme Soviet, to discuss this program at their sessions and to give their conclusions so that later the Union Supreme Soviet, say, could adopt it.

Why are we so concerned about this? First, we do not want to ruin the Union; on the contrary, we are for consolidating it in any way. Second, this program stipulates precisely a Union-scale market; and this is right. But if we are to tackle the implementation of this program within Russia, we have to go over to a new monetary unit. This is difficult; it means changing the entire credit and finance system. This will take a good deal of time, but we have no time, we have no time; time is our main item in short supply today.

[Correspondent] Well, the program has been calculated, and it is expected to start operating from 1 October. There is little time, indeed. But it may happen that the USSR Supreme Soviet will not approve it. Union republics hold their sessions at different times, too. What will your tactics be then?

[Yeltsin] The tactics are as follows: I am in touch with most Supreme Soviet chairmen or with the presidents, and they are to hold sessions and state their attitude now, in September. I hope very much that the overwhelming majority will take a positive view of this program, because today the Union government's program, even from the psychological point of view: yes, it may have been improved; yes, indeed there is some integrity in it; nevertheless, it has too much from the past. One cannot disregard this, and the people will not accept it psychologically. They will reject it. One has to bear this in mind.

Therefore, the 500 days program is, of course, also dangerous for political figures, and certain people are worried by precisely that because it has a specific timetable: a check-up after 100 days, a check-up after the next 150 days, and a check-up after 200 days. [figures as heard] Each stage can be checked, and checked by everyone. No doubt this contains a powerful explosive. It is all right to implement a program up to the year 2000, to say: comrades, we will be going over to the market during a period of 15 to 20 years. This does not commit anyone to anything. Go over if you like, but by then we will have retired and will have our pensions and a quiet life at our dachas, without worrying about anything, you see.

But here is a different matter. Such a time limit has been set, and there is nowhere to retreat. This is an enormous responsibility, and we understand what we are opting for; but we have simply nowhere to retreat. I traveled around Russia and saw so many heart-rending things, although I had thought I knew it all.

[Correspondent] And yet another question, Boris Nikolayevich. Many programs were adopted at different times—I mean the Food Program, the Non-Chernozem Zone Program—and in general they all seemed reasonable. They were put forward, and we started to believe in them.

[Yeltsin] I understand what you are saying. And of course the people also have certain doubts, perhaps; but that is why we have put ourselves into such an extra-specific framework of 500 days. After all, the food programs, energy programs, and other programs, which used to be only 20 or 30 percent fulfilled, were open-ended. And then everyone thought that when the time came they would have gone, they would not be working there any longer, and would not take responsibility for the program. In our state no one takes responsibility for anything—for any failure or for deceiving the people. No one takes responsibility. Our approach is that we are going to be placed within this specific framework, and that is it.

[Correspondent] Boris Nikolayevich, as a politician and leader of the republic, where do you see opposition to the program coming from? What is the main brake that is perhaps being placed on this program, which is supposed to come into effect in practically two weeks from now?

[Yeltsin] Above all, the Union government, all its ministries, and all its departments. So with the adoption of this program, the Ryzhkov-led government must resign without fail; and there must be a general change in the functions and running of the state. It should not be so unwieldy. We in Russia will not be providing the upkeep for 60 ministries, and that is all there is to it. We have dispensed with their services. I think that in adopting their declarations, many of the others [as heard] are doing the same.

The question arises: What is government for? There ought to be some sort of very compact cabinet attached to the president, for instance, with just a few ministers. Perhaps three, four, or five ministries will survive. This is possible—defense, and perhaps some others; but no industrial ministries. Independence—this is the most important thing—must be down below, in the enterprise, in the organization, in the soviet. The most important rights, the most important functions of authority, must reside there.

[Correspondent] When will it become clear that the program has either triumphed, or, if you will forgive me, that it has collapsed? Since it is designed for a specific number of days, it will be possible to check on its progress, as you rightly say. At what stage will it be clear that it has triumphed?

[Yeltsin] On the 501st day.

[Correspondent] On the 501st day? Well, that is not so...

[Yeltsin, interrupting] ...because in the first stage there may be some kind of internal correction. After all, the level of precision does not, all the same, extend down to a single day. Maybe a bit more than a correction, but it must internal.

No matter where I have been and spoken, I have said clearly: Give us the benefit of the doubt for two years in order to stabilize the economy. The third year is for raising people's living standards. Give the Russian parliament, the leadership, and the government the benefit of the doubt for that time—those three years. Give it, and then I will believe in the program.

Yeltsin Describes Variants to Market Program

LD1409084290 Moscow TASS in English 0810 GMT 14 Sep 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondents Lev Aksenov, Yuriy Kuzmin, and Pavel Ostrov]

[Text] Moscow September 14 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin told the republic's parliament today that President Mikhail Gorbachev sent republican parliaments three versions of the programme of transition to market economy on Thursday.

According to Yeltsin, they include a summary programme consisting "99 per cent of the ideas contained in Academician Shatalin's programme, already approved by the Russian parliament, and one per cent of provisions stipulated by the government programme and several other schemes", as well as the government's programme and the plan drafted by Shatalin's team. Yeltsin noted that the president gave the republics the right to choose any of the submitted programmes.

The joint meeting of the Russian parliament is discussing today a bill on freedom of conscience. One of its authors, co-chairman of the Russian Christian-Democratic Movement and People's Deputy of Russia Viktor Aksyuchits told TASS that the bill was "drafted with difficulty because there was stiff opposition from various sides."

Filshin on Economic Cooperation With Union

904A0589A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 6 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report on interview of Gennadiy Filshin, deputy prime minister of Russia, by Ye. Leontyeva; place and date not given: "Five Hundred Days—The Deputy Head of the Russian Government Believes That This Is an Adequate Period for Economic Revival"—first paragraph is an editorial introduction]

[Text] Gennadiy Filshin, the deputy prime minister of Russia, has been working as a member of the government for two months. He heads the Economics Committee—a structure that we are unaccustomed to hearing about. Industry and transport ministries and the committee for material and technical supply of republic and regional programs were placed under the "roof" of the committee. The deputy premier works until midnight: It is crowded in the reception room. They are looking askance at the correspondent—he is only taking up time. It really did take up a lot of time—we talked about what steps are being undertaken to revive the economy of Russia.

[Leontyeva] Gennadiy Innokentyevich, sketch the status of the Economics Committee for us in a few words.

[Filshin] Previously, as you yourself know, there was no need for such a structure. This is an organization that is associated with the new notion of principles of management of the national economy of the republic under conditions of independent enterprises, with the presence of democratic forms of administration, and a clear demarcation of functions between Union and republic organs. I will add: One and the other will make sense when we are able to implement the Declaration of Sovereignty ratified by the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies, and, moreover, also other laws, decrees, and decisions that this sovereignty guarantees.

The first thing I ran into when I assumed the post of chairman of the committee were the rather serious difficulties in implementing these decisions. I divide them into two types. The first difficulty we will have to overcome is inertia in the administration of the national economy at a time when the law on federation has not been adopted yet and when an alternative program for a switch to a market economy is still only being prepared. And when not everyone by far interprets the decisions of the higher organs as guidance for action. The second type of difficulty is connected with the fact that Russia is a special republic, where practically all organs of administration are in an embryonic stage. (The situation is different in all of the other republics). It was thought that the Union organs would perform these functions for it.

Examples? As many as you want. It is enough to say that the former RSFSR Gossnab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply] was distributing 0.9 percent of the products that were being produced on the territory of Russia. And the former RSFSR Gosplan [State Planning Committee] coordinated the production of only four to five percent of industrial products a year and a half ago. True, this figure has now increased to 25 percent.

[Leontyeva] Now you do not have either a Gosplan or a Gossnab in the traditional understanding of their roles. The industrial ministries have been eliminated, and, it seems, you are building new ones on their "ruins"?

[Filshin] Six departments of Union significance were retained—the Ministry of Defense and branches of the national economy associated with it, the Ministries of Electric Power and Electrification, Rail Transport, Maritime Fleet, Civil Aviation, and Foreign Affairs. With respect to Russian enterprises, they continue to fulfill their former functions. As for the new structures, time, a lot of time, is needed for their formation. I would say this: The transition period is needed not only for switching to market relations, but also for the transfer of functions from one administrative organ to another. Therefore, we are not at all pursuing the aim of "razing to the ground, and then..." We want this transfer of functions from the Union to Russia to be implemented together with the cadres and with the material-technical base. Because we do not have a surplus of qualified and competent people, and this, thank God, we understand very well. Of course, cadres, information, feedback, and technical means—we propose to use all of this.

[Leontyeva] Now a lot is being said and written about the confrontation between the Union and the republic, especially in the field of foreign economic activity, accusing the Russian government of extremism and of a misunderstanding of the logic of the construction of the state system.

[Filshin] In my view, foreign economic ties are basically within the sphere of competence of the Union government. The republics can, let us say, conduct trade, but they must entrust major transactions and contracts to the center where, by scale of activity and opportunities for maneuvering currency, a major effect can be achieved with export resources. But the fact that the higher organs of authority of Russia decided to differentiate Union and republic functions, where the emphasis is entirely in another direction, speaks only of the fully understandable distrust of the center. The foreign debt of the Union is growing unchecked, the assistance given to other countries out of ideological convictions continues to ravage our country, and the effectiveness of foreign economic ties is extremely low, and it is precisely for this reason that in this situation Russia is forced to make "defensive" decisions. It is taking on itself functions that the Union was unable to handle properly. Thus, only shortsighted people can speak of extremism in this case. We are not only assuming Union functions, but also all of the obligations of the Union in this sphere, starting from the moment of differentiating functions.

How do we now visualize our activity? All currency entries remain on the books of enterprise-exporters, with the exception of deductions for the Foreign Economic Bank or for another RSFSR organ. RSFSR quotas on the state debt of the Union are determined per capita, proceeding from the size of the population in the RSFSR. This will be fair, inasmuch as Russia, which creates 79.6 percent of the export resources, receives only 70 percent of the imports. That is, it transfers almost 10 percent of its own resources to the other republics. As a result there is an annual "outflow" of 12-14 billion foreign currency rubles.

[Leontyeva] The argument about who owes what to whom already has a long history.

[Filshin] No, I would not want to prolong it; my task is to remove the charge that Russia is living at someone else's expense. Thus, we are assuming not only rights, but obligations as well. We will not forget about the quotas for maintaining embassies and representations, about quotas for payments in clearing exchanges—in short, I will repeat once more, we are taking on everything that is associated with the foreign economic activity of the Union today. We are concluding principal contracts ourselves. We will take credits ourselves, and we will reimburse them ourselves. The number of licenses will be reduced sharply—there is an agreement with the Union government that it will only retain licensing in strategic directions. The list will be short, and the rest will go to the republic. Russia plans to significantly broaden the capabilities of enterprise to export—we will grant them privileges, and we will help them in the search for profitable partners.

Overall, partnership relations with the center are more expensive for us. For example, now in the preparation of a draft plan and budget for 1990, we are working up a number of contracts together with Union administrative organs. These contracts should be concluded both between Russian and Union departments, and also between our governments. No, we did not find support immediately and everywhere, but I must say that the need for cooperation is already realized by the Union partners.

[Leontyeva] So, judging from everything, you assign paramount importance to cooperation with the Union. After securing the home front with contractual relations, what steps will the government take so that the consumer market becomes richer?

[Filshin] The main thing now—for the time remaining in 1990 and in 1991—is to gather resources for the production of consumer goods. Today, this is our "battlefield." We understand well that if the store shelves remain empty for some time, both the economy and the political life of the country will be destroyed once and for all. The central Union organs were not able to concentrate resources in this vitally important direction, so who will do this now, if not the Russian government, whom the people trust at this time? Therefore, as the first order of business, we began to grapple with the resolution of this vital task.

It is very important to us "to launch" a market. More exactly, its mechanism, which is called competition—the problem of prices, around which there is now so much senseless discussion, is unsolvable. Without it the market will only be black. Consequently, the task of governments is to establish it at first at least in individual sectors of the economy, saturating them with industrial (even surplus) capacities and even "turning prices loose." Competition will absolutely lead to a price equilibrium, which will not have to be regulated.

We are making an effort to quickly begin the construction of shops and small enterprises to produce social and domestic commodities.

[Leontyeva] So far nothing has happened quickly. Why do you think that this will happen now?

[Filshin] We are introducing the state order.

[Leontyeva] The state order also is not a new matter.

[Filshin] In the first place, there was no republic order. Secondly, we will be giving it within the range of 40 percent of the cost of the product output, and enterprises agree to this. Thirdly, it will be guaranteed the provision of material-technical resources. Finally, those who took a state order will also receive other privileges—freedom from taxes, reduction of quotas, and so forth. Briefly, we will ensure the complete unshackling of enterprises working in the consumer market. We will also use state manipulations not only with material resources, but with human resources as well.

Everything that we have just talked about with you will enter into the regional program "Consumer Market." In general, there will be two types of programs of this nature. One for disaster regions, and we already have more than 30 of these (we include economic, social, and national tension under this concept). But there are five most "critical" regions. We will not be able to cope with more in 1991. The other type of program concerns resources of regions that are so important for our internal and foreign economic life: the Kemerovo and Tyumen Oblasts, Tataria, Yakutia, the Tuvin Autonomous Oblast, the Angaro-Yenisey region, the Komi ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic], and a number of rayons in the Non-Chernozem area. For the time being there will be about 10 such regions, and the programs relating to them will also be implemented through the government of Russia.

[Leontyeva] As I understand it, you are dropping the traditional planning according to annual and five-year plans, and that programs will take its place?

[Filshin] Yes, we are not preparing a plan now that is conventional in the usual sense, but proposals for the development of the national economy in 1991 that will also include regional programs and the state order (republic and Union). A tax system and various kinds of economic regulators will come into play here. We will place the capabilities of our budget at the base of these proposals: First, we will decide how to acquire money, and, afterwards, where to invest it. It is worth mentioning that up until today everything was done the other way round!

[Leontyeva] When will the people really begin to see the fruit of your efforts?

[Filshin] I think as early as the beginning of next year. We are now undertaking all possible efforts to guarantee a free hand to the basic elements of the economy—to enterprises. At first glance, the Union government is engaged in this very thing—it is introducing joint-stock enterprises, and it is setting up concerns and associations in the place of former ministries. However, behind all of this there is nothing more than an attempt to retain state power over them, and to maintain control of shareholding in its own hands. Enterprises are already suffering from the refined forms of forced "joint-stock organizing" and "concern creation" when, not having succeeded in extricating themselves from previous snares, they are falling into new ones. We will now pass appropriate decrees concerning the shift of enterprises to full economic independence, and, simultaneously on the basis of a law on demonopolization, which will be adopted in the near future, we will try to create competitive conditions for them. Briefly, all of this is set forth in a program that is now being elaborated, which journalists have already baptized the "Gorbachev-Yeltsin" program.

[Leontyeva] But you can explain your relationship to it.

[Filshin] I took part in discussions on it together with representatives of the republic, and I must say that a majority of them support this program. They are attracted most of all, of course, by the formula: "The Union organs perform only those functions that are delegated to them by the republics." And then they are attracted by the consistency of the steps of the developers working for a market economy, which will guarantee the country a way out of the crisis.

[Leontyeva] IZVESTIYA published the main provisions of the program that was worked up by a group of specialists under the leadership of Academician S.S. Shatalin. But a number of experts have expressed the opinion that the "500 Days" program does not have a built-in mechanism for its implementation....

[Filshin] Well, in the first place, "500 Days" has undergone a rather fundamental transformation from the moment of its birth. Secondly, it seems to me, every measure in it can be implemented, for it is to the point, and it makes it possible for the public to verify the process. Moreover, by entering the market we are counting on its self-regulating role, but, in addition, we foresee an opportunity for maneuvers, a mechanism for calculating irregularities. The main sin of previous programs was their fixed form and the blind belief that once adopted they would work.

We have now made it a rule to assess the consequences of adopted decisions. For example, we look into why enterprises do not want to increase the volume of their production. And we see: They are literally "stifled" by sanctions for nonfulfillment of contractual relations. Of course, this is not the only reason, but there is an ongoing expert examination, which will help us in the development of new laws and decrees.

[Leontyeva] And the last question. The Russian cabinet of ministers is now called by many a government of the transition period. And after serving as a detonator for the development of new processes, it should, it is said, resign. Democrats, it is said, are good people and progressive, but professionals are needed....

[Filshin] I do not agree with this statement of the question. In my view, approximately half of the new government is absolutely professional. And others are quickly coping with the ABC's of administration. So, we have to work with thoroughness and in earnest.

Economic Reform Draft Termed 'Half-Baked'

LD1309212290 Moscow TASS in English 2047 GMT 13 Sep 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondents Lev Aksenov, Yuriy Kozmin, and Pavel Osetrov]

[Text] Moscow September 13 TASS—The concept of the Russian economy's transition to market relations, approved by the republican parliament on Tuesday, calls for a careful elaboration of a legal mechanism for its implementation.

Members of the Republic Council, one of the two chambers of the Russian parliament, today began doing just that after a draft resolution on urgent measures to implement radical economic reform was submitted for their consideration.

Fifteen people offered their interventions within the two hours of the afternoon session.

Many of them stressed the need to defend and publicise the adopted programme as there were voters, People's Deputy Aleksandr Zelepukhin said, who believed that the parliamentarians "have sold out Russia to restore capitalism".

A proposal was made to adjourn the session for ten days to enable members of Parliament to meet their voters and tell them of the latest decisions.

The majority of the deputies viewed the prepared draft resolution as "half-baked" and only five out of nearly a hundred who took part in the voting voted in favour.

The Council of Nationalities, the parliament's other chamber, formed at its session a working group to draft a federation treaty.

The group's tasks include, in addition to an analysis of various draft treaties worked out in the committees and commissions of the Supreme Soviet, the working out of its own variant of the treaty and the coordination of this version with Russia's autonomies.

Members of the Council of Nationalities discussed and approved the draft regimen of the Russian parliament's activity.

The work of the council was very nearly blocked at some points by the lack of a quorum for taking a vote. It appeared that some of the deputies, seeking to disrupt the adoption of resolutions they did not favour, chose to abstain from voting by leaving the auditorium as the time for voting drew near.

Other parliament members were sharply critical of such practices.

Russia's Filshin Urges Debate on Economic Plan

PM1309085790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
12 Sep 90 First Edition pp 1, 3

[Interview with Gennadiy Filshin, deputy chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, by G. Ovcharenko under the "Snap Interview" rubric: "Gennadiy Filshin: 'The Government Is Saving Itself'"—first paragraph is an editorial introduction]

[Text] He is a representative of the new wave in the present cohort of political and state figures. Possibly it is precisely because Gennadiy Filshin, deputy chairman of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, does not bear the burden of the previous leadership's mistakes that he is able to pass an unblinkered and nonstandard judgment on the present situation in the country and the programs for the transition to a market economy. As a scientist and now a practitioner his voice carries increasing weight today amid the range of other authoritative opinions. I interviewed him immediately after the speech by the head of the Union government at the fourth session [of the USSR Supreme Soviet].

[Ovcharenko] Gennadiy Innokentyevich, before talking about the government's report on the preparation of the program for the transition to market relations, I would like to know why the country's economic situation has not only failed to stabilize in the five years of perestroyka but has actually deteriorated?

[Filshin] I think that the answer to that question is obvious today: The fact is that our Union government is still committed to the administration-by-command system of management. But as has been shown over many years, that inevitably leads to the failure of all ventures, even good ones.

[Ovcharenko] Yet throughout those five years all we have we heard from the government is that it is the prime opponent of the command-administration system.

[Filshin] That is what it says, true. But in fact? The significant changes which we expected in the economy and management structures just have not happened and the reforms which were announced in all those areas did not get off the drawing board.

In the first place, the structural crisis in the economy has not been overcome: Our heavy industry sectors and the military-industrial complex are essentially stifling the national economic sectors working to meet man's direct needs. Even though all the material and technical resources should have been switched to the consumer market and the mechanism of competition set in motion long ago.

Second, in the past five years new technologies have not appeared in the civilian sectors and the old ones are no longer capable of producing competitive output. The most modern and flexible technologies today are still to be found in the military industrial sectors. We pinned our hopes on conversion but the government entrusted it to the military-industrial complex itself and has essentially been a lobby for it, so it is no wonder that conversion became bogged down within the military-industrial complex. Meanwhile the civilian economy goes on collapsing.

Third and last, there have been no perceptible changes in investment policy. In practice the government continues to defend centralized capital investments, has not created a mechanism to ensure sufficiently rapid transfer of capital into the civilian sectors, and has retained all the old directive features of the administration-by-command system and the economy of the stagnation era.

All this has led to the present crisis situation. But what about foreign economic ties? Today Nikolay Ivanovich [Ryzhkov] stated that we are effectively bankrupt: There is nothing left to pay for raw materials for the light industry, for food, industrial goods, and so forth. But whom does he blame for this? After all, it is the fault primarily of the government that foreign partners are refusing to trust us and are not giving us the credits which until recently they gave so generously.

[Ovcharenko] We have now moved on to the government's report. How do you rate it?

[Filshin] Extremely unsuccessful. It was an attempt, in my view, to save not the economy but the government itself. Why were deputies not given the government program and the alternative program of Academician S. Shatalin's group? Why do they make members of the USSR Supreme Soviet discuss for the umpteenth time something which they haven't actually set eyes on? They promise to give us the composite program on which Academician A. Aganbegyan's group has been working, but not until tomorrow. You will ask: Why did we discuss this question at all today? Well, because they wanted to make the deputies acknowledge that the government has not been idle and that it is capable of carrying out any program.

[Ovcharenko] But you do not think so?

[Filshin] No. I am convinced that the Union government will simply be forced to resign before the end of the year.

[Ovcharenko] Comparing the activity of the USSR and RSFSR Supreme Soviets, which do you think has been better?

[Filshin] I would say that the question is not quite appropriate. But my answer would be that I would opt for the Russian parliament. A collective of like-minded people has already been established there. A collective imbued with the ideas of Russia's sovereignty, the ideas of the socioeconomic protection of its population, the ideas of the impossibility of further diktat by the center toward the republic.

[Ovcharenko] It is clear today that the USSR Supreme Soviet is required to discuss and adopt a hybrid of two programs....

[Filshin] I do not think that parliament will accept it: You cannot cross a snake with a hedgehog....

[Ovcharenko] Let us not rush too far ahead. Let us assume that it does accept it. Meanwhile, Russia is examining S. Shatalin's program and, judging by the discussions in committees and commissions, will support it. How will events and relations between the Union and Russia develop then?

[Filshin] Generally speaking, a very strange situation will be created then. The whole point is that the fundamental principle, namely, the idea of the Union as a single economic space and of the economic cooperation of sovereign republics with equal rights as laid down in S. Shatalin's program, will not be realized. Even though the representatives of 14 Union republics have supported this principle! And it is the S. Shatalin draft, which could be called the Gorbachev-Yeltsin group's program, that they will be submitting to the examination of their Supreme Soviets. And it is precisely that version that is being blocked today by N. Ryzhkov and L. Abalkin, who essentially did not take part in this program. That is why it seems that today the work of the country's parliament is taking the irrational course which the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium indicated to deputies.

In general I think that the republics will make us return to the S. Shatalin program developed on the initiative of Gorbachev and Yeltsin....[Filshin ends]

I thanked Gennadiy Innokentyevich for the conversation. One can either share his opinion or criticize it. Incidentally, during the conversation Arkadiy Maslennikov, head of the USSR Supreme Soviet press center, came up to us and explained:

"The deputies' lack of documents, including S. Shatalin's program, was due to an understanding between the president of the country and the chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet on the elaboration of a joint program and the subsequent presentation of that version alone for examination by the country's parliament.

"A number of deputies listening to the recording of the conversation with G. Filshin were skeptical of many of his comments, particularly the suggestion about the Union government's resignation. Nevertheless, in our view, Gennadiy Innokentyevich's views, while not indisputable, merit attention and our readers should be acquainted with them.

RSFSR Supreme Soviet Session 13 Sep Detailed

LD1309205390

Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1828 GMT on 13 September carries a 60-minute recorded report on the 13 September session of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin in Moscow. The session is in progress as the report begins.

At 1828 GMT Deputy Kuzayev discusses North Osetiya. He protests media broadcasts he says serve only to inflame local feeling. He outlines past sufferings of the Osetian people.

At 1833 GMT, RSFSR President Boris Yeltsin, in the chair, says that it would be best not to discuss the matter now, since no one is prepared for such a debate.

At 1836 GMT decisions are adopted on several points. Deputy Rudkin, deputy chairman of the legislation committee, outlines for deputies the proposed draft law on RSFSR Suprme Soviet standing orders. Rudkin suggests that the Committee for the Supervision of the Constitution be renamed the Constitutional Court. He mentions suggestions proposed about the procuracy. The first section of the standing orders discusses the general structure of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, Rudkin notes. The second deals with matters such as parliamentary sessions and procedural aspects. The third section covers commissions and committees. The fourth section defines the work of the Supreme Soviet Presidium. Section five deals with the appointment of the government, providing for the nomination of alternative candidates. Rudkin also describes the rest of the proposed standing orders. He regrets that not all suggestions from deputies could be used.

At 1850 GMT, deputies begin to question Rudkin about the constitutional court and constitutional reform.

At 1856 GMT, deputies come to the rostrum and express their agreement or disagreement with the proposed standing orders and offer additional suggestions.

At 1914 GMT, Yeltsin proposes an interim decision on the standing orders, which requires that further work be done on the document. The motion passes: 193 for, 3 against, 2 abstentions.

At 1916 GMT, Yeltsin introduces the topic of free enterprise zones. Proposals have come in from several regional soviets asking for free enterprise zone status. He proposes a decision on this be reached.

At 1918 GMT, deputies offer their opinions on free enterprise zones, warning against their use for regional advantage at the expense of state orders. A Kuzbass deputy pleads for a positive decision for her region. Another deputy asks what the difference is between free enterprise zones and a free RSFSR. A Krasnoyarsk Kray deputy says he worries about the overseas sale of natural resources.

At 1925 GMT, Khasbulatov, RSFSR first vice president, takes the rostrum to explain that the fundamental principle is the indivisibility of a Russia which deals with other republics on an interstate basis.

At 1928 GMT Yeltsin suggests an amendment instructing that the status of free enterprise zones be defined. A deputy interrupts. Yeltsin goes on to say that a Japanese firm has examined waste dumps in the Kuzbass, and has suggested providing the equipment for enriching their contents and extracting valuable elements. A vote on the decision, plus the amendment, passes: 133 for, 31 against, 32 abstentions.

Yeltsin on Ethnic Policy Errors

LD1309111190 Moscow TASS in English 1057 GMT 13 Sep 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondents Lev Aksenov, Yuriy Kozmin, and Pavel Ostrov]

[Text] Moscow September 13 TASS—Russian President Boris Yeltsin today warned deputies of the Russian Parliament against repeating a "mistake made by the union centre".

He was speaking during the parliamentary discussion of a move to declare some regions in Russia zones of free enterprise.

Yeltsin said the centre "three years ago began to oppose independence moves by some constituent republics, which has led to large-scale confrontation and ethnic conflicts".

"If the centre at the very beginning had given independence to these republics, there would not have been nationalistic sentiments and centrifugal tendencies."

Free Enterprise Zones Approved

LD1309175190 Moscow TASS in English 1730 GMT 13 Sep 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondents Lev Aksenov, Yuriy Kozmin, and Pavel Ostrov]

[Text] Moscow September 13 TASS—Although the preliminary agenda of today's joint session of the Russian Federation parliament contained just one item—the discussion of the regimen of the parliament's work, deputies chose to focus on another issue—that of establishing free enterprise zones.

Russia President Boris Yeltsin told members of the republican legislature that a number of councils of people's deputies had requested that the free enterprise status be granted to their respective territories—the Altai territory, the Kemerovo and Novgorod regions, the Jewish Autonomous Region and the town of Zelenograd (regarded as a district of Moscow).

The creation of free enterprise zones is a new development in the Russian Federation and the Soviet Union as a whole. The movement was pioneered by the Russian Federation's cities of Leningrad and Vyborg, the Maritime Territory, including the town of Nakhodka, and the Kaliningrad, Sakhalin and Chita regions.

The Russian parliament decided to give a go-ahead to such zones on the last day of its first session—July 14, 1990. The pioneering effort proved encouraging.

However, the draft resolution on establishing five more free enterprise zones in the republic caused a mixed reaction on the part of the deputies at the current session.

Some of them said haste was not advisable at this stage when the republican economy was set to switch to a market-based system.

They said they feared a sale-out of natural resources on these territories if a big number of free enterprise zones was voted into reality.

However, the opposite viewpoint prevailed. Yeltsin noted, among other things, that irrespective of the number of free enterprise zones, the republic was in need of amassing experience of the transfer to market relations—free enterprises in individual region would help do this.

In addition, he said he was confident that the innovative move would help pull these territories out of a deep economic crisis.

The president's approach was backed by numerous supporters. As a result, the Russian parliament voted by a majority to create five more free enteprise zones in the Russian Federation, bringing their total number to eleven.

As regards the regimen of the parliament's activity, there were no considerable differences over the issue. Having listened to fourteen speakers, the parliament approved of the document in its first reading.

The parliament chambers met separately in the afternoon.

Regulations Bill Discussed

LD1309143690 Moscow TASS in English 1416 GMT 13 Sep 90

[By TASS Parliamentary Correspondents Lev Aksenov, Yuriy Kozmin, and Pavel Ostrov]

[Text] Moscow September 13 TASS—Russian legislators are today discussing draft regulations of the Russian parliament compiled by the Committee on Legislation.

The Russian parliament is proclaimed a "body of Russia's Congress of People's Deputies, a permanently operating legislative and control body of the Russian Federation's state authority."

This is in sharp contrast to the old republican parliament which met twice a year for sessions lasting only several days.

Judging by the first speeches of legislators, they do not have serious objections to the bill. Some even proposed that it be approved in the first reading.

The present session of the Russian parliament, the second this year, began its deliberations on September 3.

On Tuesday the legislature approved by an overwhelming majority the daring Shatalin plan for the introduction of a market economy.

RSFSR Central Committee Members Meet 17 Aug

90UN2710B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 18 Aug 90 Second Edition p 1

["Information Report on a Conference of the Elected Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party"]

[Text] On 17 August, a conference convened of members of the Central Committee of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party elected during the first stage of the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party.

Participating were members of the congress Preparatory Committee, invited party committee secretaries, representatives of the communist-reformer section of the Democratic Platform, of the Marxist Platform section, of the initiative movement for creation of the Russian Communist Party, members of the scientific and cultural sphere, and representatives of the mass media.

Questions related to the conduct of the second stage of the Congress were examined. I.K. Polozkov, first secretary of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee, delivered the report.

Preparatory Committee members I.P. Osadchiy and V.I. Babintsev provided information regarding work on the drafts of basic congress documents.

Taking part in the discussion of issues were: V.S. Lipitskiy, branch director of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the section of communist-reformers of the Democratic Platform in the CPSU Central Committee; M.V. Popov, department head at Leningrad State University and representative of the initiative movement for the creation of the Russian Communist Party; A.A. Prigarin, director of the All-Union Scientific Center for Organization of Labor; P.I. Bestuzhev, first secretary of the Topchikhinskiy Raykom [Rayon Party Committee], Altay Kray; G.K. Rebrov, senior lecturer at Moscow State University imeni M.V. Lomonosov; G.G. Gusev, senior engineer at the territorial interbranch production-technical administration of the Kuybyshevskiy Rayispolkom [Rayon Executive Committee], city of Moscow, and representative of the communist-reformers section of the Democratic Platform in the CPSU; A.Ya. Nemtinov, secretary of the Moscow Party Gorkom [City Committee]; A.N. Maltsev, fulfilling the duties of senior lecturer of the Gorkiy Agricultural Institute; Yu.N. Prokopyev, first secretary of the Yakut Party Obkom [Oblast Committee]; V.M. Spirin, second secretary of the Irkutsk Party Obkom; V.M. Troshin, lathe operator, Production Association imeni Sverdlov, Perm Oblast; V.S. Pozhilenko, party committee secretary of the airfield equipment plant, city of Kuybyshev; A.I. Grishchenko, party committee secretary of "Yelykayevskiy" Sovkhoz [State Farm], Kemerovo Oblast; M.I. Mashnin, drilling operator at the Uzlovaya Production Association "Kran," Tula Oblast; R.T. Mironova, party committee secretary of "Rossiya" Kolkhoz [collective farm], Udmurt ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic]; A.I. Seleznev, first secretary of the Kursk Party Obkom; V.D. Kolesnikov, electrician at Heating and Power Plant No. 1, city of Orsk, Orenburg Oblast; V.P. Shevtsov, party committee secretary of the Barnaul Transportation Machine-Building Plant imeni V.I. Lenin, Altay Kray; V.T. Suslin, first secretary of the Rostov Party Obkom; V.B. Sosnin, secretary of the Chita Party Obkom; V.N. Yeremenko, "Nerskiy" Mine foreman of the "Indigirzoloto" Ore Concentration Combine, Yakut ASSR; Yu.G. Terentyev, party committee secretary of the Leningrad Production Association "Arsenal"; A.I. Kostyurin, second secretary of the Tula Party Obkom.

The decision was made to convene the second stage of the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party 4 September 1990 in Moscow, and submit the following issues for its examination: the report of the Credentials Commission, the Program of Action of the RSFSR Communist Party, additional elections of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee, ratification of the Regulations on the Control Commission of the RSFSR Communist Party, and elections of the chairman and members of the Control Commission of the RSFSR Communist Party.

The draft Program of Action of the RSFSR Communist Party was approved on the whole, and will be published in the press for discussion by communists and the community in general before its subsequent finalization. A commission was formed for further work on the drafts of basic documents.

Taking part in the work of the conference were O.S. Shenin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and Yu.A. Manayenkov, CPSU Central Committee secretary.

A conference report will soon be published in an issue of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA.

New RSFSR Politburo Members Profiled

90UN2780A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 9 Sep 90 Second Edition pp 1, 2

[Profiles of new members: "Politburo of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party]

[Text] **POLOZKOV, Ivan Kuzmich, first secretary of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party**

Born in 1935 in the village of Lesh-Plota, Solntsevskiy Rayon, Kursk Oblast; Russian. CPSU member since 1958. Graduated All-Union Correspondence Finance-Economics Institute, Correspondence Higher Party School, and Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee. Specialty—economist.

1954-1957 served in the Soviet Army. Beginning 1957—kolkhoz [collective farm] worker in Kursk Oblast. Beginning 1958—engaged in Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League], soviet, and party work. He has been second and first secretary of the Komsomol Raykom [rayon committee], secretary and second secretary of the party raykom, chairman of the rayon ispolkom [executive committee], and first secretary of the CPSU Raykom in Kursk Oblast. Worked for a number of years in the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee. Beginning 1983—secretary, and beginning 1985—first secretary of the Krasnodar CPSU Kraykom [kray committee], and beginning 1990—chairman of the Krasnodar Kray Soviet of People's Deputies. Since June 1990 he has been first secretary of the Central Committee of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party.

CPSU Central Committee since 1986; elected a member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo at the July (1990) plenum of the Central Committee. RSFSR people's deputy. He has state awards.

ANTONOVICH, Ivan Ivanovich

Born 1937 in the village of Domashi, Lyakhovichskiy Rayon, Brest Oblast; Belorussian. CPSU member since 1967. Graduated Minsk State Pedagogical Institute of Foreign Languages. Doctor of philosophical sciences, professor.

Began his labor activity in 1960. Has worked in scientific institutions of the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Academy of Sciences. Beginning 1969—associate of the UN Secretariat. Subsequently—adviser of the permanent USSR representative office under UNESCO.

1977—elected secretary of the Minsk Party Gorkom [city party committee]. Subsequently—chief of the Department of Culture of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belorussia. Since 1987 he has been the director for scientific work of the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee. Beginning 1990—deputy chief of the department for work with sociopolitical organizations of the CPSU Central Committee.

At the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party—elected a member of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party and at the September (1990) plenum of the Central Committee—secretary of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party. He has a state award.

BRYACHIKHIN, Aleksey Mikheyevich

Born 1942 in the city of Elektrostal, Moscow Oblast; Russian. CPSU member since 1966. Graduated All-Union Correspondence Engineering Construction Institute and Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee. Candidate of economic sciences.

Began his labor activity in 1960 as a foreman at the Elektrostal Plant in Moscow Oblast. 1963-1965—served in the Soviet Army. Subsequently in Komsomol work.

1970-1974—deputy chief of the Moscow Oblast administration; subsequently—of a meat industry production association. Beginning 1974—first deputy chairman of the Zagorsk City Ispolkom. Beginning 1979—instructor of the Moscow CPSU Obkom, chairman of the Solntsevo City Ispolkom. Beginning 1984—chairman of the ispolkom of the Solntsevskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies of the City of Moscow. 1987—elected first secretary of the Sevastopolskiy CPSU Raykom of Moscow. Beginning 1990—chairman of the Sevastopolskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies, Moscow.

At the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party—elected member of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party. Has state awards.

YENINA, Vera Nesterovna

Born 1947 in the village of Khlystovo, Morshanskiy Rayon, Tambov Oblast; Russian. CPSU member since 1974. Graduated Morshanskiy Library Tekhnikum and Moscow Higher Party School.

Began her labor activity in 1966 as head of the rural library in Orel Oblast. Subsequently worked on Yuzhnyy Sovkhoz in Kromskiy Rayon, Orel Oblast. Beginning 1979—engaged in party work; was elected secretary of the party organization of the Yuzhnyy Sovkhoz, secretary of the party committee of the "Put k Rassvetu" Kolkhoz. Beginning 1988—chairman of the Pobeda Kolkhoz in Kromskiy Rayon, Orel Oblast.

At the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party—elected member of the Communist Party of the RSFSR Communist Party. Has state award.

ZYUGANOV, Gennadiy Andreyevich

Born in 1944 in the village of Mymrino, Khotynetskiy Rayon, Orel Oblast; Russian. CPSU member since 1966. Graduated Orel State Pedagogical Institute and Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee. Candidate of philosophical sciences.

Began his labor activity in 1961 as a teacher in a rural secondary school in Orel Oblast. Served in the Soviet Army. Beginning 1967—trade union, Komsomol, and party work and teaching at a pedagogical institute. Elected first secretary of the Komsomol Raykom and Gorkom and the Orel Komsomol Obkom. Beginning 1974—secretary and second secretary of the Orel Party Gorkom and head of the department for propaganda and agitation of the Orel CPSU Obkom. Beginning 1983—instructor and sector chief of the department for propaganda of the CPSU Central Committee and since 1989—deputy chief of the ideological department of the CPSU Central Committee.

At the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party—elected a member of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party and at the September (1990) plenum of the Central Committee—secretary of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party. Has state awards.

ILIN, Aleksey Nikolayevich

Born in 1944 in the village of Drui, Krasnogorodskiy Rayon, Pskov Oblast; Russian. CPSU member since 1966. Graduated Velikolukskiy Agricultural Institute and the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee. Candidate of economic sciences.

1963-1966 served in the Soviet Army. Engaged in Komsomol and party work since 1967. First secretary of the Pskov Komsomol Obkom. Beginning 1975—first secretary of the Kuninskiy CPSU Raykom of Pskov Oblast, beginning 1979—secretary, and beginning 1988—first secretary of the Pskov CPSU Obkom. Beginning 1990—chairman of the Pskov Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies.

At the 28th party congress—elected member of the CPSU Central Committee; at the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party—member of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party; at the September (1990) plenum of the Central Committee—second secretary of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party. USSR people's deputy. Has state awards.

KALININ, Nikolay Vasilyevich

Born 1937 in the village of Malyye Kurashki, Rabotkinskiy Rayon, Gorkiy Oblast; Russian. CPSU member since 1958. Graduated Military Academy imeni M.V. Frunze and Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. Colonel General.

1958-1965—squad and company commander. Has been battalion commander, chief of staff of military unit, commander of the guard airborne regiment, deputy commander and commander of the guard airborne division, commander of an army corps, commander of the army, first deputy troop commander of the Carpathian Military District, first deputy commander in chief of Soviet Forces in Germany, and troop commander of the Siberian Military District. 1987-1989—commander of airborne troops, and beginning 1989—troop commander of Moscow Military District.

At the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party—elected member of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party. USSR people's deputy. Has state awards.

KASHIN, Vladimir Ivanovich

Born 1948 in the village of Nazaryevo, Sarayevskiy Rayon, Ryazan Oblast; Russian. CPSU member since 1975. Graduated Ryazan Agricultural Institute. Candidate of agricultural sciences.

Began his labor activity in 1971 as head agronomist of the Kolkhoz imeni 1 Maya in Sarayevskiy Rayon, Ryazan Oblast. After service in the ranks of the Soviet Army, worked as agronomist, senior scientific associate, laboratory chief, and head agronomist of the Krasnaya Poyma experimental production farm in Lukhovitskiy Rayon, Moscow Oblast. Beginning 1980—director of the Moscow selection station in Serebryano-Prudskiy Rayon in Moscow Oblast. Beginning 1985—first secretary of the Serebryano-Prudskiy CPSU Raykom; beginning 1990—chairman of the rayon Soviet of People's Deputies.

At the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party—elected member of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party; at the September (1990) plenum of the Central Committee—secretary of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party. Has state awards.

KUGULTINOV, David Nikitich

Born 1922 in the village of Abganer-Gakhankiny, Western Ulus, Kalmyk ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic]; Kalmyk. CPSU member since 1943. Graduated Literary Institute imeni A.M. Gorkiy.

1940-1944—served in the Soviet Army, participated in the Great Patriotic War. Beginning 1944—instructor at motor vehicle technical school in the city of Biysk, Altay Kray. 1945—subject to unlawful repression, spent more than 10 years in the City of Norilsk, Krasnoyarsk Kray. 1957—official secretary, 1961-1964 and 1973-1989—chairman of the board of the Union of Writers of the Kalmyk ASSR.

At the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party—elected member of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party. USSR people's deputy; beginning 1989—member of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Has state awards; winner of USSR and RSFSR state prizes.

LYUBIMOV, Nikolay Kholevich

Born 1949 in the village of Zaituy, Alarskiy Rayon, Irkutsk Oblast; Russian. CPSU member since 1983. Graduated Irkutsk City Vocational and Technical School.

Began his labor activity in 1966. Served in the Soviet Army. Cadre worker. Worked more than 20 years as an assembler-riveter at the Irkutsk Production Aviation Association.

At the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party—elected a member of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party.

MELNIKOV, Aleksandr Grigoryevich

Born 1930 in the City of Orekhovo-Suyevo, Moscow Oblast; Russian. CPSU member since 1957. Graduated Moscow Engineering-Construction Institute imeni V.V. Kuybyshev and Correspondence Higher Party School under the CPSU Central Committee.

Began labor activity in 1950 as an engineer of the capital construction administration at an enterprise in Tomsk. Served in the Soviet Army. Beginning 1956—engaged in Komsomol, soviet, and party work. Was department chief, second secretary of the Seversk Komsomol Gorkom in Tomsk Oblast, instructor, department chief of the party gorkom, chairman of the Seversk City Ispolkom, first secretary of the Seversk CPSU Gorkom, chief of construction department of Tomsk Party Obkom. Beginning 1978—secretary, second secretary, first secretary of the Tomsk CPSU Obkom. 1986-1988—chief of the construction department of the CPSU Central Committee. Beginning 1988—first secretary of the Kemerovo Party Obkom.

1986-1990—member of the CPSU Central Committee. At the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party—elected a member of the Central Committee; at the September (1990) plenum of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party—secretary of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party. Has state awards.

PROKOPYEV, Yuriy Nikolayevich

Born 1932 in the village of Nyurba, Leninskiy Rayon, Yakut ASSR; Yakut. CPSU member since 1958. Graduated Yakut State Pedagogical Institute and Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee. Candidate of philological sciences.

Began to work in 1950 as educator in children's home in the village of Verkhnevilyuysk, Yakut ASSR. Beginning 1955—secondary school teacher. Beginning 1956—engaged in Komsomol and party work; first secretary of the Verkhnevilyuyskiy Komsomol Raykom, secretary of the Yakut Komsomol Obkom, instructor of the party obkom. 1966-1967—junior scientific associate of the Institute of Language, Literature, and History of the Yakut Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Beginning 1967—chief of department for propaganda and agitation, secretary of Yakut CPSU Obkom and later—first secretary of Yakut Party Gorkom. 1982—elected first secretary of Yakut CPSU Obkom.

At the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party—elected member of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party. USSR people's deputy. Has state awards.

SILKOVA, Nina Prokopyevna

Born 1939 in the City of Ilanskiy, Krasnoyarsk Kray; Russian. CPSU member since 1962. Graduated Krasnoyarsk State Pedagogical Institute and Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee. Candidate of historical sciences.

Began her labor activity in 1957 as a senior pioneer leader of Yuzhno-Aleksandrovskaya Secondary School in Ilanskiy Rayon, Krasnoyarsk Kray. Beginning 1961—engaged in Komsomol and party work: was department head, second secretary, and first secretary of the Ilanskiy

Komsomol Raykom, head of the laboratory for political education of the Ilanskiy CPSU Raykom in Krasnoyarsk Kray. Beginning 1968—secretary of the Krasnoyarsk Komsomol Kraykom, subsequently—secretary of the Krasnoyarsk CPSU Gorkom, instructor, chief of department of propaganda and agitation, secretary of the Krasnoyarsk CPSU Kraykom. Beginning 1987—USSR deputy minister of culture.

At the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party—elected a member of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party; at the September (1990) plenum of the Central Committee—secretary of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party. Has state awards.

SOKOLOV, Aleksandr Sergeyevich

Born 1947 in the village of Kulakovo, Ramenskiy Rayon, Moscow Oblast; Russian. CPSU member since 1972. Graduated Moscow Institute of Land Reclamation and Water Management and Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee.

Began his labor activity in 1970 as an engineer-mechanic on the Sovkhoz imeni Telman in Ramenskiy Rayon, Moscow Oblast. Beginning 1972—engaged in Komsomol and party work. Beginning 1976—deputy chairman of the Ramenskiy City Ispolkom, Moscow Oblast. Beginning 1980—director of Podmoskovnoye Experimental Production Farm. Beginning 1985—first secretary of the Ramenskiy Party Gorkom; beginning 1989—secretary of the Moscow CPSU Obkom.

At the 28th CPSU Congress—elected a member of the CPSU Central Committee; at the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party—a member of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party; at the September (1990) plenum of the Central Committee—secretary of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party. RSFSR people's deputy. Has state awards.

STEPANOV, Viktor Nikolayevich

Born 1947 in the village of Vidlitsa, Olonetskiy Rayon, Karelian ASSR; Karelian. CPSU member since 1969. Graduated Karelian State Pedagogical Institute, Leningrad Higher Party School, and the Higher Political School under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. Candidate of philosophical sciences.

Began his labor activity in 1962 as a joiner at the Ilin timber plant of the Karellesoeksport association. Worked as director of the Bidlitsa village house of culture. Beginning 1966—engaged in Komsomol, party, and soviet work. Has been second and first secretary of the Olonetskiy Komsomol Raykom and second secretary of the Karelian Komsomol Obkom. Was elected second secretary of the Olonetskiy CPSU Raykom and first secretary of the Pryazhinskiy CPSU Raykom. Beginning 1987—department chief of the Karelian CPSU Obkom. 1988-1989—worked on the staff of the CPSU Central Committee. Beginning 1989—chairman of the presidium of the Karelian ASSR Supreme Soviet. Beginning 1990—chairman of the Karelian SSR Supreme Soviet.

At the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party—elected member of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party. RSFSR people's deputy. Has a state award.

FROLOV, Konstantin Vasilyevich

Born 1932 in the City of Kirov, Kaluga Oblast; Russian. CPSU member since 1965. Graduated Bezhitskiy Institute of Transport Machine Building. Doctor of technical sciences, professor, academician of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Began to work in 1946 at the Stroyfayns plant in the City of Kirov, Kaluga Oblast. After completion of the institution—research engineer and senior engineer of the Leningrad metallurgical plant. Beginning 1958—engaged in scientific work: went from graduate student to director of the Institute of Machine Science imeni A.A. Blagonravov of the USSR Academy of Sciences. 1985—elected vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Beginning 1986—academic secretary of the department of problems of machine building, mechanics, and control processes of the USSR Academy of Sciences, general director of the interbranch scientific and technical complex entitled "Reliability of Machines" of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

At the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party—elected a member of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party. USSR people's deputy. Has state awards; winner of Lenin and USSR state prizes.

CHIKIN, Valentin Vasilyevich

Born 1932 in Moscow; Russian. CPSU member since 1956. Graduated Moscow State University imeni M.V. Lomonosov.

Began labor activity in 1951 as a literary associate of the editorial staff of the newspaper MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS. Worked as a literary associate, deputy editor, and editor for the propaganda department, deputy editor-in-chief of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. Beginning 1971—deputy, first deputy editor-in-chief of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. 1984-1986—first deputy chairman of the USSR State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade. Beginning 1986—editor-in-chief of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA.

At the 28th party congress—elected member of the CPSU Central Committee; at the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party—member of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party. RSFSR people's deputy. Has state awards.

YASHIN, Valeriy Vasilyevich

Born 1945 in the village of Novo-Istochnoye, Leninsk-Kuznetskiy Rayon, Kemerovo Oblast; Russian. CPSU member since 1972. Graduated Moscow Higher Technical School imeni N.E. Bauman and Leningrad Higher Party School.

Began to work in 1960 as a plasterer. 1968-1974—worked as an engineer, senior engineer, and junior scientific associate of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute of Transport Machine Building in Leningrad. Beginning 1974—engaged in party work. Was an instructor, deputy department chief, and chief of department of propaganda and agitation, and chief of the organizational department of the Krasnoselskiy CPSU Raykom in Leningrad. 1983-1988—instructor, deputy chief of department of organizational-party work and then deputy chief of the department of organizational-party and personnel work of the Leningrad CPSU Obkom. 1988-1990—elected second and first secretary of the Krasnoselskiy CPSU Raykom in Leningrad. Beginning 1990—second secretary of Leningrad CPSU Obkom.

At the Constituent Congress of the RSFSR Communist Party—elected member of the Central Committee of the RSFSR Communist Party.

RSFSR Party Congress Speeches Detailed

Latsis Addresses Congress 4 Sep

90UN2789A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 7 Sep 90 Second Edition p 3

[Debate speech by O.R. Latsis, first deputy chief editor of the CPSU Central Committee journal KOMMUNIST, delivered at the RSFSR Communist Party Constituent Congress on 4 September]

[Text] I feel obligated to explain my position regarding the action program, since I have expressed it in general terms and spoken out in favor of the declaration of the majority of the Moscow delegation.

I will give a couple of examples so that it will be clear to you what we are talking about. Which key issues were the subject of discussion, the most heated disputes, and votes on individual points at the 28th congress? We argued about the basic direction of our policy and the main direction of the activity of our party. On the one hand it was suggested that we reject the communist perspective and the name Communist for the party. On the other hand, from the opposite wing it was suggested that we reject the principle of humane, democratic socialism as something social democratic and retain the previous idea, the vulgarized idea of communist which was offered by our previous program, promising to realize it by the year 1980.

As you know, the congress retained the party's name and retained the principle of the communist perspective, but not in the vulgarized sense. And I have discussed the main thing that has to be done in order for our socialism to be really socialism. It must become humane and democratic.

If you take the draft of the action program, you will see these words, which are the heading for the program declaration of the 28th congress, do not appear at all in the draft of the action program of the Communist Party of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]. You must understand the significance of the mention of these words, the key words in the political document.

We argued about the assessment of perestroyka as a whole. Attempts were made to say that it is a departure from socialism. The congress stopped with a criticism of shortcomings in the practice of perestroyka. It says in the program declaration that in many cases perestroyka has proceeded by trial and error. But its main course has already been approved.

The draft action program offers us slightly veiled hints about the unsocialist nature of perestroyka, about the idea that socialist principles have ended up in the shadows there, that it has been taken up by anticommunist forces which we should repulse.

Let me explain my position. I understand the position of those who think differently. The only thing I do not understand is how in this case it is possible simultaneously to be in the party that has adopted the program declaration of the 28th CPSU Congress and in a party which accepts, if it accepts, this document. In am not talking about anything else and I shall not try here to persuade my opponents of my viewpoint. I understand that we are adults and our positions have been formed. I ask you not to interrupt.

After heated discussions, the 28th congress adopted a course toward economic reform on the basis of a changeover to a market economy. This task is not formulated in the draft of the action program that has been presented to us. The market economy, with the exception of a quite justified mention of propaganda and instruction, is discussed in a limited way, in phrases like "when changing over to the market one must not forget about social guarantees." Of course we must not forget. But should we change over to the market or not? This point is included only in the alternative text of the group of reformers from the Democratic Platform. In the text of the preparations committee there are no words to the effect that we must carry out this changeover. Again there is a poorly veiled hint that we must develop certain alternatives and we must also discuss them throughout the party. How can we discuss them throughout the party when today, on the basis of a schedule arranged mainly by the president of the country and the general secretary of our party's Central Committee, they are already discussing the final draft in the Supreme Soviet? Are we supposed to suggest that the Supreme Soviet put this off for several months? Then we would have to say that we do not intend to deal with the soviet authorities or with our president.

The congress adopted an important decision in the area of the so-called depoliticization of the Army and the KGB. The 28th congress adopted a decision to differentiate between political organs and party organizations. But here we are offered a categorical phrase: No depoliticization at all.

One can give other examples. I have just mentioned these corrections. In general the work of crossing things out does not take a lot of time. But I have estimated that if we were to cross out all the points that would make us opponents in our own party—I have in mind the CPSU—then what would remain would amount to a phrase from the declaration of the majority of the Moscow organization to the effect that we are in favor of the fulfillment of the program declaration. Nothing of our own would be left there. Actually there would be no tasks for the Communists of Russia. And we would be lacking the very concept of how to express this. I understand that this is difficult. Indeed, Russia and the Soviet Union are practically the same thing. Perhaps it is impossible to express the difference. Perhaps we should say that we can think of nothing different. This is another issue. If we can, let us make some suggestions.

I have admitted to Comrade Osadchiy that right now, during the course of things, I do not have such an idea either. My words were strangely modified, as I was told by my comrades who attended the conference of representatives, from the words of Comrade Osadchiy. Ivan Kuzmich Polozkov said that I had stated that I did not know Russia and therefore I had nothing to say. I do not know anyone who can say that he knows all of Russia. Russia is boundless. Everyone knows something of his own. There are many places in Russia I have not been. For instance, unfortunately I have never had occasion to visit the bountiful Krasnodar Kray. I am sincerely sorry about this. But I did not say that I do not know it. I simply told the truth that I, like the preparations committee, cannot offer a prepared program this minute. It is necessary to work on the program. It cannot be thrown together in two days. We do not have a program. This is the explanation of my position, which I also defended with the Moscow delegation.

I must say that I am very alarmed when I think about the action that will be involved with the work of the second stage of our congress in the party organizations. On instructions from the CPSU Central Committee, a group of newly elected members of the Central Committee set out on trips throughout the country after the 28th congress in order to meet with Communists and nonparty members and explain the materials of the congress.

Among other comrades, I ended up going to the Kuzbass [Kuznets Basin]. I must say that from my impressions of the Kuzbass party organization—the comrades who have come here from there could do a better job of talking about this—are working under very difficult conditions. And it was very alarming and upsetting to walk through the immense buildings of the party gorkoms [city committees] in Novokuznetsk, Mezhdurechensk, and cities where the Kuzbass strikes began, some of them looking like beautiful palaces, and to hear my own steps resounding in the booming emptiness.

The party, of course, is doing work in heavy defense there. But I must say that on the basis of the documents of the 28th congress, even in the mines, among the miners who in some places are very bitter, it is possible to talk. It is difficult, but it is possible. The 28th congress gave us the arguments. I cannot imagine how I would hold a conversation on the basis of this proposed action program. People are looking for something to do and I believe that there is something that can be done. It is possible to find ways for the party organizations to take the offensive rather than the defensive. But to do this we should not give speeches to the effect that perestroyka has led us astray from the path of socialism or that it is opening up the way for wheeler-dealers from the shadow economy.

I wish to remind you that the shadow economy is unquestionably flourishing even now when we do not have even a hint of a market, it is flourishing on the body of our planned state economy, and nothing else can flourish on this body. It is just that the switch to the market could change the situation. And if even the delegates to the congress do not understand this, of course, this will not help the work of the party. Thank you. (Applause).

Belov Addresses Congress 5 Sep

90UN2789B Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 8 Sep 90 Second Edition p 4

[Debate speech by Yu.P. Belov, secretary of the Leningrad CPSU Oblast Committee, delivered at the RSFSR Communist Party Constituent Congress on 5 September]

[Text] Comrades! What I am offering for your attention basically reflects the political position and the action program of the Leningrad party obkom [oblast committee] and the document adopted on 30 August by our plenum.

When answering the question "What should be done?" any political program, in order to have the right to survive, proceeds from an analysis of what is, and from there proceeds to what should be. What do we have? We have an ever stronger process of centrifugal forces leading to the breakdown of the unified CPSU into individual republic parties. And the federative structure of the CPSU is already becoming a reality. Clear evidence of this is the composition of the present Politburo.

The market will accelerate and speed this process up. Yes, the market is a harsh necessity; there is no alternative to it. But the market is also a harsh test for the whole of society and the entire party. The market has raised the question: To be or not to be, in the emphatic sense of the word, with regard to the Soviet state and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. And it is precisely under these conditions with the market on the way that social differentiation is becoming stronger, a multiparty system is finally being formed, and the struggle of all parties for power is becoming stronger, and it is under these conditions that history prescribes the future of the RSFSR Communist Party. This is not simply a territorial organization. It should be a strong and independent political party. It is not merely a constituent part of the CPSU, it is the basis of the CPSU. No other republic organization can fulfill the role of preserving the integrity of the CPSU!

In order to have a guarantee of success in the multiparty struggle the Communist Party of the RSFSR must first of all carry out the mission of social protection, for the market as a harsh necessity sobers many people and touches on the social interests of the workers, the peasants, and the intelligentsia. And the only party that will have a guarantee of success in the struggle for power will be the one that both reflects and protects these interests best.

The Communist Party of Russia should protect the social interests of the working person: the worker at the blast furnace, in the field, at the drafting table, and in the army formation. Only if it is able to offer socially attractive programs, only then can it count on success. But to do this it must have a theoretically balanced and politically and socially rational and pragmatic program.

Any political program answers three questions as a minimum. First: It must evaluate the existing authorities and determine the attitude of the given party toward these authorities. Second: It must determine the alignment of sociopolitical forces. And, finally, only in the third place does it determine the goals and tasks, the program of its actions, its tactics and strategy. We are in a great hurry to resolve the third issue without deciding the first two.

Concerning authority. The Leningrad party organization is against any form of groundless, cheap, and abusive attitude toward the existing authority, against any crushing criticism that impugns the honor and dignity of the representatives of authority who have been elected by the people.

The Leningrad party organization is against groundless criticism of perestroyka. But we cannot but pay attention to the fact that, while proceeding toward the market, which is a harsh test for us, we do not have any strong centralized authority that is capable of guaranteeing civil, social, and political rights to the workers. Unfortunately, today neither the USSR Supreme Soviet nor the president nor the Constitutional Oversight Committee, whatever it may be engaged it, has this kind of authority.

Under these conditions there is no guarantee that the priority of public property will be protected. Yes, all forms of property should be equal legally, but not politically. From this podium we have repeatedly heard the etymological meaning of various concepts. Let us recall the meaning of the concept of socialism; socio-public. We are not speaking about the priority of state property but about various forms of property and, above all, about various forms of public property. If we do not achieve this, then what kind of party for the socialist option will we be? And we do not have this guarantee when we have a weak authority which is not capable of protecting the Constitution, and therefore there is the danger of barbaric capitalization of the country. (Applause).

If we are to speak about Russia, essentially we are living under the conditions of a diarchy. This is the authority of the Union organs and the authority of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. What can the attitude toward the authority of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet be? It can only be respectful, since this authority is the expression of the will of the people. Our attitude toward the new authority must be respectful regardless of our personal feelings about various representatives of it. We must recognize this authority and support all its undertakings that respond to the interests of the workers. But we cannot take responsibility for the actions of this authority which do not correspond to these interests, which encroach on the conquests that have been achieved at a great price, the conquests of the Soviet people. And in this respect we must learn to be a party of constructive opposition on a constitutional basis. I emphasize—a party of constructive opposition to this authority. There is a need for this.

This authority is loyal to our party in far from everything. In far from everything is it loyal to that which is the achievement of the Soviet system. This is why we must master the legal art, the art of protecting citizens and the rights of the workers. This is why our Communist factions in the soviets must first of all obtain an action program. And they do not have such a program. It has already been said from this podium that the 28th congress has reinforced the democratic conquests of the lower party levels. Undoubtedly. But the resolutions of the 28th congress do not in all ways correspond to the realities of the present day. The congress only declared that there was a market and adopted a course toward the market. But as of today the party is alienated from the development of the market policy. It can only accept that which is approved by the Supreme Soviet. There is no doubt about this. We are carrying out our civic duties. But the party which is called the ruling one as of today does not have a party concept of the market policy. It is left unprotected and it has to grab on to the tail of political events. (Applause)!

Comrades! We need to make a sober evaluation of the new realities. We are not the ruling party in the full meaning of this word. In the higher echelons of authority in the RSFSR we are not leading. We must extract bitter lessons from our defeat in the elections. And we sustained this defeat not because Article 6 of the Constitution was abolished but because we have come to the new conditions with the old cargo and experience of the state party. We must sober up politically. But while extracting our lessons we must also think about a new strategy and tactics for rational political behavior. If we resort to the experience of the old ruling party we will suffer another bitter defeat.

The market is not just a strengthening of political pluralism; the market is a strengthening of ideological pluralism. And we must be sober in this respect as well. The monopoly of communist ideology, which has led us to a dogmatic impasse, is over. And ideological pluralism has begun. In an open and ethical ideological struggle we must prove the social justice of our ideals. Bourgeois and petit bourgeois ideology is the current reality of the day. In this respect we must rid ourselves of our old experience and determine our attitude toward these ideologies. I know that people will tell me that it was determined long ago. I do not think that is completely true if we want to be political rationalists. If the ideology opposing us is expressed in forms that impugn the honor and dignity of a political party that is operating on a constitutional basis and expresses itself in blatant anti-Sovietism and anticommunism, we must appeal to the Constitution in defending our rights. There is a paradox of history which perhaps did not exist before: We are the ruling party and we are a party that is not protected by the law, one that is not yet registered, which gives our political opponents the right to attack us however they will. We cannot turn either to the court or to the Constitutional Oversight Committee. Therefore we must first of all organize a legal protection movement against all forms of accusation of our party that run counter to the Constitution. But we also need to learn to be open to ethical ideological polemics. This will sharpen our counterarguments, which are not yet sufficiently strong. We must improve our arguments. In ethical polemics with social democrats, socialists, and other parties who must become our allies. We must be a party of civic harmony.

We must be a party that is open to ethical polemics. But we must also cool off those hotheads in our party who overtly or covertly—more frequently the latter—are pushing us toward a return of the logic of the civil war, are pushing us into the maelstrom of the most terrible war there can be.

We must become a cultured political constitutional party. This we must learn for ourselves.

And, finally, the last thing, comrades. It seems to me that the draft of the action program of the Russian Communists, which contains much that is positive (it contains an appeal to the social needs of the people of Russia), it seems that this draft does not correspond to modern reality.

Comrades from the heart of Russia! You were right in the first stage of the congress when you announced your special political protest, for the center was not listening to Kostroma and Ryazan, we were listening to ourselves: The process of political development is not uniform. What has happened in Moscow and Leningrad will come to you. You must be prepared for this. The market without exploitation that is proposed in the draft is social utopia. There will be exploitation, there will be unemployment, and it is necessary to prepare the party and the masses for this. And we cannot develop a program based on the logic of the old ruling party. The situation has changed. We must fight for authority on a new basis and think of conditions that will guarantee our success.

And, finally, I suggest that this draft not be translated into theses; it should be a document for daily life. Leave it as it is, even if the local party organizations condemn it and give us a political order for a new strong Communist Party of Russia, with which the future undoubtedly lies. And we must not gain momentum on the trampoline of sending ultimatums to the congress, but instead we must recognize and feel our high measure of responsibility for the fate of the party. (Applause).

Yakovlev, Others on Congress

90UN2783B Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 6 Sep 90 p 1

[Article by A. Krotkov: "But There Are Human Features Under the Mask"]

[Text] *Who said that the only victim of a political label is the person upon whom it is hung? The greatest losses are suffered by those around him who cease to distinguish, under the stilted and misshapen mask, the vital, human features with all their complexity and contradictions. And as a result they lose the ability to adequately understand reality and react to it in a proper fashion. It seems that just such a metamorphosis may happen to those who follow the work of the constituent congress of Russian Communists which is currently taking place in the Kremlin. Some people are doing their best to hang the label of conservative on it.*

There is no question that the reactionary portion of the party apparat is represented in abundance at the congress. But stating this does not lay the whole issue to rest. The events occurring in the Kremlin are full of internal drama, and even those who are participating in them have not decided to take such a one-sided view. For instance right in front of my eyes A. Yakovlev, member of the Presidential Council, signed the famous appeal of a group of Moscow Communists which, I remember, said that the draft program of the Russian Communist Party which was prepared for the congress was a step backward in comparison with the 28th CPSU Congress.

When asked how he wished to address the Russian Communists, Aleksandr Nikolayevich said:

"The time has come to quit drawing the mass of workers off the main road of development of our country by accusing perestroyka of an anti-socialist orientation."

I foresee an objection: There are no more than one or two adherents of such ideas at the congress. In all seriousness I declare that is not the truth. Among the delegates there is a whole group of representatives of the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU" which not only participated in the preparation of the draft program but succeeded in insisting on the inclusion of several stipulations in accordance with their principles.

G. Gusev, one of the leaders of "Democratic Platform" and a Moscow engineer, said to me:

"At our demand, the draft was purged of anything to the effect that platforms can operate actively only before the adoption of general party rulings and that, subjecting themselves to strict party discipline, they must disband themselves. True, there have not been many such victories. The greatest contribution to the draft was made by adherents of 'Marxist Platform' and the initiating congress of the Leningrad Communists. As a result, the draft turned out unsatisfactory in my view. But I also put the blame for that on Democratic Communists who, despite invitations, refused to take part in the preparatory work of the congress."

I will add on my own part that heated criticism of the draft program by the Democratic Communists had, it seems, a certain effect on the organizers of the congress.

"If the Communist Party of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] is not able to immediately develop a clear program of action that is radical and progressive," V. Gidaspov, first secretary of the Leningrad Obkom [Oblast Party Committee], told me, "then no one will follow the Russian Communists at all. And their leaders risk finding themselves in the role of generals without an army."

V. Tyulkin, an ideological opponent of the Democratic Communists and member of the organizational committee of the initiating congress of the Leningrad Communists, views the situation just as critically, although from another standpoint:

"We must take a clear position," he said. "And we must take it today, right now. Talk about the lack of time for discussing the draft of our program in the primary party organizations is nothing more than an opportunity to delay the association of legitimate Communists around the Communist Party of the RSFSR. We simply cannot aspire to the role of a party with a definite world view if we are going to wait to see what the Supreme Soviet of Russia will say."

One can guess the world view of Comrade Tyulkin by his famous "jokes" about people who pronounce the letter "r" poorly... However, even the position of Viktor Arkadyevich is undergoing visible changes under the influence of the processes occurring in society. For example today, if we are to believe his words, he is no longer opposed to private property as such. But only if it is limited to the services sphere and is under strict control of the state.

I will not try to judge how sincere Tyulkin is today. But I do not doubt the sincerity of Fedor Seleznev, leader of a team of metalworkers who openly speaks out against any private property. True, it seems to me that Seleznev himself has not analyzed his own views to their logical conclusion. With that same appealing sincerity he, for example, fights for the quick introduction of market relations which, as everyone knows, are impossible without a variety of forms of property, including private property.

Today it is far simpler for yesterday's leaders, who used to swear endlessly at assemblies of adherents of private property and a multiparty system but supported them inwardly. It is somewhat more uncomfortable for those who, in order not to pass for foes of perestroyka, go for the throat of their own administrative and command system and grudgingly praise the market. But how is it for those who do not wish to hide their true feelings?

This problem would not arise anywhere else in all the civilized world. Parties of conservatives occupy solid positions in many respected states and insulate society from the mistakes of innovators who would otherwise go uncriticized.

Judging by everything, the most conservative portion of the party apparat will not succeed in gaining the upper hand in the Kremlin. An indication of the state of things is the intention of Tyulkin and his supporters to create... a communist platform within the RSFSR Communist Party. Nonetheless, the time is ripe to abandon the passion for hanging all kinds of labels on people.

RSFSR Government-Trade Union Talks Reported

PM1409112090 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 13 Sep 90 Second Edition p 1

[TASS-attributed report by V. Yegorov: "Convergent Steps"]

[Text] The desire of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] to establish firm business contacts with the new Russian Government led to a meeting of their leaders in Moscow 12 September.

The meeting is particularly topical in view of two circumstances: the Russian parliament's adoption of a decision on the program for the transition to a market economy, and the discussion, due to take place next week at the final stage of the founding congress of the RSFSR Federation of Independent Trade Unions, of the trade union association's tactics. Questions of collaboration between Russia's government and the trade union association in the conditions of economic reform were the main topic of the four-hour discussion.

The trade unions recognize that the transition to the market system is an objective necessity, noted I.Ye. Klochkov, chairman of the RSFSR Federation of Independent Trade Unions. The Russian trade union association believes that the main condition for the implementation of the program for the economy's transition to market relations drawn up by the group led by S.S. Shatalin and G.A. Yavlinskiy must be social consensus and confidence in the government on the part of the population. But the extent of this confidence is directly proportionate to the real legal guarantees ensuring social protection both of society's main productive force and of the poorly off strata of the population and people with fixed incomes. Therefore the development of such legal norms and a social protection mechanism must precede the practical implementation of economic innovations.

The RSFSR Federation of Independent Trade Unions is prepared actively to participate, through systematic consultations and other methods, in finalizing the program for the transition to the market and providing it with a system of "social amortizers." It is extremely important for all this joint work by the trade unions and the government to be carried out openly and publicly.

I.S. Silayev, chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, came out in favor of close collaboration with the RSFSR Federation of Independent Trade Unions in realizing the mechanism for the transition to market relations at every stage of this lengthy process. A place could be found in annual bilateral contracts for reciprocal commitments by the government and the trade unions on socioeconomic questions. Similar accords could be achieved in regions and at enterprises, at every level—with mutual responsibility on both sides.

Silayev Discusses RSFSR Managers Meeting

LD0709215690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 7 Sep 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] There was a conference of managers of industrial enterprises, the construction, transportation, and agricultural sectors in Moscow today.

More than 700 people from 200 towns in the Russian Federation studied one of the concepts for economic reform:

[Begin video recording] [Correspondent] Today's meeting was devoted to the latest stage of the Russian Federation's switch to a market economy. Could you comment on this stage?

[I. Silayev, chairman of RSFSR Council of Ministers] I would like to remind you that the Supreme Soviet is now actively discussing the draft program of the Shatalin group. For three days now, first in a joint sitting and then in committees and commissions, we have been actively studying and assessing that program. Realizing, however, that the main burden in implementing the chief points of that program will be borne by labor collectives, production managers, the peasantry, regions, and autonomous republics, we simply had to get together today with the main captains of industry, representatives of the krays and oblasts, to consult with them. Their attitudes are very important to us.

[Correspondent] Yes, because as I understand it, it is the captains of industry who will be affected most of all by the market reform.

[Silayev] Yes, the responsibility, let us say...[changes thought] the economy in itself will affect everyone, but there is a very high share and degree of responsibility upon those who are going to organize this work, and we do not expect uniform attitudes or rapture of any kind. Some are closer to the market today, while others still hold to the former stand of centralized planning and distribution and a life that is rather levelled off, shall we say. But, we know that a substantial and, I would say, progressive section of the captians of industry, or entrepreneurs, one might call them, support this and are waiting for us to grant them maximum economic independence so that they can successfully enter into market relations. [end recording]

Moscow Bread Crisis, Market Moves Debated

PM1409120590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by V. Belikov: "Moscow's 500 Days"]

[Text] The Moscow Gorispolkom [City Soviet Executive Committee] devoted its 11 September sitting, which lasted the entire working day, to examining various problems connected with preparing the city for life and work in market conditions.

Lessons of the "bread crisis." Tuesday saw the expiration of the period which Moscow City Soviet Chairman G. Popov had asked of Muscovites in order to normalize the situation in the bread trade. If not everywhere, in a considerable proportion of the capital's rayons it has been possible to quell the clamor, and by the end of this week it is expected that everything will return to its usual course. The session noted that Moscow possesses the capacity to produce 3,100 tonnes of bread daily, while the "peak" demand is 2,600 tonnes. Why, then, did another shortage arise?

The management of the "Moskhlebprom" production association apparently forgot that the demand for bread products leaps sharply each year at the end of August: Vacationers return home, people come back from their country cottages, and school and student canteens start up. This upsurge has been overcome year in, year out; this year, however, it exposed long-accumulated problems in supplying the city's multimillion population with this most valuable food item.

The city's bakeries operate with completely worn-out equipment. Accidents in some shops have become virtually systematic and the maintenance plan regularly fails to be met. New capacity has not been introduced, despite generously allocated resources. The association has "taken up" barely one-fifth of the 150 million rubles [R] allocated by the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Ministry of Bread Products for modernization.

The problem could be rectified by small-capacity bakeries being located in the capital's residential districts and on the premises of existing production units. Sets of equipment for them have been manufactured during the conversion of defense industry enterprises, but "Moskhlebprom" has contrived to ruin this fine initiative: Out of 28 small bakeries... one is so far in operation! Bakers' heavy, monotonous work has been provided with no material incentive at all, and the sector has begun suffering a catastrophic loss of experienced personnel.

Noting the unsatisfactory work of "Moskhlebprom" General Director M. Chaplin and the tardiness and lack of resolution displayed in the bread emergency, the Moscow Gorispolkom discharged him from his post. Incidentally, he did not appear at the sitting, although he was summoned.

Moscow's bread industry will receive help to put right the production lines at all its bread plants, and spare parts for them will be manufactured by city enterprises. The delivery vehicle fleet will be augmented by new trucks. It was resolved to go over to strict mutual material accountability in all links of the "production-transport-trade" chain. If anyone fails to meet his commitments, serious sanctions in the form of fines will immediately follow. And finally the transfer of enterprises to joint-stock and leasing forms of management will start, and it is planned to put small bakeries into private hands. By all accounts, the bread crisis will speed up the emergence of a bread market in Moscow.

Program for switching to the market. The bulky document then discussed by the Moscow Gorispolkom is called "Work Program of Immediate Measures To Normalize the Socioeconomic Development of the City..." Ispolkom Chairman Yu. Luzhkov proposed that it be called "Moscow's 500 Days" for short. This more accurately corresponds to the purpose of the program, which is to prepare the capital for market relations. Above all it envisages giving greater stability to the consumer sphere, supplying it with goods, and developing the enterpreneurial activity of individuals, labor collectives, and cooperatives of all sorts.

Moscow is establishing direct economic ties with the Baltic republics, Astrakhan Oblast, Sakhalin, and many foreign states. The capital will be able to offer its partners the products of all its large and small enterprises on a barter basis, receiving in return industrial products and goods to replenish market stocks. A commodity exchange and the Moscow Commodity House have been set up to conclude deals.

As is well-known, the Moscow City Soviet session adopted a fundamental decision transferring accommodation to the personal ownership of citizens and creating a kind of market in apartments in the city. This process has not yet gotten up full steam, although such sales have already started in certain rayons. A package of documents containing, in particular, new rules for registering and allocating housing and decisions stopping the allocation of accommodation to ministries and departments in the interests of leveling out the ispolkom waiting list for apartments, also has to be examined soon.

The city program for switching to market relations affects every facet of city life—health care, public education, culture, environmental protection. Its final section envisages the removal of all nuclear reactors from the city and the introduction of an increased charge on enterprises for the disposal of waste water. A system of local taxes for the benefit of the capital's city hall is being elaborated for the first time. It was stressed at the sitting that local taxes must raise R6-7 billion annually to ensure the normal functioning of the city's financial system.

The capital's labor exchange. This institution now being recreated is an indispensable instrument of the market economy. It will be engaged in providing free state assistance to Muscovites in finding work, vocational guidance, and retraining. The exchange and its nine city branches will have departments for registering the unemployed and paying out short-term benefits. It will be possible through the exchange to offer citizens temporarily out of work employment in various public works.

The labor exchange is to be financed out of the city budget and partly out of its commercial activity.

Kabardino-Balkaria Examines Sovereignty Draft

PM1209083490 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Sep 90 First Edition p 5

[Report from Nalchik by correspondent Lieutenant Colonel A. Nazarov under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Discriminatory Resolution"]

[Text] The second session of the Kabardino Balkarskaya ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet has been held in Nalchik. The question of the republic's sovereignty was examined, among other questions. The draft declaration puts forward, in particular, the following demands: Kabardino-Balkaria is to become a Union republic. It is essential to give compatriots living abroad the opportunity to return to their historical homeland, that is to say, to the territory where the Adygi previously lived— Krasnodar and Stavropol Krays and the Kabardino Balkarskaya ASSR; to have the right to freely withdraw from the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] and the USSR; to restore the rayons of Balkaria within the borders existing prior to March 1944; and to utilize the land, minerals, and airspace [vozdushnoye prostranstvo] in the interests of the republic rather than the interests of the RSFSR and the USSR. The Kabardian, Balkarian, and Russian languages are recognized as state languages.

The session passed a discriminatory resolution whereby officers discharged into the reserve or those who have retired will not henceforth be registered on the republic's territory, except for those drafted from those areas.

Leningrad Name Change Proposed

90P50089A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 11 Sep 90 p 1

[Article by I. Potekhina: "A Dear Name"]

[Text] Saint Petersburg, Petrograd, or Leningrad? Those meeting on the Palace Square Sunday demanded that the old name of the city on the Neva be restored.

Public opinion has still not solidified. In any case specialists are calculating what impact a possible restoration of the name will have on the state budget (a tidy sum will be spent on just the retyping of documents alone). According to estimates, this could cost over 80 million rubles.

Tension Continues on Leningrad-Estonian Border

LD0709191590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1658 GMT 7 Sep 90

[Text] Leningrad, 7 Sep (TASS)—Residents of the little Russian village of Komarovka, on the Estonia and Leningrad Oblast border have suddenly found themselves in a frontier zone as the result of four frontier posts being erected on the highway close to the Leningrad-Tallinn railway, where, as the Estonian "Kaitseliit" (Defense League) believes, the state frontier between the two republics should run.

The presidium of the Leningrad Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies has expressed its categorical protest to the Supreme Soviet and government of Estonia.

Although the Estonians assert it is all provocation, tension in the area has increased. This is stated in a joint address from the leaders of the Leningrad City and Oblast Soviets, Anatoliy Sobchak and Yuriy Yarov. Responding to the Estonian government's decision to withdraw state subsidies on meat and dairy products and fish produce and compensation to the population to offset price increases, the Leningrad leaders expressed their firm disagreement, calling for the relevant draft not to be adopted.

As Yuriy Yarov, chairman of the Leningrad Oblast soviet, told the TASS correspondent, he hopes that the Estonians will demonstrate common sense at the session of their republic's Supreme Soviet, which is to be held on 10 September and to which the Leningraders are to go, aware of their great responsibility, at their neighbors' invitation.

Shortages in Leningrad Bode Impending 'Chaos'

PM1009155590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 9 Sep 90 Second Edition p 8

[Report by correspondent N. Volynskiy under the rubric "Market: Face and Mask": "Will Neighbors Come to an Understanding?"]

[Text] Leningrad—"Checkpoints are to be set up on the territory of Leningrad Oblast at all exit points from the region. Private and state transport and passengers' baggage will be inspected...." These and some other measures have been submitted for approval to the city and oblast people's deputies. To what end?

As is already known from the press, the Estonian government intends very shortly to raise the prices of certain foodstuffs in the republic between two and four times over. State subsidies are being abolished, and the population will be paid appropriate compensation. It is not difficult to guess the consequences in advance. The high prices will "attract" cheaper goods from other regions, primarily from the Leningrad area. This has already happened in the summer, when gasoline prices leaped sharply on the "free" market in Lithuania. There then began a mass exporting of fuel from Leningrad, which caused disturbances in the city. So now the deputies of both soviets have begun considering truly draconian measures, lifted intact almost from the arsenal of "war communism." Searches, seizures...

Let us say right away that this proposal did not get through. And not only because it is essentially unconstitutional; it would simply do no good. In such situations economics are always stronger than politics. Other channels will be found for food to leak out. And the only thing the deputies of the two soviets did was to ask the Estonian Supreme Soviet to refrain temporarily from the price hike which would cause the situation in the Leningrad area to deteriorate. It is not known whether the Estonian authorities will go along with that request. One emergency measure was therefore identified, to protect the Leningrad consumer market: tougher control over sales of food, with presentation of "visiting cards."

Well, fall has arrived, and it is time to count the "chickens." The "revolutionary," urgent privatization of agriculture, the setting up of private farms, in which many Leningrad City Soviet people's deputies put their trust, has not happened. Not that it could have happened suddenly. The rejection of what is still the only way out, albeit, of course, a bad one—sending city folk to help the countryside—has left the city practically without vegetables. Interruptions have occurred in the supply of meat and dairy products—unprecedented in 45 years. VECHERNIY LENINGRAD, the newspaper of Leningrad City Soviet, reports that "the sword of impending destruction and chaos" today hangs over millions of

Leningraders. And it maintains that "the very institution of Soviet power has proved ineffectual (at any rate, under our extreme conditions)." The fact that firm authority is lacking in the region is unambiguously acknowledged in these words.

Volgograd Oblast Soviet Works for Consolidation

PM1209085290 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent Valeriy Kornev under the "Direct Line" rubric: "When Parties Act Together"]

[Text] Volgograd—There was an unusual meeting at the Volgograd Oblast Soviet—it brought together members of leading organs of different parties and social and political organizations.

The question they discussed was how to find a way to consolidate forces in the very complex period of entry into a market economy without abandoning positions and programs.

The meeting was attended by representatives of the Communist Party, Democratic Platform, and Russian Democratic Party, social democrats, Christian democrats, activists of ecological movement and the Russian social and cultural center, and others.

Obviously, there were tense moments, but the first steps toward joint action on a market economy platform were taken. A commission was formed, with all the political forces equally represented.

"The new commission will function as a consultative cabinet under the oblast soviet presidium," V. Makharadze, chairman of the Volgograd Oblast Soviet, told me.

The next session of the oblast soviet is to adopt a concept for Volgograd Oblast's switch to a market economy.

Volgograd Rally Assails Communism

LD0909215190 Moscow World Service in English 2100 GMT 9 Sep 90

[Text] An unauthorized rally in a large industrial and cultural center on the Volga river, Volgograd, involved against their will many people who had come, together with their children, to spend Sunday on the embankment. The speakers called, among other things, for outlawing the teachings of Lenin, driving Communists away, and abolishing the Communist regime. There were also calls for the national government's resignation.

Tobacco Shortage Threatens Siberian Harvests

PM1309151190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by correspondent Aleksandr Solovyev under the "Direct Line" rubric: "No Tobacco in Siberia Either..."]

[Text] Tomsk—The tobacco "riots" which began in the center of the country and in the Urals have spread to Siberia.

"A number of industrial enterprises are on the verge of shutting down, the grain, vegetables, and potatoes harvests are under threat of disruption"—these lines are from a Tomsk Oblast Trade Union Council telegram to I. Silayev, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Reopublic Council of Ministers, and I. Klochkov, chairman of the Federation of Independent Russian Trade Unions. In no way does the telegram exaggerate the gravity of the situation. In the fall fields I have seen on more than one occasion machine operators refusing to take out combines or citizens refusing to dig potatoes "unless they get some smokes." The calls for tobacco strikes are getting louder and louder at the radio equipment plant, the "Sibiryak" Sovkhoz [State Farm], and other enterprises.

The oblast soviet executive committee is trying to defuse the situation by arranging direct contacts with tobacco factories. When their products arrive in the oblast they are sent mainly to plants and to collectives engaged in harvest work. There are no cigarettes on open sale. They can only be bought from speculators at 10-20 times the normal price. It is cheaper to go shopping for potatoes....

Yeltsin Confirms Plane Crash Near Sverdlovsk

LD1409073190 Moscow TASS in English 0719 GMT 14 Sep 90

[By TASS correspondent Lev Aksenov]

[Text] Moscow September 14 TASS—A Soviet passenger plane carrying 124 passengers crashed near Sverdlovsk, the Urals, on Thursday night, Russian President Boris Yeltsin confirmed today.

Speaking in the Russian Parliament, he said the Yak-42, on a domestic flight from Volgograd to Sverdlovsk, was one and a half minutes of flight away from the Sverdlovsk runway when the accident occurred. The causes of the accident were not immediately known.

Yeltsin said a commission had left for the accident site to investigate it. Four people were reported dead, several others were taken to hospital.

Yeltsin proposed sending a message of condolences to Sverdlovsk.

'Earth Tremor' Registered in Sochi 12 Sep

LD1309135190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1300 GMT 13 Sep 90

[Text] On 12 September, at 1716 and 32 seconds, the seismic station at Sochi registered an earth tremor. The epicenter of the earthquake was at sea, 12 km from the coastal area of the resort town center. The tremor was registered at 4.5 points on the 12-point scale at its epicenter. The earthquake registered three to four points in the resort town. There are no casualties or damage.

Western Republics

Moldavia Discusses Concepts for Union Treaty

LD1309212490 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 13 Sep 90

[Text] A meeting of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Moldova Soviet Socialist Republic today discussed the republic's concept for the conclusion of a new Union treaty, ideas for which have been proposed by a working group. The proposed draft of the treaty proclaims that the member states are to be recognized as independent under international law, and that no other laws except their own are to be effective on their respective territories. It is also proposed that the exclusive right of each member of the community to own, use, and dispose of all national resources on its territory be recognized. The draft document was adopted as the basis of Moldova's official concept for the holding of talks with the center and with other republics on the conclusion of the treaty.

As regards the form of the new community, the Moldova delegation will advocate a confederation rather than a reinvigorated federation.

Deputy Frolov's Ukraine Visit Reported

PM1309093790 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Sep 90 Second Edition p 2

[UKRINFORM-TASS report followed by PRAVDA special correspondents S. Kolesnikov and M. Odinets report under the "Day's News" rubric: "Ukraine Visit"]

[Text] Vinnitsa, 10 Sep—USSR People's Deputy I.T. Frolov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chief editor of PRAVDA, visited Vinnitsa Oblast 7 through 9 September.

At a meeting with first secretaries of city and rayon party committees, representatives of the party and ideological aktiv, journalists, and PRAVDA readers there was a discussion of the sociopolitical situation in the country, ways to overcome the crisis phenomena in the economy, society's moral revival, and the participation of the party press—primarily the party's central organ, the newspaper PRAVDA—in the processes of perestroyka.

The newspaper's readers made many suggestions of fundamental importance for improving the work of its editorial board. They spoke of enhancing PRAVDA's role in fulfilling the 28th CPSU Congress decisions, developing democratic principles in the work of party organizations, and the need to give more profound and multifaceted coverage of questions of the transition to the market and of the government's economic programs. At the same time the readers rebuffed unsubstantiated attacks on the newspaper. In particular, indignation was expressed at the decision of Lvov Oblast Soviet to close down the PRAVDA correspondent's center.

Kiev, 10 Sep—A meeting with leading social scientists of Kiev higher educational institutions and academic institutes was held at the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee today. Opening the meeting, V. Ostrozhinskiy, secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, called for a strengthening of the role and functions of institute party organizations in the republic's renewed Communist Party and the activation of the work of social science teachers.

Those present were addressed by I. Frolov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chief editor of PRAVDA. He answered a number of questions from those present.

Ukraine Communist Party Reduces Party Apparatus

LD1309121190 Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 1800 GMT 12 Sep 90

[Excerpts] The ground floor of the building occupied by the Novovolynsk Party Gorkom [city party committee] has been handed over to the local Museum of History. The free space has been obtained thanks to the reduction of the gorkom's personnel.

The question of reducing the governing apparatus of the Ukraine Central Committee Communist Party and its thorough reorganization was discussed at the briefing held at the press center of the Ukraine Central Committee Communist Party.

Leonind Novokhatko, in charge of the press center, said at the briefing:

[Begin Novokhatko recording] Not only the apparatus of the Communist Party of Ukraine Central Committee is subject of reduction and reorganization. This also applies to all local party organs. All this is connected with the need to change their functions. What I mean is to strengthen such functions as consultation, prognostication, making analysis, information providing, sociological research; in other words, the functions linked with servicing the elective party organ.

In general, the apparatus of local party organs, such as raykoms [rayon party committee], gorkoms, and obkoms [oblast party committee] are to be reduced by 40 percent, and the apparatus of the Ukraine Central Committee Communist Party by 45 percent. [passage omitted] Some departments of the Ukraine Central Committee Communist Party will entirely be dissolved. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Kravchuk Previews Supreme Soviet Session

PM1409085490 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Sep 90 Second Edition p 1

[Report by PRAVDA correspondents M. Odinets and I. Tikhomirov under the "Response" rubric: "Act Was Unlawful"]

[Text] Yesterday in Kiev, L. Kravchuk, chairman of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, gave a press conference. He talked about the work of the session of the republic's parliament which opens 1 October. First and foremost this means questions of economic autonomy, the transition to market relations, and the preparation for concluding the Union treaty.

L. Kravchuk reported on the sitting of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium held the day before and said that it had repealed a number of unlawful acts by soviets of various levels on the dismantling of monuments to Lenin as well as the decision of the Lvov Oblast Soviet Presidium to transfer the PRAVDA correspondents' center to another oblast. The document was not adopted fully unanimously but the majority agreed that the Lvov decision is unlawful. This is a question of a flagrant violation of the law, L. Kravchuk stressed, and the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet must act in its defense. If we want to be a rule-of-law state, such actions cannot be tolerated.

Meanwhile it was also said that complex processes are taking place in the western oblasts of the Ukraine and that they must not be treated lightly. There must be a profound and thoughtful analysis and various aspects of life must be illustrated appropriately with a sober and realistic approach.

Donetsk Workers Appeal to Public Movements

PM1409100690 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
11 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report by Nikolay Lisovenko under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Call for Concord"]

[Text] Donetsk—The "Butovka-Donetsk" Mine Labor Collective Council, sewing workers at the Volodarskiy factory, and staffers of the Kiyevskiy Rayon and Voroshilovskiy Rayon departments of the Donetsk militia have adopted an "Appeal" to leaders of democratic movements and public organizations and the oblast's population.

This anxious document notes that the sociopolitical situation in Donetsk Oblast remains difficult. Shortages of goods, housing, and food products—all this agitates people, and hence all sorts of rallies, picketing, hunger strikes, and so forth are constantly held in cities and settlements. As a rule, many people turn out to see and hear these events, where the protesters' ambitions often get the better of reason. In order to avoid matters getting out of hand, militia workers have to be in constant readiness, and this means that additional forces from the Criminal Investigations Department, the patrol-guard service, and the State Automobile Inspectorate have to be brought in to protect public order and the safety of the participants in the mass events. But sending them to a rally means diverting them from their main job, which is preventing and solving crimes. The Donetsk militia have too much of this main work as it is: As of today 27,000 crimes have been committed in the oblast, including 259 murders, 832 robberies, and 69 thefts. In view of such an alarming state of affairs, the miners, sewing workers, and militiamen call on the population of the Donbass to unite on the basis of the principles of civic awareness and collective responsibility for the fate of democracy.

"It is not the extremist slogans of loudmouths at rallies, or the constant threat of strikes and hunger strikes, but civil peace, concord, and mutual understanding, together with the conscientious labor of all, which is the path to improving the people's life"—these are the words which conclude the "Appeal," which is being read in all the collectives in the Donbass.

Caucasus

Armenian 'Terrorists' Refuse To Surrender Arms

PM1409100190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
13 Sep 90 First Edition p 2

[TASS report under the "Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow" rubric: "Shots Continue"]

[Text] Exactly a month remains before the expiration of the deadline stipulated by a USSR presidential decree for surrendering weapons. However, reports coming in from Armenia testify that, as before, weapons remain in the hands of terrorists and are brought into play virtually daily.

In Artashakskiy Rayon criminals who ignored the requests of members of the law and order organs opened fire on them, wounding one. One of the terrorists was killed as a result of retaliatory measures.

On the evening of 11 September five people, including two children with firearms wounds, were delivered to an Internal Troops military unit from the Khodzhavend locality in the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic.

On the same day a military detail was bombarded from Armenia's Vardenisskiy Rayon. A border troops subunit also came under attack from the Armenian side near the village of Yukhary Ayrum in Azerbaijan's Kelbadzharskiy Rayon.

Weapons are being confiscated by Armenia's law and order organs. In Mashtatskiy Rayon a homemade mortar, grenades, and ammunition were confiscated from the headquarters of the "Vrizhar" detachment. In Yekhegnadzorskiy Rayon a hail gun was discovered and delivered to an Internal Affairs rayon department. Unfortunately, the quantity of confiscated weapons is minimal and no weapons have been voluntarily surrendered in the last 24 hours.

Armenia-Azerbaijan Border Conflict Continues

Misunderstandings Persist

PM1309113790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Sep 90 First Edition p 4

[Report by special correspondent Colonel V. Gavrilenko under the rubric "Nagorno-Karabakh: Uneasy Situation": "Mountains of Sorrow"]

[Text] Stepanakert-Moscow—The dogged "chopper" climbed higher and higher, opening up to us the majestic green mountains. We could have gone into raptures and tugged at each other's sleeves, pointing out these incredible beauties. But we stayed silent. The wind was whistling through the cabin—all the windows were open. They had been turned into embrasures. Submachine gun barrels were looking at the uneasy greenery of the mountains. A sad reality of our days—green mountains of sorrow.... Somewhere here on their slopes lies the black trace of the tragedy of the Yak passenger aircraft. Here, on these slopes, shots ring out and blood is shed. Here, on these slopes, the border between two republics—for long years a conventional border—has suddenly become very tangible.

We landed on a small site near the school in Kelbadzhar. We made the acquaintance of Colonel A. Savchenko, sector commandant, and Lieutenant Colonel A. Voronov, commander of an Internal Troops subunit.

The commandant has many cares, but there is one to which all commandants of border sectors devote the lion's share of efforts—reconciling the warring sides. Aleksandr Grigoryevich communicates constantly with the leadership of two neighboring rayons—Azerbaijan's Kelbadzharskiy Rayon and Armenia's Vardenisskiy Rayon. He has already received agreement in principle to talks. Neither side seems to refuse, but every time some circumstances arise at the last moment and the meetings fall through. Savchenko shook his head with regret: "I know these circumstances.... Fear. Particularly on the other side. The armed fraternity rules the roost there...."

This "armed fraternity" also causes a lot of trouble for Lt. Col. A. Voronov. I leafed through a journal with him—I do not know what it was called: combat operations journal, maybe. Entries followed one after another—exchanges of fire every night at Internal Troops posts. Three of them are particularly "hot"—near Mount Konchurgay (2,700 meters above sea level), near the small town of Suyudly (2,200 meters), and in the region of the Alagel Lakes (2,800 meters). The position of the last is also complicated by the fact that here the territory of Azerbaijan juts into Armenian territory like a narrow neck, and the post is fired on from practically all sides. Aleksandr Ivanovich turned the next page:

"And here a battle with a large armed group.... We took two guerrillas who had a carbine and a submachine gun, as well as much besides.... I will show you now...."

The "trophies" had been laid out right on the floor in the school corridor. Weapons. A large quantity of ammunition. Explosives. Detonators and igniter cords. Signal shells. A radio set. Medical supplies. And... a packet of disposable syringes. The medicines also included some containing narcotics.

Who are they, these guerrillas? Armenian National Army detachments which have not laid down their arms? I do not know. But while they exist, there is a danger of armed clashes. The Azerbaijani side's present restraint is by no means a carefree expectation. Last winter I saw how Azerbaijani armed groups can operate. They are in no way inferior to the present Armenian ones: either in the degree of organization, or in armaments, or in decisiveness, or—let us call things by their proper name—in cruelty. So, is it war? Self-destruction? A repeat of 1918-1919, when Armenian dashnaks and Azerbaijani musavatists used weapons to clarify their relations? Meanwhile, the people suffered and the region fell into neglect. Does history really teach nothing?

Again the helicopter climbed doggedly up into the mountains. We were flying toward the Alagel Lakes, to the post No. 7. There an exchange of fire had been rumbling all night. Lt. Col. A. Voronov pointed out the nearby hills from which the fire had come. With Captain Valentin Balandin, post chief, we walked round this small garrison lost among the emerald hills of the high mountains.

Soldiers sometimes spend whole nights in these trenches. Sheltering from bullets, answering fire from the dark hills. This makes service here particularly difficult and dangerous. It is also difficult because they get little sleep and it is difficult to run—there is a lack of oxygen. And also because it is excruciatingly difficult for a guy drafted from somewhere near Kostroma to understand why, for the sake of what there is this cruel—yet from a military viewpoint pointless—shooting here every night. But the intention is to put the soldier off balance so that, after sitting all night under fire, in the morning he writes a letter home and tells his mother about everything. So that she and other mothers march to the city's central square with a poster demanding "Bring our sons back from the Transcaucasus."

A base intention. An intention to make the peoples of the Transcaucasus quarrel with the Russian soldier, with the Russian people. But this happened in Azerbaijan last winter! Then healthy forces gained the upper hand, and that wave died down. Now others have taken over the baton.

In Stepanakert it is possible to read two words on almost every wall—"Artsakh" and "Miatsum." Artsakh is the Armenian name for Nagorno-Karabakh. Miatsum is a call for reunification with the motherland. I realize that this is of very great concern to every Armenian heart. But if you argue from positions of common sense and respect for the sovereign rights of Union republics, it turns out that one republic is claiming part of another's territory.

Of course, the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast], forming an autonomous part of Azerbaijan, has not achieved economic prosperity over the past decades. Although, compared with other parts of the republic, matters have been better there. Nevertheless, at a session of the republic committee on the NKAO in Stepanakert, which I recently attended, its chairman—Viktor Petrovich Polyanichko, second secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee—frankly admitted: "Throughout these 70 years the republic has taken little interest in Karabakh. We are now trying to make up for lost time."

They seem to have taken this matter seriously. Schools, hospitals, housing, clubs, and culture centers are being constructed. Regardless of the ethnic makeup of cities and settlements. Communications, the financial system, health care, and education have been thoroughly tackled. Of course, you cannot resolve overnight the problems which have built up over years and even decades. It takes time. And the two communities inhabiting Karabakh have a need, an acute need, of calm.

But, unfortunately, emotions, mutual grudges, and mistrust still rule the roost in Karabakh. The good intentions of the republican authorities come up against a wall of misunderstanding, concealed resistance, and even sabotage. Under such conditions it is difficult, very difficult, for the people of Karabakh to do good.

It is not easy to write about Karabakh: Everything there is so interwoven and tangled. Event follows event, one superimposed on another.... I would not like to end on this note, but what can you do?—things are still sad and uneasy in this area of green mountains. And yet people live on hopes. I remember finding myself in the home of G. Tsaturyan, a resident of the settlement of Kirkindzhan. My host Grigoriy Vartanovich and his wife Yermonya Sumbatovna are ordinary, sincere people. Grigoriy Vartanovich was a front-line soldier, his whole chest covered with decorations, and he is one of the oldest and most respected people in the settlement. We sat drinking tea with bramble preserves. No, the front-line soldier did not complain or count up grudges, although he has reason to do so. At one moment he fumbled in his jacket pocket and brought out a handful of flattened bullets: "I picked them out of the house walls and windows...." Nevertheless, speaking about the future, he emphasized these words: "We have nowhere to go from here, neither these nor the others. We will go on living on this land as we have done."

Staffers Begin Hunger Strike

LD1309171390 Moscow TASS in English 1612 GMT 13 Sep 90

[By TASS correspondent Vadim Byrkin]

[Text] Stepanakert September 13 TASS—Thirteen staff members of the Askeran regional party committee in Nagorno-Karabakh went on a hunger strike on Wednesday to protest the Azerbaijani authorities' decision to disband several regional party and executive committees here and attempts to replace them by provisional organisational bureaus.

Although tensions have slightly eased, the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh is still unstable. Shootings, the pelting of cars with stones and hostage taking are commonplace in the region.

An address from the military commandant in the area urging the population not to give in to provocations and observe the state of emergency has been broadcast through loudspeakers on armoured vehicles for the second day now. The curfew has been extended by one hour.

Georgian Movie Director Returns Lenin Prize

PM1409102590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Sep 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Report from Tbilisi filed by correspondent Besik Urigashvilii under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Lenin Prize Rejected"]

[Text] Rezo Chkheidze, well-know Georgian movie director and director of the Gruziyafilm Movie Studio, has rejected the Lenin Prize awarded him for the film "Your Son, the Land."

He has stated that he is returning the decoration, prize-winner's diploma, and monetary award to the USSR Committee for Lenin and State Prizes.

In an open letter to USSR President M.S. Gorbachev published in the republic newspaper KOMUNISTI Chkheidze writes that it was Lenin and the other Bolshevik leaders—Stalin, Trotskiy, and Ordzhonikidze—who were to blame for the occupation of Georgia in 1921, when the Red Army entered the Georgian Democratic Republic. The time has come, the letter says, when every one of us should get rid of everything connected with an antihuman and obsolete system of thinking and values.

Let us note that the prize was awarded to the movie director four years ago.